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OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM:
A Preference-Based Ethical Theory
ABSTRACT
There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns
individual preferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived,
can satisfy individual preferences and interests better than amorality or immorality.
What is unclear, however, is whether these preferences are those individuals
actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate
this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethics that relies on individual
preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literature to date.
"Occurrent contractarianism," as I have called it, is rooted in our social-
psychological state. Given the characteristics we have, and given the social
situation in which we are embedded, the best resolve we have of furthering our
individually defined preferences is to adopt and adhere to a moral system.
Occurrent contractarianism remains true to the original contractarian insight; that
morality is a rational institution, capable of being designed for and adhered to even
by non-tuistic rational beings following merely their own occurrent preferences.
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There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns
individual preferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived,
can satisfy individual preferences and interests better than amorality or
immorality. What is unclear, however, is whether these preferences are those
individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is
to investigate this question.
In my dissertation, I introduce a version of contractarian ethics that relies
on individual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the
literature to date. One of the fundamental tenets of contractarianism is that
morality must be individually motivating. The merit of this approach is that
contractarianism is committed to keeping a wary eye on human nature; it is a
psychologically realist position. What humans are psychologically capable of
matters. The problem is that the concept of morality is often depicted as being
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precisely antithetical to individual self interest. Morality is designed partly to curb
self-interest. It appears to be in my interest to steal, but it is immoral to do so. If
rationality is defined as a tool to maximize individual preference, whatever that
preference may be, then there is little hope, evidently, of linking morality to
individual motivation. Recent contractarian answers to this problem focus
primarily on the claim that it is not really in my or anyone's self-interest to steal
(or cheat, lie, murder, etc.). In the long term, given the social context of human
lives, one does better, individually defined, to live within and according to a
moral structure. David Gauthier (1986) believed that so long as an ethical theory
appeals to considered self-interest, we have a solution to the paradox of
constraining self-interest on self-interested grounds. My criticism of appeals to
considered self-interest is that morality becomes standard-bound, not
preference-based. What counts as "considered" depends on standards
independent of the individual's preferences. If we appeal to standards that
determine what interests individuals should possess, then it follows that a
particular moral rule is really in a person's self-interest to abide (not merely to
have others abide) whether or not that person thinks so. Appealing to standards
that have no necessary connection to individual preferences is to abrogate the
raison d'etre of contractarian ethics.  Consider: a perfectly sensible question is to
ask in what way is this standard more motivating to me than any given actual
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preference I may happen to have. If contractarians wish to remain committed to
psychological realism, the answer must be: "None whatsoever." And this is a
problem for contractarians. My solution is to appeal to one's occurrent interests.
Occurrent interests are longer standing than mere whims, but the direction and
value of these occurrent interests is to be determined exclusively by the agent
herself. 
My thesis is divided into four parts. The first concerns two preliminary
chapters addressing the issue of what contractarian moral theory is and to which
ethical tradition it applies. The meat of the thesis begins in part II. The emphasis
in part II is to flesh out what should properly count as self-interest and rationality.
Part III introduces what I call "Occurrent Contractarianism." It takes the lessons
we have learned about preferences and rationality from part II and shows how
we can derive a system of moral strictures and obligations based on occurrent
preferences. Part of this endeavour makes use of recent work in game theory.
Part IV investigates the political and social implications of occurrent
contractarianism, focusing predominantly on its link to libertarian thought.
PART I: PRELIMINARIES
Chapter 1 introduces contractarian moral theory and can be safely skipped by
anyone already familiar with contractarian thought. Chapter 2 responds to
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modern critiques of the ethical tradition in which contractarianism is part. The
focus of my thesis remains solely within the confines of contractarian thought.
My main concern is what shape contractarian theory should take. The question
whether anyone should accept contractarian theory, whatever its shape, thus
remains for the most part ignored. Part I and particularly chapter 2 is my attempt
at remedying to some degree this question.
PART II: SELF-INTEREST
Part II explores the complicated issue of self-interest. For contractarians to
remain loyal to their roots by appealing to individual self-interest, we cannot
have ethicists determining in isolation what any given individual's motivations
really are. There must be a clear tie to what the individual agent's motivations
actually are if there is to be any appeal to them. Preferences must be weighted
by the individual herself.  Chapter 3 looks at the traditional contractarian account
of self-interest. Chapter 4 surveys modern accounts that attempt, or so I argue,
to objectify self-interest so that it easier accords with moral theory. Chapter 5
explicates what I mean by occurrent preferences; those preferences upon which
I build  my contractarian theory in part III. Chapter 6 investigates some problems
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with the traditional model of rationality upon which preference-based theories of
morality are largely dependent.
PART III: OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM
Part III explores the equally complicated issue of how this preference-based
notion of self-interest relates to morality. Reliance on standard-bound
preferences can solve prisoner dilemmas more easily than occurrent-based
versions. This is so simply because the dominant preference-bound strategy is
to defect. If we can appeal to the sorts of preferences we should have, this can
easily override our more short-sighted straightforward maximizing strategies.
Troubles, however, begin. So long as we leave it to the individual to rank her
own preferences there is no guarantee that they will match what an ethicist may
have deemed appropriate. It would appear that as much as we want a principle
to determine when to appeal to standard-bound preferences and when to appeal
to occurrent or actual ones, the more simply incompatible the two sorts of
preferences are. One is a preference simpliciter, and the other is what a rational
preference should be. The resolution is found within recent work in game theory.
What game theoretic results show is that we can reach an (albeit minimal)
ethical domain through occurrent preferences by the added appeal to
agreement. It is this feature that makes contractarianism the successful theory
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compared to other theories that also seek to ground morality in rational self-
interest. Occurrent contractarianism is not a form of ethical egoism. It does not
say simply: “Do whatever is in your occurrent interests." This is the state of
nature, after all, and contractarians are anxious to escape the state of nature. As
Gauthier argues, the moral sphere is not a parametric game, where actors take
themselves to be the sole variable in a fixed environment. Rather, agents
interact with others, and interaction involves strategic choice. Game theory is the
tool to help us investigate the ramifications of strategic choice. What is in my
interest must be tempered by necessity with what is in your interest. If we wish to
interact, and we assume we both see and want the benefits of mutual
cooperation, our individual interests must be compromised somewhat. Occurrent
self-interest, then, is already necessarily constrained by contractarian principles
since contractarianism emphasizes the furthering of self-interest within the
confines of an interpersonal arena. "Occurrent contractarianism," as I have
called it, is rooted in our social-psychological state. Given the characteristics we
have, and given the social situation in which we are embedded, the best resolve
we have of furthering our individually defined preferences is to adopt and adhere
to a moral system. Contractarianism thus, remains true to its original insight; that
morality is a rational institution, capable of being designed for and adhered to by
non-tuistic rational beings following merely their own occurrent preferences.
Murray
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The layout of Part III is as follows: Chapter 7 introduces the theory of
occurrent contractarianism. Chapter 8 explores how a moral theory based on
occurrent preferences can nevertheless yield duties, obligations, and the
legitimate enforcement of those duties and obligations. Chapter 9 presents a
summary of recent game-theoretic results that help support the conclusions of
chapter 8. The contents of Chapter 10, focusing on the problems and limited
applicability of game theoretic results, qualifies the findings raised in chapter 9.
Chapter 10 is the most technical of the chapters and can be skipped without loss
of continuity.
PART IV: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
Part IV of my thesis explores the social and political implications of occurrent
contractarianism. Of particular interest is my claim that occurrent
contractarianism cannot serve as a foundation for libertarianism. This may seem
surprising since there is much overlap in policy endorsement between
contractarianism and libertarianism. After all, if it is a matter of occurrent
interests that decide cooperative strategies, we cannot be forced to provide the
satisfaction, or the means to satisfaction, of others' interests that we do not have
unless we can be compensated sufficiently. Good consequences are defined by
the individuals themselves on contractarian grounds. The procedural focus of
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contractarianism means that contractarians will not necessarily adopt whatever
political system leads to the best, objectively defined, results. Given this, it is
beside the point for libertarians to tell us what those best results are -- at least, if
their intent is to show that libertarianism is grounded on contractarianism.
Chapter 11 explores the schism between Locke and Hobbes. Hobbes
represents the contractarian in this debate, and Locke the libertarian. This
chapter is not intended to be simply an historical account. Hobbes is wrong in a
fundamental way and I attempt to fix his political conclusions based on what he
could legitimately claim if he were an occurrent contractarian. Both Locke and
this altered Hobbes will praise limited government. The focus of the chapter,
however, is to show that they will agree for very different reasons. These
different reasons carry over to the distinction between modern libertarianism and
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1.1 THE NATURE OF MORAL THEORY
Only recently have we started to build a secular ethic.  The prejudice of religion1
has marred the way for scientific insight ever since its ungainly inception. For a
number of us, this prejudice has finally been torn asunder. But what sort of
secular ethic are we entitled to get? The question is not, by the way, to ask why
we have a moral institution if there were no God. The answer may be that people
thought incorrectly that there was a God and that this God would punish people
for certain acts. Our concern is: even if morality arose through religious belief,
why did the religious elite pick out these acts to brandish as right or wrong rather
than others. Removing the possibility of divine insight (which would not help
matters anyway for we would simply ask why did God pick out these acts rather
than others), we assume there must be pragmatic reasons for the selection of
these acts over others. If the pragmatic reason is simply the furthering the
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      See chapter 2 in this thesis for a defence of the reductionist2
strategy against the criticisms of anti-theorists.
      John Stuart Mill should also be given credit for furthering secular3
ethics. See, particularly his attack against the intolerance of
religious dogmatism in his On Liberty, Elizabeth Rapaport (ed.), Hackett
Publishing Co. [1859] 1978.
interests of the religious elders solely, then this grounding will not do for us now.
What we want to know, then, is not simply how ethics came about, but is it a
good thing now to maintain a moral institution. In other words, what is in it for us
to be moral?
It is important to realize that by asking this question I am committed to a
purely reductionist approach to ethics.  I do not care how people are moral.2
Presumably they were taught to be. I want to know in what way morality can be
built from purely amoral grounds. Whether or not this is why we are moral, it will
help to show the mechanics of morality. The claim I will argue for in this thesis is
that it is rational on purely self-interested terms to adopt and to act on moral
dispositions.
In this project, I propose to build an ethical theory devoid of a priori moral
or religious assumptions. I am not unique in this attempt and do not pretend to
be. Parfit cited Hume and Nietzsche as two notable atheist ethicists.  He did not3
consider Hobbes, however, because Hobbes of course was a theist. But unlike
other theists, Hobbes crafted an ethic that was independent of religious belief.
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The outcome of that project is a theory we call today "contractarianism."  This is
the theory that interests me. It interests me more than other secular attempts at
morality, for example utilitarianism, because contractarianism is motivating in
ways that utilitarianism is not. My project is a refinement of contractarianism.
What follows in this preliminary is an overview of contractarian ethics. The
remaining part of the thesis will focus on modifications of this skeletal frame
focusing predominantly on the nature of preferences and self-interest. I do not
pretend that other aspects do not also require further clarification or emendation.
1.2 CONTRACTARIANISM
In brief, Contractarianism is the theory that what is moral is derived through
interactions with people. Contractarianism holds that morality serves a purpose,
and that is to better enable individuals with disparate aspirations to cohabit
peacefully. As individuals prosper within a moral realm, as compared to an
amoral realm, it is in each individual's self-interest to live in a moral domain. As
the moral domain can not flourish without general obedience to the moral
dictates that system advocates, it is, indirectly, in each individual's self-interest
to obey the moral dictums. Morality is founded on self-interest.
Since morality is man-made for the purpose of securing the interests of
disparate people, what is "moral" must meet individual interests. It is assumed
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that what people voluntarily and freely agree to is what is in the individuals'
interests. Thus, the contractarian credo may be put thus:
In order for an act to be considered moral, all people concerned in
the act, including the repercussions of the act if any, must
voluntarily agree or can be reasonably assumed they would
voluntarily agree.
Its negative, although redundant, thesis is this:
Any act by people that negatively affects others who have not
voluntarily agreed to being so affected is necessarily an immoral
act.
Who the concerned parties are is a crucial matter for contractarianism. It
is not the case that anyone off the street who whines about an agreement made
between people other than herself should be sufficient to render their agreement
null or impermissible. The whining must be justified. The dissenter must be
affected in the requisite way in order to squelch the agreements of others. The
requisite way typically is conceived as harm. The appeal to the harm principle is
supposed to rule out busybodies who interfere in others' lives for no good
reason. That Barney doesn't like Betty's having a nose ring is not thought to
count as warranting the banishing of nose rings. The concept of harm, however,
is not clearly defined. Barney may really feel "harmed" by people wearing nose
rings, albeit in a non-physical way. It would be simple if contractarians could
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      cf. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, James W.4
Ellington (trans.) Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981 [1785], 31
[423].
speak of only "physical harms" when they speak of "harms," but this is not right.
Imposed psychological harms cannot be permissible in moral theory. Some
criterion of normalacy is required. If someone is harmed by all sorts of things
that normal people are not, this individual must be deemed an unreliable
measuring rod of harm. What should count as "normal harm," however, is still
admittedly vague.
The intent of contractarianism is to permit a maximum amount of negative
liberty. You can do anything you want, so long as your actions either effect no
one, or you get the consent (possibly through negotiation and compensation) of
those your actions affect. This is an easy principle to apply in countless
situations. Contractarian principles determine the procedure to test the morality
of any given action. It is important to recognize that contractarianism does not
mean that the resulting content of any appropriately applied contractarian
procedure is necessarily a universal moral dictum in the way that Kant thought.
The condition of universalizability for Kant focused on the content of moral
actions. That it is wrong for me to waste my talents means it is wrong for
everyone to waste their talents.  The universalizability condition for4
contractarians focuses on the universalizable use of the contractarian
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      I ignore, although Paul Viminitz urges me not to, the possibility5
that legal euthanasia will merely increase the likelihood of camouflaged
murder. It is a burden, financially if not emotionally, on the
descendants to keep grampa alive. Life insurance premiums and wills may
also make it profitable for family members to stage unwarranted "mercy
killings."
procedure; not the universalizability of the results of any particular use of the
procedure. Whatever meets uncoerced agreement from concerned parties is
morally permissible. Acting on what does not meet this condition is immoral. That
Sally agrees to have sex with Tom does not mean she agrees to have sex with
everyone. Or if Sally decides not to have sex with Tom, it does not (necessarily)
mean she regards sex for everyone as immoral. Under the contractarian aegis, if
one wonders whether a considered act is moral or not, ask simply, do all parties
affected by this act agree, or is it conceivable that they would agree if they were
rational. We assume that my taking a stranger's purse is not an act that the
stranger would consent to. Theft in general will fail the contractarian test as will
everything else that is harmful and non-consensual. Euthanasia should be
permitted so long as only those concerned agree.  Another example where5
contractarianism is clear concern cases of homosexuality. So long as all parties
involved voluntarily consent to homosexual acts, nothing is immoral about it. To
disagree is to explicitly reject contractarian principles. The claim would be that it
is an immoral act, whether or not the people involved consent. But claiming
Murray 8
      One might (unsuccessfully, mind you) claim to be a contractarian6
while disallowing certain homosexual acts on the grounds that consent
must be between rational or perhaps normal individuals. One would then
disallow homosexuality on the grounds that homosexuals are abnormal or
irrational. To claim it is abnormal and that therefore is immoral is
simply to beg the question, however. Surely part of morality is to
tolerate differences among people, not to exacerbate them. To claim that
homosexuality is in some sense "irrational" would also be difficult to
back.
      This is a point Bernard Williams and Alisdaire MacIntyre do not7
fully appreciate when they argue that the existence of moral dilemmas
proves the implacability of foundationalist normative theories such as
contractarianism. See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of
Philosophy, London, Fontana Press, 1985, ch. 8 and Alisdaire MacIntyre,
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Philosophy, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame
University Press, 1984, 6-18.
homosexuality to be "immoral" just like that is driven by a mere aesthetic or
religious fervour that has no place in contractarian moral theory.6
Contractarianism, thus, protects individual liberty; forbids the standard
"immoral" acts, such as murder, rape, theft, assault, fraud; and offers fairly clear
resolutions to many current social issues. A precautionary note may be
necessary. The mere application of contractarian principles cannot resolve all
moral debates. Disagreements may be about matters of fact or definition.
Whether a fetus is a person that deserves to be granted hypothetical assent to
abortion is not a matter the theory of contractarianism can say anything about.
Contractarianism is not a panacea to good sense.  Typically, moral conflicts7
involve disagreement on which theory to apply, and not on how to apply it.
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1.3 SOME CRITICISMS
Contractarianism is not criticized for what it can do, however, but for what it fails
to do. If two people agree to row a boat, and this action does not adversely affect
others not party to the agreement, nothing could be immoral about the act, or so
contractarians would avow. Many strongly protest. It is often supposed, for
example, that one's moral duty is to give positive aid to the suffering. That two
people consent to row a boat may then be immoral, according to these objectors,
if a third were drowning and they were rowing the boat away from the victim.
Morality, it is claimed, must require more than mere agreements; in fact, morality
must impose strictures on the content of particular agreements. If so,
contractarianism fails to ground morality.
The contractarian motto is that any agreement is legitimate so long as it
does not adversely affect others. The question before us is whether or not the
drowning victim was harmed by the rowers' failure to rescue him. If the drowning
victim had a claim right against these two rowers to be saved, then their failing to
save him does adversely affect him. But the victim has no such claim right under
contractarian theory, and so cannot be considered to be harmed by the suspect
rowers. Within the contractarian tradition, "harm" has been defined in relation to
a baseline. If an individual is made worse off than she was, this counts as harm.
If you are drowning with your wallet in your pocket, your baseline is the state of
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      I will ignore the complications that death creates. If you do drown,8
then your baseline is so low that nothing could worsen your state. Thus,
seemingly, taking a dead man's wallet may not be morally inadmissible.
If the dead man had a will, however, perhaps that wallet, or its
contents, were to be given to someone else, in which case it would be
immoral to take the wallet, since it reduces the baseline of the
beneficiary.
      This is Kai Nielsen's injunction in his "Capitalism, Socialism, and9
Justice," in T. Regan and D. Van DeVeere (eds.) And Justice for All,
Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1982, 264-286.
drowning with your wallet. Thus, failing to save you will not count as harming you
since you will still be drowning with your wallet. Taking your wallet before you
drown will be "harming" you for it worsens your state relative to your baseline.8
Thus contractarians are consistent in maintaining that rowing away from the
victim is morally permissible.
This does not answer the problem, really. The complaint is not that
contractarians are inconsistent; it is that they are immoral, or, more formally, that
their theory of morality fails to capture morality. Knowing why contractarians
claim that the two rowers are not harming the drowning man does not convince
many that the two rowers are thereby moral. Some think it is "morally monstrous"
that a moral theory will have nothing to say to someone who allows another
person to drown.9
Defenders of contractarianism are for the most part baffled and
embarrassed by this complaint. Their confusion is understandable. The
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      Hampton has reservations about Gauthier's hypothetical10
contractarianism, but she does not venture to explain her reluctance.
(Jean Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition,  Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988, 266, nt.7.) I suspect it is a
misplaced concern for his appeal to considered preferences that I too
have grave doubts about (see chapter 4 in this thesis).
      David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in Eugene Miller (ed.),11
David Hume - Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, Indianapolis:
complaint leaves the boundaries of discourse in which contractarians speak.
They are interested in devising a moral theory devoid of appeals to emotions
and intuitions. But this objection throws these intuitions and emotions back into
the ring. They refuse to play the contractarians' game. Defenders of
contractarianism feel, I suspect, that they are not allowed to have these
emotions and intuitions since they are trying to build a moral theory independent
of them. But nothing is further from the truth. That we have sympathies to help
others will motivate us to help those others. Nothing in contractarian theory will
ever forbid acting on one's naturally felt motivations. Simply, they profess that
we cannot demand others to act on the motivations that we feel. It is an ethic of
toleration; not totalitarianism.
1.4 HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACTARIANISM
The currently favoured version of contractarianism may be called hypothetical
contractarianism.  The origin of hypothetical contractarianism stems from the10
criticisms Hume raised.  The grounds of political or moral institutions is certainly11
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LibertyClassics, 1987, pt. II, Essay XII, 465-487.
      Hume, 474.12
not founded on some original contract. Conquest and the wielding of power is a
more historically accurate portrayal of the foundation of political obedience.
Moreover, even if political sovereignty were founded on an original contract,
there is no good reason why we are bound to what would be an ancient and
possibly barbaric document.
Different from original contractarianism is explicit contractarianism.
Whatever people explicitly agree to, so long as there are no negative
externalities, is necessarily morally permissible. Anything that harms another
that was not explicitly agreed upon is classified as immoral. It is a large
concession, really, that Hume recognized explicit agreements are a perfectly
legitimate ground for morality. The consent of the people is not only a “just
foundation of government...It is surely the best and most sacred of any.”  The12
problem is that legitimacy based solely on explicit agreement is not practical on
a large scale. We can not expect explicit agreement on every action of the state
before we deem an act morally permissible. There are just too many people, and
often one needs to act quickly. Political obedience must be justified, if it is to be
justified at all, on grounds other than explicit agreement.
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Granting the impracticality of explicit consent, some have understood
contractarianism as granting legitimacy to political institutions on the basis of
implicit consent. Implicit consent is the belief that so long as you benefit from
some aspects of a political structure, you have thereby given consent to all other
aspects of that political reign. The problem is that this will include something to
which, had I known, I would not have given my consent. Implicit
contractarianism, at any rate, is similar to explicit contractarianism except it is
not dependent on time-consuming verbal or written agreements. Some things we
can safely assume. In epistemology, even, it may well be reasonable to assume
things otherwise unverifiable. It is a good bet, for example, that my chair
continues to exist during those intermissions when no one perceives it. Likewise
for certain moral justifications. For example, voting is one means of trying to
come close to getting explicit agreement. It is not a particularly successful
method. To begin with, my choice is highly restricted at the outset. And
secondly, my voting for Smith, on this system, somehow confers my consent to
Jones getting elected (when more people, however ill-informed, voted for
Jones). Or when I vote for Smith because I like his policy on education, say,
society assumes for purposes of convenience that I voted for all of Smith's
policies. Once Smith has been voted in, he no longer needs explicit consent for
everything that he does, even if it goes against many of my preferences. The
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time saved is surely beneficial. Smith can achieve many more things if he only
requires my implicit consent rather than my explicit consent. Moreover, I can get
on with my own pursuits without being interrupted by annoying polls. But the
assumptions we make about people's preferences are far less sure than the safe
assumptions we make in epistemology. The Laws convinced Socrates of the
binding force of implicit agreements in the Crito.  Because Socrates did not13
complain when he was born and educated in the state, and did not leave Athens,
he thereby ought have no complaint against being executed by the state. This
absurd result is enough to cast doubt on grounding morality on implicit
agreements.
Being hurt by another's action does not necessarily mean it goes against
contractarian principles. If one has agreed to partake in a sport or a business in
which being hurt is part of the known risk, that one is hurt will count as an aspect
of the agreement. Thus becoming bankrupt because a competitor has out-bid
you does not count as being harmed by the competitor. Presumably you have
agreed to the framework in which business is transacted, and this includes the
opportunity for new businesses to emerge. It is not clear that implicit consent
works this way even for business transactions, however. It is questionable
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whether you have agreed to all the risks of, say, working in an industry. Severe,
debilitating accidents that could have been foreseen and prevented by one's
superiors are not the sort of things to which right-minded individuals would likely
consent.
Hypothetical contractarianism solves the problems inherent in the earlier
forms of contractarianism. The acid test is in deciding what would be reasonable
for an individual to have consented to, suitably situated and with sufficient
knowledge. It would not be reasonable to accept being blinded in the course of
one’s work, and thus being blinded can not count as being part of the bargain. 
Although Hobbes believed we have a duty to accept everything the
sovereign doles out to us, the foundation of the contract is not implicit in this
sense. For as Hume points out, the implicit agreement would hold even if some
tyrant took over the state "by violence" and people submitted to them "by
necessity."  There is no philosophical or moral reason for why we are bound to14
observe our tacit promises. For Hume, allegiance to one's government is not due
to an implicit agreement, nor an original agreement. Rather, "allegiance and
fidelity are both submitted to by mankind, on account of the apparent interests
and necessities of human society."  I maintain that this is precisely the emphasis15
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of contractarianism, notwithstanding the usual utilitarian interpretation of this
remark.
The utilitarian flavour is derived in this way: Since it is a good for the
aggregate whole, that is its justification. But this does not capture Hume's
meaning, given his emphasis on the necessity of the benefits to the individual.
"For it is evident that every man loves himself better than any other person."16
What is required to make this into a utilitarian doctrine is the success of Mill's
proof of utility, the attempt to show how from this we ought to pursue the
happiness of everyone. But this is clearly unsuccessful. The contractarian17 
notion, instead, is that by everyone's pursuing their own happiness, within the
confines of allowing others to do the same, this best ensures the happiness of
everyone. Gauthier calls this understanding of contractarianism hypothetical
contractarianism.  Accordingly, "systems of property and government are18
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      I take exception to the first case. According to it, there is no20
need for justice if we have everything in abundance. In children, at any
rate, this does not follow. Among a thousand identical teddy bears, the
child wants only the one she's already picked out. We have, I think, a
natural possessiveness of
things, and if so, we may still require property rights (i.e. justice)
even if there is a natural abundance of things. This possessiveness does
not occur only in children, either. Consider our relation to spouses.
The claim that there are "many fish in the sea" is not comforting should
one's neighbour take one's spouse. Simply because there is plenty of
sexual prowess in one's spouse to go around, it does not follow we do
not mind if it does "go around." So long as there is emotional
attachment to things, however irrational that may be, superabundance,
alone, is not enough to render justice unnecessary.
      Gauthier, Moral Dealing, 35.21
legitimized in terms of the consent they would receive from rational persons in a
suitably characterized position of free choice."  19
Gauthier's claim is that Hume was right in objecting to explicit, original,
and implicit versions of contractarianism, but that he left unharmed hypothetical
contractarianism. In fact, Hume endorsed a form of hypothetical
contractarianism. We can see this clearly, I believe, by examining Hume's
conception of justice. Justice for Hume extends no farther than mutual
convenience and mutual advantage. This can be gleaned especially from his six
cases where justice is an unnecessary virtue.  In these cases, justice becomes20
useless to the individual. It is no longer in the individual's interest to agree to
oblige the requirements of justice. And we take this to mean, should it be rational
to agree, then it is morally permissible.21
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According to Gauthier, government dictums are legitimate hypothetically
so long as they are what rational individuals, suitably positioned, would freely
choose.  Rawls, too, so far as he is a contractarian at all, advocates22
hypothetical contractarianism when he speaks of what people would choose
from a fair choice situation. He bases his ethical and political policies not on
actual agreement between people, but on agreement reached from behind a veil
of ignorance.23
That both Gauthier and Rawls adopt hypothetical models of
contractarianism belies a stark difference between their approaches. Gauthier's
model of hypothetical contractarianism is severely restricted by what individuals
would choose under their current preference scheme. Rawls, on the other hand,
adopts a wholly unrealistic hypothetical situation, and thus his version of
hypothetical contractarianism is harder to motivate us in the real world. If part of
the raison d'être of contractarianism is to motivate rational self-interested people
to be moral, then Gauthier's realist version is preferable to Rawls's ideal version.
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      Depending on how we add up the utility scores, we can claim that25
killing an innocent baby is morally justified (the parents' happiness is
increased due to the increased freedom to pursue their own good) or
unjustified (the disutility to the infant as well as the outraged
onlookers outweighs the happiness of the parents).
1.5 APPLICATIONS
I believe with Smart that the sole purpose of philosophy is its instrumental
value.  Most writers focus on the political implications of their ethical theories,24
and others apply their theories to social problems like prostitution, euthanasia,
and same-sex bills. It is not difficult to apply a theory like contractarianism to
settle most of these disputes. The simplicity of its procedural application is far
superior, for example, to the complex and potentially nonfalsifiable methods of
utilitarianism.  Because our disputes are still raging, we can infer that it is not25
because we do not know how to apply our theories, but that we have not yet
settled on which theory to apply.
The original motivation of my interest in the philosophy of ethics is what to
do with criminals. That we should lock them up is not at issue. If offenders of our
moral theories are not punished, our moral theory is useless. My specific
concern is with rehabilitation. Criminals by and large are not unaware that
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society in general deems murder, theft, assault, fraud and the like wrong. Telling
them that it is wrong, then, does no good. Speaking to them of God does no
good for any atheist. For that matter, it may do little good for certain theists, as
well. Either the saved are already predetermined from birthright or
predetermination, or the God is a forgiving God so long as a certain incantation
is uttered at one's death bed, no matter how heinous one's deeds. Neither does
threatening imprisonment do any good for those who earn peer-reputation points
for incarceration, or for those whose status quo is less than life in prison, or for
those who believe themselves smart enough to avoid incarceration the next time.
What to do then? A strong test of any ethical theory is not to see if it passes
muster with staid academicians, but whether it can be successfully applied with
the prisoner or would-be prisoner population. Rehabilitating inmates with a
contractarian theory is more than just of academic interest. A relatively
successful psychological therapy for inmates is called "Reality Therapy" devised
by William Glasser.  Its principles come close to the philosophical theory I am26
espousing here, and its success (relative to the generally low success rate with
the  offender population) gives me some support that this theory can be
successfully implemented in the real world. Reality Therapy, in brief, appeals to
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the interests the inmate has and challenges the inmate to assess his past
attempts at satisfying those interests. The plan is to show that his own interests
are not being satisfied by his criminal projects, and thus he should learn to
change his methods of satisfying his own goals and interests.
That this therapy approach makes no appeal to transcendental notions,
but only self-interest, should not be surprising when we are dealing with a low-
morality biased population. That it nevertheless works is very informative. It




THEORY AND ANTI-THEORY IN ETHICS
There are two contrasting paradigms in ethics: theory-driven ethics (such as
Kantianism, utilitarianism, libertarianism and contractarianism) and anti-theory-
driven ethics (including virtue ethics, moral realism, non-cognitivism, and communi-
tarianism). In this chapter, I will consider three of the anti-theorists' complaints
against theory-driven ethics, focusing primarily on contractarianism. (i) Contractar-
ianism offers a narrow and distorted view of morality by being unable to generate
virtues such as generosity, kindness, and compassion. (ii) Contractarianism is
unduly restricted for being tied to stringent, antiquated models of rationality.
Moreover, rationality is not the only motive of people, and hence any pretensions
of offering a normative theory is hopelessly idealistic. (iii) Contractarianism is self-
defeating. Contractarians claim universalizability, but they fail to clearly recognize
that their theory is itself culturally biased, and hence non-universalizable. In other
words, theory ethics is ultimately grounded in the very extant cultural normative
ethical practices it was supposed to be justifying. 
I disagree. In this chapter I attempt to show why the anti-theorists' complaints
are misguided.
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2.1 THE SCOPE OF MORALITY
2.1.1 Broad and Narrow Ethics
One of the consequences of the contractarian conception of the origin of morality
is that the province of morality is restricted to interpersonal relations solely. Let us
call this the narrow view.  How one acts in relations to others may be a moral
matter, whereas it is never a moral matter, on the narrow view, when your actions
concern yourself alone.  Anti-theorists, by contrast, hold a broad view of morality.
They claim that all we need do is look at the world and we can see that morality
extends also into the intrapersonal domain.  Charles Taylor, for example holds that27
any deliberation that requires what he calls "strong evaluation,"  will be a moral28
matter. Strong evaluation consists in our discriminating right and wrong; good and
evil; noble and base; and other sorts of contrastive terms.  Accordingly, any desire29
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      One could, I suppose, believe that solely intrapersonal goals might31
matter morally so long as one held a theological perspective. One ought
to be good, say, even if alone on a desert island. In this case,
"Goodness" is not defined by interaction with others, but by some
internal code. What is "good" may be adherence to God's word, and God's
word will clearly extend to both interpersonal and intrapersonal
actions. I find such a claim implausible, but it at least has the merit
of making sense of a "very broad" conception of morality.
that involves strong evaluation is necessarily a moral decision.   Since we30
distinguish right and wrong actions even in our intrapersonal spheres of life,
morality must necessarily be "broadly" construed.
I have no qualms that we do deem some intrapersonal desires worthy of who
we are, and others unworthy, and one way to articulate this contrastive feeling is
to call one "good," the other "bad." What needs to be argued, however, is why the
mere use of these otherwise "moral" words is enough to draw the matter into the
moral purview without simply equivocating on terms. 
Anti-theorists such as communitarians believe that intrapersonal goals ought
also to play a part in morality in a way that is not merely derivative of interpersonal
goals. If one continually beats up on people, then an individual goal to control one's
aggressive urges would be a moral matter; but only derivatively so. The communi-
tarian claim is stronger than this restriction: individual goals that have no influence
on one's interpersonal goals also matter morally.  I think this "broad" reading runs31
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counter to our normal understanding of the scope of morality. Typically we believe
that not all recommendations are moral ones. For example, "Select a medium brush
for best results," is a good recommendation, but not obviously a moral
recommendation.
By contrast, contractarians claim that the narrowness of ethics follows from
the observation that people have disparate views of what the good is. Since
conceptions of the good will tend to differ, conflicts over what one ought to do will
likely arise in interpersonal relations. Morality, then, is strictly an attempt to resolve
these interpersonal conflicts. Where no interpersonal relation is, one's conception
of the good is all that matters, and so there is no need for an arbiter ("morality" for
contractarians). Once one accepts the basic premises of subjectively defined
notions of the good, the contractarian notion of "narrow" ethics would seem to
follow. If morality also seeps into the intrapersonal domain, as the broad view
advocates, then morality limits one's personal thoughts, ambitions, and goals. Such
restrictions require justification that is not forthcoming from the anti-theorists. Nor
can they explain the irony in Sartre's remark  in The Age of Reason: "Everybody
always had Boris's good in view. But it varied with each individual."
If morality is narrowly construed then the sorts of moral demands will concern
our interactions with others solely. What you do on your own is permissible so long
as it does not adversely affect others. If morality also seeps into your intrapersonal
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domain, as the broad view advocates, then morality limits one's personal thoughts,
ambitions, and goals. There will be such a thing as a "good life" that you ought to
aspire to, much in the way that Aristotle, for example, conceived it. The problem is,
this view of the good life may not be shared by everyone, and worse, not shared by
you. On this point, I agree with Mill:
All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning are
far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what
they deem his good.32
2.1.2 Justice
A criticism raised by anti-theorists against the narrow view is that it reduces morality
to justice issues. Let us first admit that many of our important decisions occur
outside the interpersonal arena. What career I should pursue or how I should best
spend my free time are matters that concern me deeply, and yet are matters about
which the narrow view of ethics could not care less (unless externalities exist). They
do not care about these intrapersonal matters not because they are insensitive
brutes, but because they recognize that people differ as to what counts as
intrapersonally important. What matters morally for the narrow view concerns only
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that area of "overlapping consensus," to use Rawls's terms.  An overlapping33
consensus is whatever reasonable people can agree on. To claim that matters
beyond this consensus ought to be politically enforced is to impose the values of
a sub-group on everyone. On the narrow view, no society has a right to demand of
its populace more than what satisfies this overlapping consensus.  It is not a
necessary condition that an overarching consensus is minimal. It may be that
everyone in a closed society believes that it is everyone's duty to profess
Catholicism at every level of society; in schools and courtrooms for example. The
overlapping consensus then would permit the church to overrule the state. Appeals
to psychological realism, however, plus the desire to peacefully associate with more
than merely one's own cultural group, precludes such thick conceptions of the
overlapping consensus. The narrow view claims that the overlapping consensus is
minimal and hence moral and political demands will also be minimal. The
consensus will entail neutral matters of justice and little else.
Communitarians can accept Rawls's notion of overlapping consensus.
Simply, they will deny that this overlapping consensus is so narrow. Why is this
overlapping consensus simply the justice answer, they will ask. There is more than
right dealing in our overlapping consensus, they claim. So why say that is all? Why
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not some common purpose in this overlapping consensus? Why not a worthwhile
goal on which everyone can agree, rather than this mere conflict resolution
procedure?
The question is sensible, it appears to me, only if we limit  the range of
disparate peoples to those who do share certain goals and values. If the
overlapping consensus is supposed to encompass all the peoples of the world, a
target to which any moral system should aspire, then this rhetorical question is
answered simply by noting that the values or the world's people are too distinct and
varied to allow overlapping consensus of such breadth. Rawls avoids this problem,
admittedly, by appealing to the overlapping consensus of only those religions,
philosophies, and morals that are reasonable.  Reasonable doctrines, in Rawls's34
understanding, are only those by which all reasonable people "can cooperate with
others on terms all can accept."   It is questionable how much import Rawls makes35
of this conception of "reasonableness." That only "reasonable" people will agree to
make justice decisions from behind the veil of ignorance is a position he seems
committed to make. But if so, his concept of "reasonableness" is stretched beyond
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plausibility. As blandly put in the text, however, it seems an acceptable criterion; we
do not expect agreement from unreasonable people.
Rawls was concerned only with political conceptions; not moral matters. It
is conceivable, in fact, that Rawls did not consider an overlapping consensus of
morality to be possible, since he viewed moral conceptions as belonging to those
comprehensive doctrines that had to be left at the threshold of a liberal political
theory.  Nothing prevents our finding an overlapping consensus among disparate36
(reasonable) moral theories in the way Rawls had done for political theories,
however. Searching for an overlapping consensus will find a paradigmatical core
agreement among the disparate peoples. For example, do not (prima facie) kill,
steal, rape, lie.
If we leave it at this negative conception, however, we can not claim that
there is a moral obligation to be charitable, or to save someone from drowning. For
this reason, the moral prescriptions appear to be identical to the narrow political
strictures of justice; hence the communitarian complaint as well as Rawls's
reluctance to apply the same test to moral theories as he does to political justice
issues.
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Egalitarians and communitarians will conceive of the scope of justice to be
fairly broad; including duties of benevolence and duties of forbearance. Libertarians
will conceive of justice as far more restricted than that, advocating merely negative
duties.  If justice were the sole content of morality, morality would be fairly broad37
on the egalitarian account and horribly narrow on the libertarian perspective.
Although contractarians indeed conceive of justice as being restricted to negative
demands of non-interference with liberty, conceiving their view of morality as
horribly "narrow" follows only if they also adhere to the claim that morality is
exhausted by justice. But they need not do so.
A more sensible view is that justice is a subset of morality. We might better
see this if we construe justice as that which is demanded. Other parts of morality
are not demands but recommendations. To disobey moral commands (justice) will
merit punishment. To disobey a moral recommendation, on the other hand, will
merit disapproval at most. Of course, if the matter is serious enough, we will do
more than disapprove; we will cut off our social intercourse with them.  Where
social intercourse has mutual benefits, these dissenters stand to lose out.
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      There will be exceptions that makes this distinction not fully38
Kantian. For example, killing someone in self-defence may well excuse
you from a charge of murder, or lying under certain circumstances may
seem morally praiseworthy. We can think of the categorical-hypothetical
imperatives as dimensions along a sliding scale; categorical on one end,
and hypothetical on the other.
      I say this because I accept the universalizability principle of39
ethics. And I accept the universalizability principle because I view
ethics as having the goal of social harmony. Social harmony can not be
achieved if people are not treated equally on certain dimensions.
What we have not yet shown is where or how we should draw the boundary
between recommendations and demands. To tentatively use Kant's distinction, think
of demands as categorical. At least, let us say they involve fewer excuses and
mitigating circumstances than do recommendations. To recommend something is
hypothetical. It depends pretty clearly on one's position, situation, and abilities. Let
us call this "context" for short. My claim then is this: Demands are relatively context
insensitive; recommendations context sensitive. It is a recommendation, rather than
a demand, if the action depends largely on your ability to do it. But if it is a demand
to do something, it is expected that you are able to do that thing; it is expected that
differences in context will not diminish your duty to perform to given demand.38
If this is the case, the sort of things we can demand of you must be pretty
slight given the context sensitivity of our traits and dispositions. Moral demands
must be such that practically everyone in any context, can obey.  Most of the39
typical positive duties that have any political or social ramifications are context
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sensitive. Whereas all negative duties are context insensitive. For example,
demands to feed the poor cannot be context insensitive; whereas demands to
refrain from taking anyone's food can be context insensitive. Now, if demands of
justice must be context insensitive in order to be universalized, then demands of
justice will tend to be limited to negative demands; duties of forbearance. Everyone
can equally obey duties of forbearance; whatever their sex, race, social status, or
physical or mental abilities.
If it is the case that justice concerns those things we can demand of
everyone and only negative duties are the types of demands we can make of
everyone, it follows that justice will be exhausted by negative duties. The typical
complaint against this "narrow" conception is this: Doesn't morality clearly demand
we help victims, prevent starvation, assist our neighbours and the like? Any moral
theory that fails to include benevolence is surely "morally monstrous," if not "evil"!40
But such a reaction is misplaced since here we are talking about what the confines
of justice are, not what the confines of morality are. To think (for example) that
Nozick's entitlement theory captures justice is not to say we are forbidden from
helping our neighbours, and, importantly, nor is it to say morality may not in fact
recommend such forms of benevolent behaviour. A moral theory that denied this
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would fail to meet a realistic constraint on what a moral theory should do for us. All
a "narrow" concept of justice says is that we cannot demand benevolent actions. It
is another thing to recommend it, and we may even have good reason to
recommend it, let alone reasons that are good from the point of view of the agent.41
So far, the narrow view maintains that morality is not reduced to justice
issues as communitarians claim, since there is a distinction between moral
demands and moral recommendations. At this point, a perfectly sensible question
is this: Well, then, what prevents you from saying morality will also include
intrapersonal matters? For consider, you have just admitted that moral
recommendations need not be context insensitive, as moral demands do.  On what
grounds, then,  do you stop these moral recommendations from entering into the
intrapersonal domain? Although I cannot demand that you be less apathetic, there
is nothing stopping me from recommending that you be more caring. True this is not
a justice issue, but you have admitted that justice issues do not exhaust the moral
domain.
Thus, to maintain a narrow view of morality over a broad view, there must be
a different sort of distinction to be made than appeals to justice. The narrow view
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holds that neither recommendations nor demands are moral (as opposed to non-
moral) if the issue involves no direct interpersonal associations.
2.1.3 Ignored Virtues
Anti-theorists have more to complain about than the restriction to interpersonal
relations. Annette Baier, for example, argues that theory-based ethics cannot
account for the various virtues such as "kindness," "generosity," "gentleness," and
"humility." To artificially truncate morality to exclude these virtues is to offer not only
a narrow but also a distorted view of moral practices.42
The complaint has force if we antecedently assume that theory must conform
to folk-ethics of the current society. Then any theory that cannot adequately
accommodate all the varied and conflicting doctrines adumbrated by folk-on-the-
street must be thrown out. But since the issue revolves around precisely whether
or not theories have force independent of its ties to particular folk-ethics, this
antecedent assumption merely begs the question. Nevertheless, there is some
weight to Baier's remarks. Any ethic that cannot adequately explain the general
assent to benevolence, kindness, generosity and the like is to be seriously
questioned.
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Narrow ethics does not of course outlaw such virtues. They recognize their
importance, but only as further members of the wide ranging human passions that
people will find it in their interest to pursue. Narrow ethics carves out a moral space
in which these, and other passions, are allowed to flourish.
This does not resolve the problem, however. The fact that some of us feel
altruistic, say, does not yet explain why we endorse altruism. We do not merely
permit kindness, compassion, and generosity; we in fact recommend it, and often
frown upon its absence. It is phenomenologically inaccurate to say we permit
someone to rescue a child drowning. Such action is to be wholeheartedly
recommended. How can the narrow view of ethics consistently maintain that we
should endorse altruism? It would appear they have no grounds to make this claim.
Many theory-driven ethics too often explain our reasons for recommending altruism
by reducing the altruistic feeling to some non-tuistic rationalization. Would it not be
better for you, they say, if everyone helped others when in need. And then, of
course they need to make the further move to show why therefore you should be
altruistic too. But barring the muddle they get into by this attempt, this does
disservice to the phenomenology of why we act altruistically. I don't think: "Ah ha!
Now he or his parents or the spectators or God owe me something." Simply, I have
the child's interest at heart.
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Contractarians do not fall into this muddle, although they, too, appeal to self-
interest in explaining this endorsement. It is the same justification for any assurance
problem. I have altruistic feelings, and therefore, in a sense, I cannot help acting
on them. What I need assurance on is that you too will have altruistic feelings so
that I won't be disadvantaged by mine. Arguing in this line does not reduce our
altruistic feelings to non-tuistic ones. It does not reduce the feelings you have for
someone, simply it defines the reasons we have for recommending those feelings.
Of course, my recommending others to be moral is itself a strong feeling, the
phenomenology of which is not captured by talk about assurance problems. True
enough, but I cannot justify my affecting others by the mere appeal to the fact that
I have a certain feeling. I cannot legitimately claim that you must be kind to me
because I feel it's right. Mere feelings, or moral sentiments, are sufficient
explanation for the intrapersonal sphere, but as soon as you require or recommend
others to share those feelings, you need to do more than pound your chest in your
attempt at pointing at those sentiments you have and expect others to share. To
legitimately influence others requires justification. Appeals to theory is therefore not
inappropriate.
2.2 THE NON-COGNITIVIST CRITIQUE
2.2.1 Reason and Passion
Murray 37
      This, too, is consistent with Hume: "One principle foundation of43
moral praise being supposed to lie in the usefulness of any quality or
action, it is evident that reason must enter for a considerable share in
all decisions of this kind; since nothing but that faculty can instruct
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"Concerning Moral Sentiment," in L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch
(eds.), Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the
Principles of Morals, 3rd. edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 285).
Hume argues against the belief that we are motivated to act according to what is
rational. Rather, the passions rule. This observation has  been used as an attack
on theory-driven ethics given their commitment to deriving morality from purely
rational principles. The complaint is undeserved, however. Rationality under the
contractarian's notion is held to be simply instrumental; a tool to satisfy one's
preferences. The preferences, or passions, then, are the master; and reason its
slave by serving only the passion's wishes. This understanding of rationality is seen
to be in complete accord with Hume's notions. Citing Hume's observations of the
link between rationality and the passions as refuting contractarianism is therefore
peculiar. 
The mere fact that the passions rule reason does not mean that reason plays
no role, or even a central role.  A theory or anti-theory advocating that what is right43
is whatever your passions say is right is simply ethical relativism. The problem with
relativism in relation to ethics is that it is just false. It is a false doctrine, not merely
because it generates contradictions, but that it is false even according to the folk-
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ethics that the non-cognitivists appeal to. When Albert says, "abortion is
permissible under certain conditions," he does not mean that since Jane thinks it
is always wrong, it is always wrong. Quite the opposite. He thinks Jane is wrong.
The anti-theorists need to explain how moral sympathy or folk-ethics alone
is going to do the job of solving interpersonal conflicts. Which sympathies do we call
"moral," and why? But the non-cognitivists, not only are unable to answer this
question, are not even allowed to ask it. They can do nothing more than shrug or
simply shout louder with Mooreian emphasis: "This is moral. This is not."
But if the appeal is merely to your intuitions as to what is moral, why should
anyone else accept that -- especially when their views differ so much? Resolving
this, and justifying coercion requires appeals beyond mere subjective belief. The
appeal to rationalism is understood by contractarians as a minimal requirement.
What is rational is what will satisfy your preferences given the circumstances in
which you are embedded. That some of those circumstances are social ones, it is
incumbent upon you to consider the desires of the other agents, desires that may
be counter to your own. Ignoring this is done so at your own cost, given the free and
rational actions of others. Hence, some degree of compromise, i.e., moral
resolutions, is rational. That moral choice is rational means simply it will best satisfy
everyone's preferences, whatever they are, given the social, historical, and
psychological factors in which we are embedded.
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To criticize this notion of rationality is to criticize the desire of people to
satisfy their preferences. And that goes against psychological realism and appeals
to folk-ethics.44
2.2.2 The Evils of Reductionism and the Obliging Stranger
Many theory-driven ethics, and contractarianism is one, are reductionistic. These
attempt to explain why we term some acts moral and others immoral without appeal
merely to the emotive force of moral judgements. Ever since Ayer and Stevenson,45
a growing number of people have challenged reductionist approaches to ethics.46
Gass put it succinctly: "[P]rinciples ... frequently get in the way of good sense."47
Gass does not appeal to brute intuition of the Mooreian brand. Rather, he wishes
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Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, 48-
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to draw our attention to the bare moral transparency of some acts. It is wrong to
burn someone alive for no reason. To ask, yes, but what is wrong with burning a
man alive is to clearly suffer "from a sort of folie de doute morale."  Any reductionist48
theory that attempts to explain just what it is about the act that makes it wrong will
be more inscrutable than the event it attempts to explain. It will sound simply
ludicrous, queerly unfamiliar, out of place, and as Gass avows, merely laughable.
This challenges reductionist theories in general. Rather than starting with
principles and developing a moral or political structure from them, Gass and
company argue for a non-reductionist approach that begins with clear cases of
morality and immorality and to treat these as data.  The reductionist approach,49
however, does much the same. Simply, from these clear cases, an underlying
principle is deduced. The merit of the reductionist approach, then, is to find an
underlying principle that explains why we treat certain cases as moral and others
as immoral. And knowing this will enable a normative theory to be developed.
Philosophy, after all, is not a purely descriptive enterprise. The non-reductionist
approach is flawed, philosophically speaking, for being confined to a purely
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Kantianism, predominantly (cf. Gass, 198), or reductionist theses in
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      Gass, 193.51
descriptive role. If our interest is in normative ethics, the non-reductionist approach
is idle. 
Defending reductionist approaches in general does not guarantee that the
contractarian reduction is successful. If we find cases where contractarians say,
"Moral," while our intuitions say, "Immoral," we have reason to doubt the reductions
of contractarianism. William Gass offers such a case.  His "clear case of50
immorality," is troubling for contractarians not merely because of their inability to
adequately explain why it is wrong; but that they cannot even claim that it is wrong!
Let us see why.
Imagine I approach a stranger on the street and say to him, "If you
please, sir, I desire to perform an experiment with your aid." The
stranger is obliging, and I lead him away. In a dark place conveniently
by, I strike his head with the broad of an axe and cart him home. I
place him, buttered and trussed, in an ample electric oven. The
thermostat reads 450  F. Thereupon I go off to play poker with friends0
and forget all about the obliging stranger in the stove. When I return,
I realize I have overbaked my specimen, and the experiment, alas, is
ruined.51
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He continues, "Any ethic that does not roundly condemn my action is vicious."52
Now, since the stranger consented to participate in the experiment, and anything
that meets mutual consent is morally permissible according to contractarians, it
would appear that contractarianism is therefore a vicious ethic, if it is an ethic at all.
One could complain that the obliging stranger did not, presumably, consent
to being hit on the head and burnt in an oven. He consented to partake in some
experiment, and most of us who consent to fill out questionnaires in malls or help
out in psychology experiments assume that we will not be adversely affected in the
process. So long as contractarians speak of "informed consent" in grounding the
moral permissibility of an act, contractarianism would not be shown to be vicious
after all, since the onus was on Gass to explain to the stranger what the experiment
constituted. 
Let us side-step this response by altering Gass's case. What if Mr.
Gourmand approaches a stranger and asks permission to chop her up and roast
her and she, knowing full well the implication of the request, obliges?  According53
to contractarianism this would evidently be morally permissible, but to normal
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people such an act is morally atrocious, whether it was agreed to or not. So much
the worse for contractarianism. Why would anyone defend such a theory?
The answer is this. The cost of making this case transparently clear is its
removal from the rather more muddy reality. I admit that under such a scenario,
contractarians have no moral right to intercede. Roasting the obliging stranger is
a morally permissible event. What it is not, however, is an instance that can
properly capture our moral intuitions. The moral outrage we feel is based on our
inability to grasp one of the requisite premises of the thought experiment. The
scenario demands that we assume the stranger obliges. This is what we cannot
fathom. Our normal intuitions are such that the stranger would not, if she were at
all normal, acquiesce to the horrible request. Being unable to dismiss this normal
intuition, we also feel the moral outrage in the continuance of the act. But so long
as she does not oblige, or is not in a fit frame of mind to appreciate the request, our
moral outrage is justified under contractarianism.
2.3 SELF-DEFEATING
The last  of the anti-theorists's complaints that I shall look at stems from the fact
that "good" is a varied notion, depending on one's culture, personal identity, and
other social, historical, and psychological factors.  This is interesting, since this54
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was the insight of Hobbes. Contractarianism is in fact built upon this precise notion.
So it is not obvious why it is used as a criticism of contractarianism. The
explanation given by the anti-theorists is that "utility," say, or "liberty," or "negative
liberty," or "justice," or any of these sorts of abstract concepts represent the
contractarian's notion of an absolute, inviolable "Good." Holding absolute universal
concepts of the good violates contractarian's own conditions of the subjectivity of
"good." Hence, contractarianism is self-defeating.
This response is right in so far as we view these abstract concepts appealed
to by contractarians as a substantive value on equal footing with the countless other
substantive values that we may share. Unfortunately for the anti-theorists, this is the
wrong way of looking at it. It is true that justice is not the only important thing to
humans.  But this is not the contractarian's claim. It is not even claimed that a
particular theory of justice is the only thing disparate groups share in common.
Rather, justice is the only thing that best ensures the diversity of things that are
important to people. In Rawls's terms, justice is one of the primary goods that
enables everyone to have whatever it is they want.  A primary or what Paul Viminitz55
calls an "enabling" good is that which secures the space for subjective goods to be
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attained. Likewise, liberty is not the only important thing for people, since we can
imagine cases of giving up our liberty in order to benefit in other ways. This
happens all the time, when we accept jobs, for example. But this does nothing to
dampen the contractarian's point, since to give up liberty to take a job, say, is
something we should have the liberty to do as well as not to do if such is our desire.
If we had no liberty to pursue our passions we would not be able to serve our
passions. 
Both Taylor's and MacIntyre's main complaint is that contractarians do
precisely what they criticize others for doing: foisting their pet values on everyone
else. We can now see that they misinterpret the contractarian's concern for primary
or enabling goods. The "rule of right" or the "rule of toleration" is not the only
important thing to anyone, let alone everyone. The important things are what the
rule of toleration protects, not the rule of toleration itself. Justice is not valued for
its intrinsic worth. Rather, justice is valued merely as a way of preserving the
disparate goods that individuals do intrinsically value.
Some anti-theorists have even claimed that theory ethicists conceive "utility"
as a universal good; a good to which all should aspire, a good by which we can
evaluate all acts.  But this is mistaken. "Utility" is a measurement of individual56
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      My complaint is with another aspect of this argument, but it is59
also worth noting that this connection is invalid. Simply because
conceptions of the good are part of the collective community
consciousness, it does not follow that conceptions of the good are
communal matters. That is to say, so long as we take "communal matters"
to imply that the community can decide moral issues by vote. But such
design on morality is contradictory to the origins of sanctified moral
issues through collective community consciousness.
values and is not itself a value. To think so is to commit a category mistake; similar
to assuming that because individual books are written by authors and a library is
a collection of books, that therefore the library is written by an author.
2.3.1 Communal Self-Identity
There is another side to the argument that theory-based ethics are self-defeating.
One of the maxims for anti-theorists is this:  No individual conceives her notion of
the good in isolation from other individuals.  "One is a self only among other
selves."  The narrow view, accordingly, demands that individuals are conceived of57
as atomistic beings utterly independent of one another. And this individualism is an
illusion.  Individuals have a subjective sense of the good, but do so not as monads,58
but as members of a community. Thus, conceptions of the good are not individual
matters alone, but are part of the collective community consciousness. Conceptions
of the good are thus claimed to be  communal matters.  59
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Taylor is not the originator of this view: he is merely one of a long line of
communitarian thinkers, including Rousseau and Bradley.  But all such60
communitarian proposals succumb to the same criticism; namely, the mere fact that
we are influenced by the community in which we live has little to say about how we
ought to act.
I cannot deny that we are influenced by our community. If our strong
evaluations are dependent on what sort of personal identity we have, then it follows
that our strong evaluations will be influenced by these external social factors. But
this argument can have effect on the narrow view only if we exaggerate the claim
beyond plausibility.
For the social identity argument to have any force against the contractarian
position, the argument would need to take either of the following two forms: (i) We
are constituted by our community space. Thus, what really matters to me will be to
a large extent the result of my communal space rather than my particular
individuality. But if my identity and strong evaluations are constituted by my
communal space, then it follows that others in my communal space will also share
my intrapersonal values and goals. If so, the overlapping consensus will be much
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broader than what liberals conceive. The overlapping consensus will also
encompass our strong evaluations.
This line of reasoning is amiss. We need not deny that social influences
greatly affect our strong evaluations to deny that we should expect any
homogeneity from this fact. The reason is our identity is constituted by a multiplicity
of social variables. That we are socially influenced, or even socially constituted, is
not to say we are influenced or constituted by only one thing. The term "social" is
a catch-all phrase for a multiplicity of factors, including our social positions, our
career choices, upbringing, surroundings, associations, etc. Although there is some
plausibility that any one factor will have an influence on many people, it goes
against probability that many individuals will be equally affected by all the same
variables together. So although we are socially affected (or stronger: constituted)
it does not follow that we will share the same values. We should not expect
homogeneity of values among individual social beings simply on the basis of
common social factors.
The second form of the communitarian argument is this: (ii) We are
constituted by our community space. Thus, what really matters to me will be to a
large extent the result of my communal space rather than my particular individuality.
But since it matters to me what my identity is, it matters to me what my communal
space is. Therefore, we should not simply allow laissez-faire mentality to rule our
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political conceptions. We should instead design and implement a certain sort of
society; one that is conducive to the personal identities we desire.
This argument advocates strong positive rights and its antecedent
obligations. It argues against contractarian notions of finding a happy medium
among competing conceptions of the good, and argues instead that some
conceptions of the good should reign supreme. The problem here is conceptual.
Again, we need not deny that social influences greatly affect our personal identity,
but this line of thinking goes too far. If my identity is that which my community
creates, and my identity is that with which I do identify, then it is difficult to imagine
ever criticizing the community in which I live -- particularly on the grounds of its
effect on my identity. Conceptually, there could be no identity crisis if identity is
constituted by one's community, and we are all immersed in some community. On
what grounds can we possibly desire revisionist change to our present communal
structure? It can not be on the grounds of our current personal identities, if what we
mean by identity is that which we do in fact identify with. To conceive of a better
society, or a better identity, can only be imaginable if the present community has
less influence on our identities than this strong argument claims.
Either interpretation, then, (i) or (ii), of the communitarian identity argument
is unsuccessful when laid out in the above manner.
Murray 50
      Rawls, Political Liberalism, 4. It is more than this, but this will61
do.
      Although Taylor, Haworth, and Sandel make this claim, see also,62
more recently, Margaret Moore, "Political Liberalism and Cultural
Diversity." Unpublished manuscript, 1995.
      See for example, John Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, G. J. Warnock63
(ed.) Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1962.
2.3.2 Inevitable Cultural Biases
A similar argument to the communal self-identity rejoinder is that contractarian
doctrines have an inevitable bias that destroys their liberal aspirations. Rawls, for
example, claims the goal of liberal politics is to achieve toleration among disparate
cultural groups.  To achieve a proper overlap of the varying (reasonable)61
comprehensive doctrines of the different cultural groups represented within a given
society, the political structure cannot pander to any one cultural group. It must be
culturally neutral. Such an ideal, anti-theorists complain, is impossible. Even
aspiring to a cultural neutrality is itself part of the individualistic culture to which
Rawls and other contractarians belong. In this case, they are merely imposing their
cultural norms on everyone else, and brandishing them as the only reasonable
ones.  They cannot help but violate their own principles.62
Lessons we have learned from the natural language school should put this
complaint to rest.  To alter a term so that its negation is an impossibility is to have63
altered the term for the worse. Bouwsma noted the puerility of claiming that
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everything is an illusion. Whether everything is an illusion or not does not alter the
fact that we make a distinction between reality and fiction, dreaming and being
awake, or the distinction  between real barns and papier-maché barns.  Dennett,64
in a similar vein, argued against the philosophical concept of determinism that
precludes the distinction of being chained to one's chair and not being so bound.65
We can make a similar observation of the communitarian's claim that everything is
essentially culturally bound. Perhaps so, contractarians can respond, but who
cares. It does not deny the distinction contractarians make: that political or moral
institutions should try as far as possible to accommodate everyone, no matter their
particular cultural background.
How best to do this? The liberal answer is to adopt negative rules. This, they
argue, best permits the pursuit of whatever one's disparate goals are, with the sole
restriction of not interceding in others' pursuits. That a fundamental theist believes
his pursuits are thwarted because the crucifix is not hung in public schools or court
houses is to be deemed unreasonable not because it doesn't accord with the
liberal's secular culture, but because it doesn't accord with any other culture.
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The rejoinder that leaving public schools and court houses bereft of religious
symbolism accords only with the liberal's sense of secularism is to misconstrue the
absence of cultural symbols for being itself a cultural symbol. The removal of
cultural symbols from political offices is best viewed as a fair resolve given the
existence of competing cultures. It is the anti-theorist's complaint against this
resolve that reveals bias.
2.4 SUMMARY
Anti-theorists have argued against theory-driven ethics for the following reasons.
(i) Theory ethics offer a narrow and distorted view of morality by being unable to
generate virtues such as generosity, kindness, and compassion. To this I have
argued that contractarians have not excluded these virtues from the moral purview;
merely their allowance and recommendation is derivative of the main purpose of
morality: to allow peaceful coexistence notwithstanding disparate views of the good.
(ii) Contractarianism is unduly restricted for being tied to rationality, and that
rationality is not the only motive of people. Hence any pretensions of offering a
normative theory is hopelessly idealistic. This argument is misinformed about the
role of rationality in ethics within contractarian theory. The contractarian notion of
rationality is consistent with Hume's, not inconsistent with it. 
Murray 53
(iii) Contractarianism is self-defeating. There are a number of variations of
this argument, but the general trend is to claim that the theory is itself
unconsciously motivated by the particular culture in which the theoreticians are
embedded. To the extent that everything is biased by culture to some extent, this
complaint is idle. To the extent that we can nevertheless distinguish enabling goods
from raw goods, this complaint is false. The hope of an overlapping consensus of
disparate groups is not idealistic if what we expect to find are negative principles
of toleration rather than some robust notion of good. They are different types of
things and confusing them is what has caused the recent epidemic of anti-theorists.
2.4.1 Where to from Here?
To broaden morality into one's private affairs is to broaden societal strictures into
one's private affairs. The liberal tradition narrows the scope of morality with the
intention of thus allowing individuals to pursue their own disparate goals with the
minimum of external interference. Problems, however, remain for narrow ethics. A
key problem is how morality is conceived to be in the interest of the individual. We
have objected against the broad conception of morality on the grounds that broad
ethics cannot necessarily appeal to the self-interested nature of disparate
individuals. But how can narrow ethics do any better?
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As stated, this question is too broad. There is a wide range of advocates of
narrow ethics and depending on the ethical theory we will have differing answers.
Contractarianism is one of the liberal theses that views morality narrowly. What I
am concerned with is how contractarians ought to answer this question. How can
contractarians successfully derive a morality from the self-interested nature of
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If morality is to be at all useful it must cater to human self-interest. An ethical theory
that fails to cater to self-interest, on the contractarian view, fails to be
psychologically realistic. This claim can be criticized on two levels. (i) Is it the case
that morality can hope to pander to self-interest? And (ii) Is it the case that humans
are motivated solely by self-interest? In Part II, I wish to examine the second
question. In short, my answer is: Yes, so long as we understand what we mean by
"self-interest." In Part III, I will investigate the first.
3.1 DUTY VERSUS INTEREST
Many have interpreted the contractarian tradition as claiming that the sole moral
principle, the principle upon which all other moral dictates are based, is the
obligation to keep one's agreement. Socrates tells Crito that his execution is a
moral obligation since he had, in effect, agreed to it (although vicariously through
an implicit agreement).  Such a notion can also be seen in Hobbes's Third law of66
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nature: "That men performe their Covenant made,"  as well as such statements as:67
"and that he ought, and it is his Duty, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own:
and that such hindrance is Injustice, and Injury...."  It is no wonder, then, that A. E.68
Taylor interprets the contractarian as claiming:
...it is always to my interest to conform to the law. And to say that this
is to my interest is equivalent to saying that it is my duty; my duty, in
fact, means my personal interest, calmly understood.69
I believe this interpretation corrupts the whole enterprise of basing ethics on
self-interest. I have no "duty" to follow my interest. Simply, I have an interest in
doing so. In the State of Nature no duty exists. Yet interests exist. Consequently the
two can not be equated in the way Taylor prescribes. Should they be, then since it
is the case that we have an interest in electing a sovereign, we are bound to do so.
But this is not Hobbes's position. Rather, we are bound to obey the sovereign
because we have contracted to obey him. 
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Taylor is wrong, then, but so too is Hobbes here. If it is the case that the
sovereign demands what is not in one's self-interest, largely understood, then there
is no duty to obey him. Otherwise, as Hume noted, there is a difficulty for those who
wish to base contractarian ethics on self-interest. "We are bound to obey our
sovereign, it is said; because we have given a tacit promise to that purpose. But
why are we bound to observe our promise?"  On Taylor's interpretation, the70
contractarian can only claim "It is our duty." It is for this reason that Taylor saw in
Hobbes's ethical doctrine "a very strict deontology, curiously suggestive ... of some
of the characteristic theses of Kant."71
The "duty to stick to one's agreements," as explained in the natural laws of
Hobbes, is the wrong interpretation of contractarianism. The reliance on self-
interest that is crucial to contractarianism is instead best expressed by Hume: Only
when everyone may reasonably expect to benefit does justice or obedience obtain.72
Murray 59
      David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals," In73
L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (eds.), Enquiries Concerning Human
Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd. edn. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989, app. III. And also David Hume, A Treatise of
Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) 2nd edition revised by P.H.
Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978 [1888], bk III, pt. II.,
sec. III.
Contrary to Hume's explicit avowals, Hume's rowboat analogy is a classic
example of contractarian thinking. In the rowboat analogy, two people cooperate for
mutual benefit. Hume's point in raising the example was to show that no explicit
contract was ever made.  The important concession to contractarian thought,73
however, is in Hume's arguments that the moral convention determining each
rower's action is based on individual self-interest. Each rower does better if they
both conform to the convention of shared rowing. What Hume failed to see is the
fact that no contracts being made should not bother contractarians, although it does
argue against the need for a sovereign to overlook such cooperative tasks. But
contractarians do not require a sovereign, contra Hobbes.
Conventions exist precisely because they work. True, there may be a time
when they no longer serve their original purpose, due to further information or
changed circumstances, yet they linger anyway. Religion, for example, comes to
mind. But generally, conventions come into being for contributing in some way to
the security of individuals. It is the legitimacy of these conventions that confer
Murray 60
      "They imagine not, that their consent gives their prince a title:74
But they willingly consent, because they think, that, from a long
possession, he has acquired a title, independent of their choice or
inclination" (Hume, "Original Contract," 457).
      David Gauthier,  Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason,75
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990, 56.
consent as Hume points out,  rather than the reverse. Consistent with empirical74
observation, people would not consent to that which is not in their self-interest. The
legitimacy of adhering to agreements made is implicit in the fact that the agreement
prospect, in order to be agreed to, will be consistent with individual self-interest.
Granting this, consent is natural. There is no need to suppose that contractarians
are committed to denying that one consents only to that which is in one's self-
interest, given one's situation, the situation of the other bargainers, and the
available options. This is absolutely consistent with Hume's assertion that our
consent binds us only because of our interest in being thereby bound. Gauthier,
too, recognizes that this is not incompatible with contractarianism.  Contracts are75
binding not because we are duty bound, as if independently of our interests, but
because we have an interest in being thereby bound.
 Hume believed natural sentiment is the grounding for why we behave
morally. Hobbes, on the other hand, maintained that to be moral, i.e., to comply with
one's covenants, is in one's own interests. And this is a very much different
interpretation than what has come to be considered the standard interpretation of
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Hobbes. There is no "duty" then to stick to one's agreements unless we have an
interest in doing so. The raison d'etre of contractarianism is precisely to show that
we do have an interest in sticking to our agreements. After all, if we had an interest
in making them, we have an interest in abiding by them. The duty comes once we
accept a moral inclination and not before. The advantage of morality is, after all,
indirect. To offset seeking direct advantages, we see the advantage of setting up
a moral institution that makes it one's duty to keep agreements. So long as we
recognize the duty is created, we must dismiss the interpretation that we have a
duty to obey the natural laws found in the State of Nature. There is no duty to obey
the laws of nature. Simply, the laws of nature point out what is reasonable, what will
likely satisfy one's interests.
3.2 RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST
One of the important claims of contractarian ethics is that the guiding motivation of
morality is rational self-interest. But by rational self-interest, contractarians do not
mean that all people are naturally egoistical maniacs deliberately calculating their
every action for their sole monetary profit with never a motive for others' interests.
Murray 62
      Joseph Butler, "Upon human Nature," from  Fifteen Sermons Preached76
at the Rolls Chapel, London, 1726 [reprinted in Bernard Baumrin (ed.),
Hobbes's Leviathan: Interpretation and Criticism, Belmont, Cal:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1969, 16-25].
One's interest may be the interests of another, as Butler rightly saw.  Thus, pointing76
out altruistic acts of people does nothing to harm the psychological claim that
humans are motivated by their own interests solely. Likewise, it may be in one's
interest to act in the spur of the moment; to be non-calculating. In golf, for example,
the time for deliberate calculations is on the practice ranges and putting greens, not
during one's backswing. Some calculations are appropriate; what club to use, what
side of the pin to shoot for, whether to lay up. But during the set up and swing itself,
that is the time to delegate all authority to the muscles; to keep the mind silent.
Prospective love interests, as well, are best kept alive by acting "from the heart"
rather than "from the head." Calculating how to be romantic is often to fail. None of
these points detract from the claim that morality is (or can be shown to be) based
on rational self-interest.
How then do contractarians interpret self-interest so that these points are not
countervailing factors?
3.3 THE ATTRACTION OF SELF-INTEREST
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The attraction of basing morality on self-interest was evident as far back as the
Republic. It is good to be moral, Socrates believed, because only in being moral
does one's soul function properly: in harmony. There is nothing better for the self
than to have a harmonious soul. That is a good to the self! The claim, after all, is
not: "Get your soul in harmony because you're hurting others." The others
seemingly do not matter. It is for the good of your own soul that you should be nice
to others. The power of such an argument, if it succeeds, is to render morality a
prudential course of action. No longer should we view morality and individual
interest as conflicting. If the sole motivation to be "immoral" is that one can benefit
from it, showing how this is actually a false premise, that immorality is a deficit and
morality a benefit to the self, is to internalize morality as being the rational choice
for all. 
Socrates's argument is unlikely to be convincing however often parents try
precisely this approach on their progeny. The earliest moral lessons parents place
on their children is that "bad" acts -- defined merely by what their parents forbid --
will merit punishment of some sort. As it is typically in one's self-interest not to be
punished, it is derivatively in one's self-interest to be "good." At a certain age,
always younger than the parents anticipate, the children learn that some "bad" acts
can either be committed without detection, or the benefits derived from them
nevertheless outweigh the consequent punishment. Another possibility is that some
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children regularly receive punishment for all sorts of acts for no other reason than
the punisher is in one of those moods. In such cases, as the children are being
punished anyway, they might as well take the benefit from acts otherwise deemed
"wrong," for example, the exploitation of younger siblings for their own gratification.
For this group, since punishment is inconsistent and forthcoming anyway, it is no
deterrent for "immorality." In fact, it is possible that inconsistent and regular
beatings increase the likelihood of immorality. In all these cases, parents quickly
require a further justification for "good acts" than the avoidance of mere
punishment. This stage may be delayed for a spell by simply increasing the
punishment. Quite likely, some parents are unable to muster the sophistication of
Socrates's argument ever, and have no other recourse but to up the ante until the
children leave, quite likely prematurely.
But the sophistication of Socrates's argument is itself unconvincing. It
requires the belief that we have souls in the requisite sense, and that these are
organised in such a way that certain behaviours in the external world directly affect
it. Such a belief is taxed when we consider that identical actions may be moral or
immoral depending on the context. That I push John into the river may have been
a good thing if it was to have John avoid a drunk driver. To distinguish that case
from one where I simply push him in because I don't like him, the soul requires
connections through the senses, understandings in terms of concepts embedded
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in the physical world, as well as feedback loops. In other words, the tripartite soul
requires sophistication to the degree where the soul loses any explanatory power
at all. But Socrates's answer for why be moral is unsatisfactory not merely because
it requires specious metaphysical beliefs to support it. Under Plato's analysis, a
harmonious soul is when the reason rules over the passions and appetites. This is
not a recipe for a harmonious soul in all circumstances. Nor can it all by itself
resolve the issue of what or what not is moral. We do not say it is moral to steal
diamonds so long as one does so with a calm, cool disposition. The calculating
assassin is not more moral than a frenzied spouse who kills her abusive husband.
Exasperated parents may simply decree that a certain act is right just
because it is. This is the antithesis of the self-interest approach. The claim is that
morality is not in one's self-interest, and that that's just the point. Kant took this
approach. 
3.4 KANT
Morality as a motivator is often thought to be precisely counter to self-interest. Duty,
accordingly, is a motivator as much as self-interest. A prime example is Immanuel
Kant. Kant advocated a strict deontologic ethic without appeal to self-interest of any
sort. Kantianism, thus, is a counter theory to contractarianism. If the contractarian
self-interest claim can stand on its own, it is necessary to show that Kantian
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      Specifically, "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at77
the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Immanuel
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, James W. Ellington
(trans.) Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981 [Originally
published, 1785], 30 [Paul Menzer's (Berlin, 1911) Konligliche
deontologic theory is supported by self-interest after all. This is easily
demonstrated.
Kant advocates an ethic based on duty. It is not enough that one obeys a
duty; it is moral so long as one's motivation in obeying that duty is of the
appropriate sort. The appropriate sort is that which does not further one's
self-interest. It is as if the proper moral motivation for Kant is a begrudging one.
This, however, isn't quite appropriate, since, presumably one begrudges the act
because it conflicts with one's self-interests, and so far as self-interests enter the
picture, the less moral is the motivation. The proper motivation, then, is not to have
concern for one's self-interest at all. The contractarian claim is that this is not
psychologically possible. That is just not the way we work. And I shall argue that
Kant is not unaware of this psychological fact.
According to Kantian ethics, it is not enough to know that to be moral one
must do one's duty. We also need to know what one's duty is. Is it to be charitable?
Pursue one's talents? Refrain from reading pornography? As a proper theory
should, Kant provides us with a formula for ascertaining the moral action in any
given situation. The principle, or formula, is the Universal Principle. This, roughly,
states that you should act only on the maxim by which you would have others act.77
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Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Standard pagination, 421]).
      I am not thinking of the case where "stealing" is in fact a right.78
Of course, where theft is "permissible, it is no longer "theft" in the
proper sense at all. I ask readers, therefore, to substitute "theft" or
its analogues with "taking the possessions of others without their
consent" or its analogue.
If I am thinking of stealing money and am wondering if my duty forbids or permits
this act, I need ask myself whether I would like it if everyone steals. And I think,
among other things, that if everyone steals, people would not tend to leave things
lying around. Things would be chained down, thus making it more difficult for me
to steal.  I might also think anything that I possessed might be stolen, and this may78
seem a cost greater than the benefit I might derive by my stealing others' goods. In
my calculations in deciding between a system where everyone steals and a system
where no one steals, I would have to add to the "everyone steals" system the cost
of locking everything down to prevent my property being stolen as well as the cost
of interminable vigilance over my own belongings. Kant's claim, and I agree with
him, is that stealing is unlikely to be a maxim I could consistently will on everyone.
Hence, theft is found to be immoral by appealing to the universal principle: I have
a duty not to steal.
Kant's principle is supposed to provide universal agreement about one's
duties. It can do so only so long as everyone has property they value more than the
property of others. But this is unlikely to be the case for everyone. People living in
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      So long, anyway, that the calculations are taken at the current79
time-slice, or where the current time-slice is accredited more weight
than future time-slices, since it is conceivable that under a "theft is
permissible" system someone may go from rags to riches, and at that
point may wish for a "theft is not permissible" system.
      Schopenhauer made this observation in 1840 in On the Basis of80
Ethics, E. F. J. Payne (trans.) New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1965,  pt.
II, §7, 89-92.
squalor may not be concerned about protecting the crumbs, rags, and debris they
happened to have scrounged out of the dumps. These people will place different
weightings in their calculations than those Kant proposed. Willing that everyone
steals may come out ahead of willing that no one steals.  Barring this, it is unclear79
whether recognition of one's categorical imperative is sufficient to motivate us to act
on them. It is questionable whether my mere willing that others refrain from stealing
is sufficient evidence that I will or even should refrain from stealing.
These observations are beside the point, however. The interesting thing in
relation to contractarianism is that Kant's principle relies, after all, on self-interest.80
We recognize what is our duty on the grounds of individual interest alone. The fact
that I would not like it if my maxim were universalized is what is being appealed to:
my interests according to the hypothetical scenario. Only when the calculation is
favourable to my self-interest, will I agree to abide by duty, and not before. Duty,
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      Gauthier observes much the same thing, and calls it, erroneously, I81
believe, a "subversive reinterpretation of Kant" (Gauthier, Moral
Dealing, 110). I do not pretend anything of the sort here. Simply, I
believe Kant fails to ground a deontologic ethic, and he went wrong
because, by his own account, he appeals to self-interested motivations.
It is a critique of Kant. It points out that Kant can not consistently
ground his ethics without appeal to self-interest, as he expressly
intends. More, it points out that his moral imperatives could only be
grounded on contractarian lines. It is idle to claim that this is an
"interpretation" of Kant. It is a criticism. He fails his own
objectives. For our purposes, it is more than that Kant fails. This, by
itself, does not support contractarian thought. The important point is
that it fails precisely because his underlying justification points more
toward a contractarian grounding of morality than his deontologic view.
      Kant stated that some acts will be rationally inconsistent; he did82
not assert that they would all be so (Kant, 32 [424]). This should not
affect my argument here. For those acts that are not irrational, self-
interest is the foundation for our not willing them to be universal
laws. For those acts that, accordingly, are irrational to will to be
universal, what I argue below applies.
      Kant, 34 [426]; 36 [428-429].83
then, contrary to Kant's express claims, is shown to be grounded on self-interest;
precisely the view of contractarianism.  81
One may point out that Kant believed it is not self-interest, per se, that we
appeal to when evaluating whether our maxims can be universalized. Kant thought
it would be rationally inconsistent to believe otherwise in immoral cases.  According82
to Kant, the impossibility of universalizing an immoral maxim is not based on a
contingent notion of one's preference structure, but upon an objective concept of
rationality itself.83
Murray 70
      See Gauthier, Moral Dealing, 115.84
      "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions; and can85
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them," Hume,
Treatise, pt. III, sec. III.
      Kant's example does not add the clause "if suffering unendurably",86
and this by itself is suspect. As it is suicide we are dealing with in
the example, we do not need to check to see if we think everyone should
kill themselves whether they want to or not. And even if that is what we
are supposed to be asking, what does it matter to the suicide victim,
should he succeed? 
Two responses can be made. For one, it is not clear that Kant succeeds in
his claim that reason has no practical role.  If Hume is correct, reason is purely84
instrumental to our passions.  If so, showing the rationality of not acting on a given85
maxim does not show that self-interested motives do not play a key role in that
calculation. More critical, however, is that it is highly suspect that Kant succeeds
in showing that there are purely logical inconsistencies in abiding by certain
maxims. It might be claimed that "allowing stealing" is an inconsistency by definition.
There is no such thing as consensual theft. But if we consider whether we would will
everybody to take whatever they fancy, then there is no logical inconsistency here.
Nor is there any logical inconsistency in claiming that any person should kill oneself
if they want to and are suffering unendurably.  What do I care if others kill86
themselves. Would I want others to kill themselves if they are suffering as much as
me? If I am considering it for me, the consistent thing would in fact allow it for others
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too. Why should I be so heartless to prevent it? And neither is there any logical
inconsistency if I want to harm others. It is true that if I will that everyone abide by
this maxim, I must recognize the likelihood of being harmed myself. But there
appears nothing that makes the desire to harm both others and oneself logically or
necessarily inconsistent. Mass murderers who turn the gun upon themselves when
the police are closing in, however pathological, are not necessarily illogical.
It would be disastrous for Kant if people have differing views on what the
categorical imperative dictates in any particular situation. It can not be that one
person believes people must be charitable according to the universal test, while
another person conceives no such duty after applying the universal test. Different
results from the same test would destroy the desired universality of morality that
Kant (and contractarians) want. Thus, wherever there is a disagreement about
whether a personal maxim can be universalized (as in the cases of suicide, charity,
pursuing one's talents, and possibly even harm), it is incumbent on Kant to show
that one side is wrong. If the wrongness can be due to illogicality, or internal
inconsistency, then the charge of elitism or paternalism against Kant can be
avoided. But so long as there is an underlying appeal to individual interest, no such
inconsistency can be shown. 
3.5 MORAL REASONS
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We have seen ways in which parents fail to show that morality is a good thing for
their children to oblige. Of course it is conceivable that it is a good thing for the
parents that their children are moral, at least toward them. Likewise, it is
conceivable that to live in a society that is moral is a good thing for their children.
Our question is not, "Why should we be moral," but "Why should I be moral?" It
cannot suffice to claim that it is in one's interest to be moral to avoid punishment.
This does not speak to the possibility of avoiding punishment, or cases where the
punishment does not outweigh the immoral act. Nor for that matter does it explain
why some acts are deemed punishable while others are not. The reason for such
a distinction can not resort to punishment without being stupidly recursive. And if
there is a reason to punish some sorts of acts over others, then this should be the
reason not to do those acts all by itself, without recourse to the punishment
attached to it.
This latter remark is not precisely true without qualification. It is conceivable
that it is in my self-interest to adopt a system where you and others would behave
morally toward me. But in order to ensure that you comply, it may be rational to
erect a system of punishment. Once this is set up, it is presumably neutral as to
who the defector is. Thus, it is rational that I adopt a system that would punish me
for defection. My reason for adopting the system is different than my reason for
abiding by the system. I may abide by the system of morality merely out of fear of
Murray 73
      See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Oxford, Oxford University87
Press, 1986, 23, and Hobbes's Leviathan, xiv (75); as well as Thomas
Hobbes, De Cive, Sterling P. Lamprecht (ed.) New York, 1949, 3.31 (57-
58). Perhaps this is not far removed from Kant's understanding. What is
in one's considered self-interest may well accord with what passes the
universalizable test. What does not pass the test is not considered to
be truly in the actor's self-interest. 
punishment, although I can accept such a system so long as the punishment
system protects me in other ways I deem profitable for me. In other words, the
punishment commands cannot be arbitrary. They must meet my self-interest, largely
construed.
It is roughly in this way contractarians claim that morality is based on self-
interest. But what do I mean by "largely construed"? This is an important question
that will, in fact, take up the bulk of my thesis. Self-interest is certainly not the direct
basis of moral motivation. Or, alternatively, unconsidered self-interest is not the
basis of moral motivation. If on a whim I wish to punch my brother in the face, acting
on it cannot be moral on most accounts even though it furthers my self-interest in
some respects. If contractarians mean by "self-interest" this notion of "direct"
self-interest, or "unreflected" self-interest that includes mere whims, contractarians
would agree that morality is not based on "self-interest" so defined. Contractarians
believe self-interest is constrained by morality, but they argue that the rational
motivation for accepting a moral system is itself grounded on longer-ranged, or
"considered" self-interest.  87
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      In chapter 4 of this thesis.88
Reliance on "considered" preferences in this way, however, makes room for
a separate criticism. If whatever people seek they call good, then if they do not seek
what is rational -- even what is good for them if they were rational -- then it can not
be the case that what is good for them is the rational act. The contractarian claim
is that since x better enables people to pursue their disparate goods, people
rationally, if not in reality, will see x as a good. However true that may be, there will
be a conflict for a person A who does not see the good of x in this light. If good is
defined in terms of self-interest alone, then x will not be good for A. If it is not good
for A, it is irrational for him to pursue it. Thus, contractarians, at this level, advocate
a contradiction. X for A is both good and not good.
Simply put, reliance on "considered self-interest" as a grounding for morality
is very much like saying: "Morality is based on self-interest, so long as your
interests are moral." If this is what the introduction of "considered" self-interest
amounts to, the contractarian attempt to ground morality on rational self-interest is
pathetic. Before we address this problem,  we need to be more clear about what88
constitutes self-interest.
3.6 THE NATURE OF SELF-INTEREST
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      Michael Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, New York:89
Cambridge University Press, 1982.  Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice?
Which Rationality? Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1987.
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.
      Butler, 20-21.90
      Butler, 20-21.91
The contractarian claim that men are by nature self-interested is often held to be
refuted by the empirical fact that people frequently have sympathies for other
people. It would appear that if morality is based on self-interest, then people agree
to morality in purely calculating terms. But the calculating model of contractarianism
does not do justice to the phenomenology of moral sentiment. If we help a stranger,
it is not because we expect some recompense. We just are benevolent, and are so
out of goodness itself, and not out of some long-range, utility preference. Versions
of this complaint have been seen in Hume, Rousseau, and Locke, and more
recently by Taylor, MacIntyre, and Sandel.  Butler noted a distinction, however, that89
circumvents this compliant. Butler argued that our capacities to feel and act for
others' benefit is not necessarily counter to self-interest. Benevolence, for Butler,
is the result of action motivated by "proper" self-regard.  "By acting merely from90
regard to reputation, without any consideration to the good of others, men often
contribute to public good."  The word "often" here is troublesome, I admit. Is it the91
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      Butler, 25.92
case that sometimes self-interested actions do not lead to the public good, or is it
to be taken more strongly: that self-interested actions sometimes are counter to the
public good? If he allows self-interest to in fact inhibit the public good, it is difficult
to maintain that morality can be based entirely on self-interest. And surely empirical
evidence supports the claim that self-interested actions are often counter-
productive to the public good. The existence of prisons attest to this fact. People
are malevolent at times, and so Butler requires an explanation as to how this is
possible if we are nevertheless designed by an omnipotent deity to be benevolent
by merely abiding by our self-interest. Butler's explanation is that "true" self-interest
will never run counter to the public good.
There is a manifest negligence in men of their real happiness or
interest in the present world, when the interest is inconsistent with a
present gratification...thus they are often unjust to themselves as to
others.92
So, when people are unkind or cruel to others as we see prevalent in the world, this
is not due to any fault in God; merely in man. They fail to pursue or fail to recognize
their own "true" good, and that is why they can fail to be benevolent. 
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      Butler, Sermons II and III.93
      Butler, 22.94
The main concern in this thesis is how to flesh out what one's "true" interests
are. Butler's claim is that we need to attend to the voice of our conscience.  This93
will not help unless we know a priori what sort of a voice our conscience has. And
there will be evident circularity if it turns out that we know what our conscience tells
us not by introspection, but by post hoc assessment of the recommended actions.
In other words, I fear that if the act is not benevolent, it is then judged not to have
been in accord with our "true" conscience. What our "true" interests are may well
be unrelated to what interests an individual might actually have. Discovering one's
true interests by one's conscience becomes hopelessly circular. Butler avoided this
circularity by what may be now termed a "communitarian" manoeuvre. His belief is
not simply "one's interests are not truly one's interests unless they are benevolent."
Rather, he believes (along with Rousseau, MacIntyre, Taylor, and Sandel) that we
share interests. In particular, we share a common idea of the good. "Men are so
much of one body, that in a peculiar manner they feel for each other," and "Mankind
are by nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the inward
sensations of one man and those of another."  Any interest in oneself that is not in94
such close correspondence to the interests of another will be regarded as perverse
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      Butler, 23.95
      Butler quotes from Rom. xii, 4,5.96
in some way. The pursuit of any wayward interest will have to be misguided. It is
misguided not because they are doing evil to others, but because "they do evil to
themselves, too."  And this is because we are, accordingly, "one body in Christ."95           96
I shall ignore Butler's reliance on religious speculations. Charles Taylor
supplants the "one-body-in-Christ" thesis with an only slightly less religious model
of an Aristotelian good that we all intuitively feel, if only we examined ourselves
sufficiently. What is intriguing to note is that Butler is often cited as criticizing the
psychological egoism prevalent in contractarian thought, whereas these reflections
indicate that Butler's own theory may be viewed as advocating psychological
egoism: Pursue your own true good, and that will necessarily benefit others. Given
this, a normative theory would be: Pursue your own true good always. As this is
compatible with contractarianism (so long as it is suitably interpreted), then the
general interpretation that Butler critiques Hobbes for advocating psychological
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      "When Butler set himself to expose the fallacies of the `selfish'97
psychology of human action, he found admirable examples of them in some
of Hobbes's analyses of the `passions', and he did the work of
refutation so thoroughly that he has perhaps made the notion that there
is nothing in Hobbes but this `selfish psychology' ... current from his
day to our own," A.E. Taylor, 36.
      See, for example, Bernard Gert, "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism,"98
in Baumrin (ed.), 109. [Originally published in Journal of the History
of Ideas, 28, 4, 1967.]
      Butler, 22.99
egoism is ungrounded.  If people pursue only their own satisfaction, then97
benevolence will abound.
One may contest my claim that Butler is himself a psychological egoist on the
grounds that "psychological egoism" is a thesis much more narrowly defined than
simply saying people act in their own interests. Psychological egoism, for some, is
the thesis that people never act with others in mind; never act to further moral
motives; never act for reasons of benevolence.  Butler and Socrates do not say98
merely that being moral is good for the soul; morality is also good for others. And
this is what is denied by the strict thesis of psychological egoism. For Butler,
"people enjoy doing good for others."  If the strict thesis is the correct rendition of99
psychological egoism, however, then neither are contractarians in general nor
Hobbes in particular psychological egoists. Hobbes's thesis is that men always act
in order to satisfy their own desires. But "desires" for contractarians are simply
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      Gert, 112. For example, Hobbes speaks of the natural affections of100
parents for their children (De cive, 3). 
      Gert, 111.101
whatever desires the agent happens to hold, and this should incorporate any moral
sentiment he wishes to act on; including benevolence. As Bernard Gert rightly
decrees, "for Hobbes, it is simply a matter of definition that all voluntary acts are
done in order to satisfy our desires. But...he does not deny that we can desire good
for another."  100
A possible complaint against the contractarian understanding of self-
interested actions is that this weakened version of psychological egoism is
vacuous. Has it been so weakened it makes no interesting claim whatsoever? To
distinguish this weaker version from the strong version of psychological egoism,
Gert calls the second "tautological egoism."  Any action, whether it produces acts101
good for the public or bad for the public or even good or bad acts for the agent
herself, is said to be motivated by self-interest. But if the consequence of the act is
not in the interest of the agent herself, for example driving while drunk and as a
result crashing and being seriously injured, in what sense do we mean the act was
motivated by "self-interest"? Butler appears to be right when he says some acts are
"really" in our self-interest, while other acts are not. But the claim of tautological
egoism all by itself can not seem to accommodate this crucial distinction. And
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without it, the contractarian hope of grounding morality on "self-interest," broadly
construed, seems destined to fail. 
The received answer relies on an understanding of what interests are
rational to pursue, rather than what interests are approved of by one's conscience.
What interests are rational to pursue, however, is itself open to much debate, and,





My claim in the previous chapter was that the only way to conceive of the ontogeny
of morality is through satisfaction of self-interest. Human psychology is such that
whatever is not in one's self interest will be unmotivating. Further, morality is an
institution that preserves, rather than curtails, self-interest given the social situation
in which we find ourselves. Contractarianism is a moral theory that gives a viable
account of how morality is grounded on self-interest.
Interests, however, are not simple things. An individual may have competing
interests. In such a case, although the pursuit of morality may further one of these
interests, it curtails another interest that the individual also holds. To claim that
morality furthers self-interest, then, is not precisely accurate. Morality furthers only
some interests. A problem, then, for interest-based ethicists is how to decide which
interests count as being conducive to morality, and which interests do not. The
purpose of this chapter is to flesh out in more depth what contractarians mean by
self-interest when they claim morality is grounded upon that.
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      H. Frankfurt,"Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,"102
Journal of Philosophy, 68, 1971, 5-20.
4.1 FRANKFURT'S MODEL
Frankfurt distinguished two types of preferences: first and second-order
preferences.  First-order preferences are preferences simpliciter. They are102
preferences for or to avoid objects or states of affairs. That I prefer to have ice
cream rather than a peach is a first-order preference. But suppose I am concerned
about my cholesterol level. Then it may be the case that I would prefer not to have
the ice cream. This latter preference is not of the same type as the first. They are
not merely competing interests, although the satisfaction of one is the
disappointment of the other. Rather, the second preference has as its subject
matter the first preference itself. It is not simply true that I prefer the peach. At the
first-order level I do not. The second-order preference however gives commentary
on the first. I would prefer not to have preferences for high cholesterol foods such
as ice cream. I would prefer it if I would prefer peach.
The point of Frankfurt's model is that everyone will likely hold preferences
that are vain and shortsighted at some time. Yet they may at the same time hold
metapreferences, preferences about those shortsighted preferences. Given this,
people may want social choices to be in favour of their metapreferences rather than
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their first-order preferences. For example, I may have learned that acting on whims
gives low odds of success. If a social choice rule helps prevent me from acting on
whims, this may be seen as a good thing for me. The contractarian claim that
morality ought to further individual preferences is no emendation for
contractarianism if our individual preferences include debauchery, brutality,
viciousness, and vice. Under Frankfurt's model, however, people could
unanimously prefer that one's (first-order) preferences be overridden given that
people have weak wills and recognize that they do. Incorporating into contractarian
thought the emphasis on preserving second-order preferences over first-order
preferences would thus solve the problem of whims. I can ask my crew to bind me
and to refuse my orders while I sail past the sirens, and I trust that they will honour
that reasoned second-order preference over my unreasoned first-order preference.
I am better off that my crew decides to honour my second-order preference over my
first-order preference. Analogously, we may be better off if social choice rules are
based on furthering second-order preferences rather than first-order ones.
Let me be clear that I resist such results. It is questionable, for one, whether
the distinction between orders of preferences is not mere fabrication. The claim is
that second-order preferences have as their subject first-order preferences. But this
is not obvious. My desire for ice cream is a first-order preference. It is not clearly
the case, however well we can word it that way, that my second-order desire is
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precisely the not wanting to want ice cream. More realistically, it is to be healthy.
On this translation, we do not have different types of desires in the Frankfurtian
sense; merely we have competing desires; one for ice-cream and one for health.
There can be no practical guide to determine whether social rules should preserve
first or second-order preferences.
Barring this worry, Frankfurt's model cannot help us unless we are content
that second-order preferences always trump first-order ones. Contractarians cannot
be content about this for at least three reasons. (i) For one, it is not the case that
morality is based on or serves our second-order preferences. Morality in part
defines them. That I prefer to bop Charles on the nose can only be circumnavigated
by a higher order preference that is already normatively operative. Otherwise there
is no grounding for why I should prefer one over the other. Why should I garner a
higher order preference that prefers I do not commit preemptive violence?
Assuming that people naturally have these higher order preferences seems
empirically false. But even if they were naturally held by people at various degrees
of cognizance, we still want to know why we should honour those rather than the
first-order preferences they aim to supplant. We require a reason that appeals to
the preferences we actually have. The contractarian claim that morality is founded
on self-interest would be idle if self-interest "proper" is meant only those interests
that are morally proper.
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(ii) If the claim is that it is these particular second-order preferences that are
satisfied by morality, an individual can still ask why should morality interest him
then. The reliance on these second-order preferences become standard-bound
rather than preference-based. (This is a topic I discuss at great length in chapters
seven and eight.)
(iii) For that matter, it may be the case that I prefer not to worry about
cholesterol. There seems nothing intrinsic in the distinction itself that second-order
preferences should trump first-order preferences all the time. Think of an ordinary
case. I want to ask Betty out on a date. Due to last minute jitters I catch myself
preferring I did not have an interest in Betty in this way. Should this higher order
preference win out here? Assuming that it should not, at least necessarily, we
recognize that higher order preferences do not necessarily have greater weight
than lower order preferences, and thus any rule to always follow higher order
preferences when they conflict with lower order preferences is not a good guide.
There is either a rule for which preference order wins out, or the decision is
left to the individuals themselves. If it is the former, then we have moved from self-
interest, per se, and have adopted an external standard for determining what counts
as "self-interest." But morality based on standards is not morality based on
individual preferences, and hence contractarians cannot endorse it. If it is the latter,
then there is nothing but the stronger preference that wins out, whether it be first
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or second-order ones. And thus, as far as contractarianism is concerned, there is
little use for the distinction. Morality cannot be bent to serve only one sort. And nor
would it even be wise to do so, since some first-order preferences may be intuitively
moral while second-order preferences may be intuitively immoral.
There is also the further problem of an infinite regress with Frankfurt's model.
If second-order preferences trump first-order preferences, there may well be third-
order preferences that trump second-order ones. Perhaps there are higher order
preferences above these. Sincerely doubting the efficacy of a second-order
preference cannot merely be the whiny complaint of the first-order preference the
metapreference had intended to squash. If we can be at all serious in wondering
about the efficacy of a second-order preference, this must be on the basis of a
third-order preference, at least given Frankfurt's model. Alternatively, if we judge
metapreferences by something outside our preferences (for example, according to
duty, virtue, faith, or precedent) then we are simply abandoning our anchorage in
individual preference. There is no way such a non-preference-based standard can
legitimately be called contractarian.
4.2 GAUTHIER'S CONSIDERED SELF-INTEREST
Butler distinguished between true and false self-interest, and claimed that morality
furthers only one's true self-interest. Which interests are one's true interests are
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those in accordance to God's design, recognized by one's conscience.  David103
Gauthier, in his seminal work, Morals by Agreement, adopted the Butler-like lines
of distinguishing between types of preferences. Rather than basing "true
preferences" on God's design, however, morality for Gauthier was grounded on
"considered" self-interest.  Gauthier argues that we can base morality on104
rationality. This is certainly more easily done (albeit illegitimate) if we introduce
moral normative assumptions in our definition of rationality. I shall argue that this
is what he does. A rational act, for Gauthier, is conceived of as that which furthers
one's preferences -- provided that one's preferences are "considered." It is the
introduction of "considered" preferences that I find problematic.
Rationality, for Gauthier, is identified with the maximization of utility, and
utility is associated with preferences.  How we determine what one's preferences105
are, however, is a matter of some concern. Gauthier argues that preferences must
be considered for otherwise "one may have reason to act contrary to one's actual
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occurrent preferences given that, were one adequately to reflect, one would change
those preferences."  The problem is that this removes the conception of rationality106
from strict preference fulfilment. We need now ask what is the process of reflecting
on one's preferences? What is the mechanism of weighing, of considering one's
preferences? Under Gauthier's program, it can not be preference -- for that is what
is being assessed -- and nor can it be rationality -- for what is rational is defined
once the preference is considered. If we do insist on "considered" preferences, that
is an admission that rationality is more than merely preference maximizing; it must
also be involved in preference ordering. This precisely is the complaint raised by
James Fishkin. "The criteria for considered preferences specify nothing about the
appropriate conditions for preference formation."  And if this preference ordering107
is found to be external to the individual's subjective ranking, then we have an
objective account of what preference it is rational to have -- based, for example, on
the wisdom and experience of generations and not on the individual's own
occurrent understanding. "Common sense," Baier claims, "allows the rational
assessment of the relation between some beliefs and some attitudes....We do not
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allow any and every outcome of reflection to be rational."  For example, if rather108
than the nail I hammer my thumb, most of us will assume this was not my
preference. Typically, then, we do not assume preference from mere behaviour. Of
course, one may conceive of some rational explanation for desiring to hammer my
thumb rather than the nail. Perhaps I had wanted to avoid killing a butterfly that had
alighted upon the nail. But if my "reason" was because a dog told me, we may think
the reason irrational, according to Baier. We may be entitled to think it so given the
community's belief that dogs do not talk and, even if they did, that is not sufficient
reason to abide by what they say. Thus, on Baier's view, we have a concept of
rationality that supersedes whether or not one's attitudinal preferences coincide
with one's behaviourial actions.  We have, instead, "standards by which to judge109
whether the preferred accords with the preferable."110
The typical complaint against objective standards is that we have no rational
basis for accepting them. An objective criterion for Baier, however, need not be
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fixed. It need not be floating in the "queer" metaphysical realm noted by Mackie.111
Rather it is dependent upon the social norms of the times. Baier and Mackie are in
fact closely related on this point. Mackie is often taken to be adamantly against any
objective standards of ethics. This is simply not so. He openly admits that,
"Evaluations of many sorts are commonly made in relation to agreed and assumed
standards....Given any sufficiently determinate standards, it will be an objective
issue, a matter of truth and falsehood, how well any particular specimen measures
up to those standards."  Moreover, the selection of any particular standard is not112
arbitrary; it is based upon the function the standard is intended to achieve. If the
function of morality is to reduce conflict, then any standard or principle that serves
this is good. It is an objective fact, for the most part, whether someone satisfies this
particular standard or principle. All Mackie denies, as well anyone should, is that
the standard itself is objective. It is not an objective fact existing independently of
men that morality must resolve conflicts, or that the purpose of morality is to make
men happy, or to allow them to pursue their own goals. There is no threat to
morality to deny the objectivity of these values. Denying their objectivity does not
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make them arbitrary, however. It depends on the use we want for them. Basing
morality on bicycle riding ability, for example, is not a use we have much call for.
This objectivity based on subjective but non-arbitrary standards according
to function is also the notion of objectivity that holds for Baier. The criterion of
rationality for Baier is the reliance on "the public system of reasons [that] have the
backing of the experience and wisdom of many generations."  Until we deem that113
dogs can communicate to people, a dog's talking cannot be counted as a rational
reason. Although it may not be contrary to my reasoning to hammer my thumb given
my belief about the message from the dog, my reason itself may be judged to be
irrational. "Irrationality, but not contrariety to reason may depend on the manner in
which preferences are held."114
One problem for contractarians in accepting Baier's account is that if we
judge actions simply according to "the public system of reasons," then why not also
accept the morals that are backed by the community's beliefs. To say that morality
is rational but that rationality is a social -- and not individual -- standard is to give
up -- not answer -- the search for a rational self-interested account of why we
should individually accept morality. If so, we have lost the individual appeal of
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rationality and with it the individual appeal of morality. We cannot both introduce
some objective standard for determining what counts as a considered preference
according to external societal standards, and yet also claim that utility (preference
maximization) is subjective.
One last comment against the introduction of considered preferences needs
to be noted. According to Gauthier, "maximization imposes conditions on
preferences."  Yet, "unconsidered preferences may meet, considered preferences115
may fail the conditions for maximization."  If considered preferences may fail116
conditions for maximization, then how can maximization measure considered
preferences? And more telling, if considered preferences may fail the conditions for
maximization, how can a maximizer rationally adopt the constraint of considered
preferences? The introduction of "considered preferences" invariably puts one in
a bind.
For contractarianism to succeed, a concept of rationality must be found that
remains subjective; that can appeal to the individual's own motivational system.
What is "considered" must be dependent entirely on the agent. David Schmidtz
proposes such a model.
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4.3 SCHMIDTZ'S REFLECTIVE RATIONALITY
Like Gauthier, Schmidtz disparages the concept of rationality that makes it simply
a means-end instrumental relation. As with Baier, Schmidtz holds that one's ends
can be rationally or irrationally held. On the old instrumental model of rationality,
what is rational is simply whatever achieves one's end. Thus, rational evaluation of
one's ends is an impossibility. Schmidtz disagrees. Ends can be evaluated in terms
of how they further further ends. As stated, this does not alter the means-ends
instrumental model, since whenever we evaluate an end in terms of a higher end,
we simply treat the first end as a mean. Schmidtz means more than this. Some ends
are what he terms "maieutic ends." "Maieutic ends are the further ends for the sake
of which we choose final ends."  Accordingly, there is a distinction between117
pursuing a final end and choosing that final end. One may choose a final end in
terms of some further end, but this is not the reason why one pursues a final end.
In the straight means-ends model, eliminating the end renders the mean as
pointless. If I want to court Betty I should buy her flowers. But if I no longer want to
court Betty, in fact have learned to dislike her, I should no longer want to buy her
flowers. But with maieutic ends, "eliminating the further end is part of the
process."  For example, once Betty decides to marry Barney rather than Malcolm,118
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she has satisfied her desire to be married. But no longer having to make a decision
of who to marry does not eliminate (although to be sure it lessens) her desire for
Barney. Desires to be married, like desires for a career, are maieutic ends,
Schmidtz reasons. Final ends can be rationally assessed in accordance to how well
they satisfy maieutic ends, and particular maieutic ends can be judged by the light
of one's overarching maieutic end. Although Schmidtz considers the possibility of
other overarching maieutic ends, he posits the overarching maieutic end to be
"having something to live for." This beats out mere survival because if there is
nothing to live for one would not necessarily want to survive any longer. Suicide
and euthanasia, then, have a chance of being considered rational acts.
There is one more element in Schmidtz's reflective rationality model. One of
the problems with the instrumental model is that it leaves loose ends. We can justify
acts according to how well they satisfy particular ends, but we cannot justify the
ends themselves. They just sit there. If the beginning of the chain is not justified, it
is difficult to see how the last link in the chain is justified. Lacking this justification,
it is difficult for some to see how we can call the last link in the chain a rational act.
Frankfurt allows that some ends are just settled.  The infinite chain complaint is119
mere philosophical sophistry, he believes. In arithmetic, for example, it is possible
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that we have made an error in our calculation, and so it is wise to double check. But
at some point, we stop double checking. Our final answer is not unjustified merely
because we did not recheck one more time. Thus Frankfurt is not particularly
bothered by the infinite regress argument. Some ends are decisively accepted in
a non-arbitrary, wholehearted way, and this is enough. Not for Schmidtz, however.
He justifies the maieutic ends by the particular pursuits themselves. In order to have
something to live for, we need particular ends. But the particular ends are
themselves justified by our needing something to live for.  Thus he offers a120
circular, but non-vicious, justificatory scheme of ends. "By closing the justification
no loose ends need further justification."  121
Schmidtz's plan was to show how even the narrowest of conceptions of
rationality "has the resources to explain the rational choice of ends, and further, to
do so without leaving loose ends."  The model breaks down, however, on both122
points. On the old model, the postulated maieutic ends are simply the final
unjustified ends in question. The distinction that maieutic ends fall away like missile
platforms on their satisfaction unlike final ends is misleading. If I do not want to
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court Betty, I will not buy her flowers. But likewise, if Betty does not want to get
married, she will not marry Barney. Maieutic ends and final ends are thus not
different on this score. And if I want to court Betty but only for one night, my buying
her flowers may satisfy that. But I do not suppose that Schmidtz would want to call
a desire for a one night stand with Betty a maieutic end merely on the grounds that
the desire to buy her flowers fell from the corpus of desires like a missile platform.
Maieutic ends seem merely to be the wholehearted ends described by
Frankfurt. They can be big or small, depending on the level of abstraction we give
them. My point here is that recognizing the existence of maieutic ends does not
alter the means-end model of rationality in any significant way. It could so long as
these special ends are themselves justified in the non-vicious circular way that
Schmidtz proposes. But his model breaks down here as well. Having something to
live for, the overarching maieutic end, can be achieved by any means, and so does
not justify the particular end Schmidtz needs to close the circle. That Betty wants
to be married is satisfied by her marrying Barney, but it does not by itself justify her
marrying Barney given that there were other options. Failing this, the justification
of having something to live for is not satisfied by any particular act. Rather it is
something one must grow into. Decisions are justified merely on the grounds that
some decision needs to be made, or that some decision is better than no decision.
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This fact is not grounds to justify the particular decision made. Failing this, the circle
cannot close so neatly. And hence there will inevitably be loose ends.
4.4 TAYLOR'S STRONG EVALUATION
Charles Taylor also belittles the means-end instrumental model of rationality.  Or,123
if that is all there is to being rational, he suspects that morality must be linked to
something higher. This something higher is autonomy.  Rather than merely124
following one's considered self-interest, a being must be autonomous. Being
autonomous is more than being self-regulating. A squirrel, a schizophrenic, or a
sociopath may be self-regulating. Whatever occurrent desires the agent has, as
long as those are the ones he pursues for the duration of the time he has that
desire is indicative of self-regulation. There is nothing in the concept of self-
regulation that requires reflection on what it is one is regulating. Frankfurt believed
that critical reflection is the essential ingredient for personal autonomy.125
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To be self-regulating, all one needs is to choose actions that will satisfy
one's desires. But to capture what we mean by autonomy, also necessary is the
ability to reflect on one's desires, to decide what goals one ought to pursue, to
decide whether some desires are worthy of actualizing or not. Although Frankfurt's
notion of self-reflection is necessary for autonomy, Taylor believes it is not
sufficient. Reflection on whether to abide by one's desires may be satisfied in two
ways, a weak way or a strong way. Weak deliberation is such as to see which of
two desires one should satisfy now. For example, one may desire to swim and eat,
yet be unable to do both simultaneously. Thus, one needs to decide which of these
two occurrent desires one should satisfy first. This sort of deliberation about one's
desires is something a squirrel should be capable of doing. If our intuition that
squirrels are not autonomous is correct, then some further distinction is required.
The further distinction, according to Taylor, is strong evaluation.
 One engages in strong evaluation if one deliberates whether one should
have that particular desire at all. Of course, the desire to swim or to eat need not
be denigrated by a strong evaluator. What might not be tolerated by a strong
evaluator, however, is the desire to smoke. A weak evaluator may have to decide
whether he should smoke now or swim now. It is conceivable that after the swim,
he will smoke. A strong evaluator, on the other hand, would consider whether he
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should smoke at all. Other sorts of desires that require strong evaluation include the
desire for extra-marital affairs or the desire to injure those who irk us. These are
sorts of desires that an autonomous being would deliberate about in the strong
sense, and not just in the weak sense. An autonomous being would decide not
merely whether he should have an extra-marital affair now or later, but whether he
should have an extra-marital affair at all. A strong evaluator is engaged in a
"deeper" level of self reflection than in deciding between whether he wants to chase
an occurrent desire now more or less than he wants to chase another occurrent
desire now. It is not sufficient for the autonomous being (a strong evaluator) that he
thereby pursue a desire merely because he has it and it is not contingently in
conflict with any of his other desires. And this, accordingly, is not something the
weak evaluator would consider. The strong evaluator may reject outright the pursuit
of a particular desire. The ability to make such decisions is the mark, for Taylor, of
the autonomous being.
It is debatable at this point whether an autonomous being need to decide the
issue one way or the other. It is conceivable that after strong evaluation he may
decide to have extra-marital affairs, smoke, and hit those who irk him. Once that
has been decided, then further weak evaluations about this matter may crop up. He
is autonomous not to the extent that he always is engaged in strong evaluation, but
Murray 101
      It is not clear whether Taylor agrees with this. This gives the126
picture that an autonomous individual is not constantly engaged in
strong evaluation. Taylor, however, claims that "the kind of being we
are to realize is constantly in question" (Charles Taylor,
"Responsibility for Self," in A. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976, 289). This may overstate
the case.
      Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern127
Identity, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989, 35-39.
simply that he has engaged or is capable of engaging in strong evaluation about
his first-order desires.  126
For those who argue for the autonomy-morality connection, they must explain
why autonomous beings will necessarily decide in favour of moral choices. Taylor's
response to this is that strong evaluations are made on the basis of one's self-
identity. One's self-identity is in turn constituted by one's community.  But then it127
would seem a simple (too simple) step to connect autonomy and morality. If one's
community happens to disapprove of extra-marital affairs, then presumably you
yourself do as well on this view. Thus, after strong evaluation, one will conclude
against extra-marital affairs. Whatever is considered moral in your community will
be what an autonomous being will choose. This relies on an excessively strong
connection between self-identity and community values. As I have already
discussed in chapter 2, I cannot deny that we are influenced by our community. If
our strong evaluations (both the outcome and the perceived need for making a
strong evaluation in a given situation) are dependent on what sort of personal
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identity we have, then it follows that our strong evaluations (which occur in both
interpersonal and intrapersonal matters) will be influenced by these external social
factors. We need not deny that social influences greatly effect our strong
evaluations to deny that we should expect any homogeneity from this fact. The
reason is, our identity is constituted by a multiplicity of social variables. That we are
socially influenced, or even socially constituted, is not to say we are influenced or
constituted by only one thing. The term "social" is a catch-all term for a multiplicity
of factors, including our social positions, our career choices, upbringing,
surroundings, peers, associations, keep-sakes, etc. Although there is some
plausibility that any one factor will have an influence on many people, it goes
against probability that many individuals will be equally affected by all the same
variables together. So although we are socially affected (or stronger: constituted)
it does not follow that we will share the same values. We should not expect
homogeneity of moral beliefs among individuals simply on the basis of a common
set of social factors. We are influenced differently by different factors within that set.
Barring the questions we need to raise about the implications of the strong
evaluation thesis, we may decide to raise questions about the strong evaluation
distinction itself. For example, there is one sense in which this is no augmentation
of Frankfurt's model. Frankfurt defines a wanton as one who lives almost entirely
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by following first-order desires.  Nevertheless, this wanton is able to decide which128
desire to achieve at any given moment,  for surely it is impossible to have only129
first-order desires that never even contingently conflict (unless one has only one
desire). According to Taylor, however, evaluation between contingently conflicting
desires is the mark of a weak evaluator. On Taylor's analysis, nothing but the very
minimal life forms could live entirely on first-order desires. It is evident, then, that
what Frankfurt calls a wanton, Taylor would call a weak evaluator. But once we
recognize this difference in vocabulary, we see that there is no difference in their
recognizing the same conceptual distinction between having a desire, deciding
between desires, and deciding about one's desires. If there is no relevant
distinction between Taylor's and Frankfurt's models, then the same criticisms that
have been raised against Frankfurt apply equally well to Taylor.
A further problem with Taylor's model, however, is this: Part of Taylor's
motivation for introducing strong evaluation is that Taylor's distinction between first
and second-order desires cannot adequately address how second-order desires
originate. It seems possible that second-order desires may themselves have been
un-autonomously accepted. Frankfurt believes there is a point where the
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      Taylor wants to say no strong evaluation is settled, since any132
strong evaluation is open to re-evaluation (Taylor, Human Agency, 38;
Sources, 20). But this is beside the point here. Just as one may
recalculate 17 x 82 at some future time, the limited double checking
that goes on now reaches a non-arbitrary degree of decisiveness.
satisfaction of our second-order desires "resonates" through us, and we need no
higher order desires evaluating these any more than we need to continuously
recheck our arithmetic.  This "loose end" bothered Taylor, evidently, as much as130
it did Schmidtz. Moving from a model that posits desires judging other desires to a
model that has people "evaluating" desires is supposed to eliminate this reliance
on settled preferences for autonomy.  It does not, however. This same problem (if131
it is a problem) remains. That I vow never to entertain a particular desire is itself an
evaluation that will just seem settled to me. That is, it will be based on the type of
person I am (or want to become), and this personal identity must merely be that with
which I do in fact identify.  If we ask, but ought we identify with this, we meet132
precisely the infinite regress problem raised against Frankfurt's model.
There is a fundamental problem with linking morality to autonomy (rather
than rational self-interest) that tarnishes all attempts. We can concede a strong link
between morality and autonomy and yet deny that this is enough to support the
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claim that being moral is dependent on being autonomous. Defendants of the
autonomy view also need to show that the strong evaluations of an autonomous
individual will necessarily be moral resolutions. It is not at all clear that whoever is
autonomous (a strong evaluator) is necessarily moral. Whether an autonomous
agent is engaged in deliberating about moral matters, deliberating about moral
matters is not identical to being moral. A thief may have deliberated about his
desire to steal; simply he resolved that it was a "good" thing. What matters if we find
a link between autonomy and morality if that does not give us any guidance as to
how the autonomous person ought to resolve particular moral issues?
What else is required is (i) the claim that to be autonomous is, in some
sense, to lead a well-adjusted life, and (ii) the claim that a well-adjusted life for
social beings will likely include some notion of interpersonal skills. One needs to be
socially well-adjusted in order to be intrapersonally well-adjusted. If so, since part
of our notion of being socially well-adjusted incorporates the moral domain
(interpersonal relations), it would seem to follow that part of being well-adjusted will
be to be moral. Unfortunately, this would not yet equate to saying that an
autonomous individual will necessarily prefer a particular moral action. Although a
moral character is the disposition to do the right thing at the right time, this does not
mean necessarily doing the right thing in a particular case. Other factors need to
be accounted for: including cognitive factors (knowing that a case for strong
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evaluation is at hand is dependent on a variety of cognitive skills) and psychological
factors (being alert enough, not run down, sick, tired, disinterested, preoccupied,
in a rush, etc.).
Even if it is shown that an autonomous agent always acts morally, it requires
further argumentation to show that non-autonomous agents do not generally act
morally. If autonomous and non-autonomous agents are equally capable of acting
morally, then the concept of autonomy is irrelevant to morality. Claiming that acting
morally is one of the conditions of autonomy is to simply beg the question.
Nevertheless, this, in effect, is precisely what is argued. A criterion for a minimal
level of autonomy is based on our notion of what a normal individual is. Part of our
notion of a normal person will be that he is a moral individual to some extent.  It133
is normal, we think, that an individual has certain moral sentiments. Morality then
slips into our defining concept of autonomy. Under such a view, the link between
autonomy and morality is not based on any theoretical account, but simply on
descriptive folk-psychology. This is not necessarily bad. That autonomy becomes
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85, 5, 1978, 1030-1051). Accordingly, the more you believe that the bad
suffer and the good are rewarded on earth, the less likely you will
offer help to those suffering, since they must obviously "deserve" it.
Recall Dante's pushing back from his boat those grieving in Hell since
divine justice ordains they suffer without respite (Dante, Divine
Comedy, The Inferno, Canto VIII). Here although strong evaluators are
making moral decisions, the outcome is not clearly the normal "moral"
response.
relative to conventions (conventions of normalacy will presumably differ in different
societies and times) should not surprise us. The problem, however, is in fleshing
out these normal moral sentiments. Because people differ substantially and
because many factors beyond disposition influence our behaviour, the "normal"
moral sentiments will not likely be conceived in terms of any particular moral
substantive issue. The test cases can not be such things as "helping this injured
woman," for many "normal" people may fail to do this.  More likely, the "normal"134
moral sentiments will be reduced to something abstract. For example, a "normal"
moral sentiment may be the having of "other-regarding" interests. As soon as we
identify what a normal sentiment consists in these abstract terms, however, it is
unlikely it will of its own prove to be sufficient for being moral. The question we
have then is on what grounds does being autonomous necessarily enable one to
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comply with the mores of one's society? Particularly, we return to the question, what
purpose does it serve the autonomous individual to be moral? And this question
asks what is the benefit to the individual in being moral. We are back at the need
to define morality in terms of rational self-interest. The excursion to autonomy is
therefore idle. 
My point here is that the key of morality cannot be dependent on autonomy.
Nevertheless, there is an obstacle in effectively resolving this debate. Autonomists
and self-interest theorists have a different understanding of the function of morality.
If morality's purpose is to have individuals lead good, virtuous, full lives, then
autonomy and morality will clearly be interconnected concepts. In fact, the goal of
morality or social institutions will be precisely to raise autonomy levels of
individuals, since full lives is dependent on being autonomous. Morality on this view
is broadly conceived; it encompasses every aspect of an individual's life, both
interpersonally and intrapersonally. If, instead, we view the function of morality as
controlling merely the interpersonal domain, then morality is seen merely as an
enabler, a device in place to secure against interference in the pursuit of people's
lives as the individuals themselves deem fit. How that life is led is left up to the
individual. There is no antecedent notion of what a good life is by which his life is
measured, at least within the intrapersonal sphere. Autonomy plays a part here in
how full that individual's life can be, but the part it plays on this narrow view is an
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amoral one. On the narrow view of morality,  autonomy may be a factor in135
achieving one's preferences, or certainly those preferences one autonomously
endorses, but this is an amoral concern. Morality takes place within the
interpersonal sphere and can be defended, so preference-based contractarians
argue, by appeals to unmitigated occurrent preferences alone. 
4.5 SUMMARY
I have argued that the criterion of what is or is not a considered preference is either
an objective standard -- external to the individual actor -- or that it is decided wholly
by the actor herself. If it is objective or standard-bound, then we have lost the
motivational force for an actor to be "rational" when her preferences dictate some
alternative choice. If morality is to be based on rationality, and rationality is pre-
determined by some objective criterion of what preferences are worth pursuing, we
have introduced a normative concept into the definition of rationality. This would be
fatal to the contractarian goal of linking morality to individual self-interest.
On the other hand, if the determination of considered preferences is left
wholly up to the individual, then we must admit that a considered preference can
be none other than a preference held presently by the actor -- whether or not it will
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sustain sufficient reflection. If this is true, then the introduction of "considered"
preferences is wholly idle and we have, in fact, no different an account of rationality
than that which furthers one's preferences.
Thus, introducing considered preferences as a criterion of rationality is either
fatal or idle. We can do well to dispense with it. Having dispensed with considered
preferences, we are left with a bare account of rationality that is contentless. What
is rational is simply that which furthers one's preferences. Any preference. This is
how the economists conceived it. What precisely counts as a preference when
there appear to be many and when these conflict (as they often do) does pose a
problem to the instrumental concept of rationality. The seeming resolve by
considered preferences does not work. How a model using occurrent preferences
fares will be seen in the subsequent chapters. We must first rid possible






Schmidtz, Baier, and Taylor found the inevitability of loose ends debilitating for the
instrumental model of rationality. It need not be. Schmidtz is right in so far as
pointing out that many of our ends can themselves be justified according to some
larger end that we have. This should suffice to make us able to judge the rationality
of particular ends. If we go back far enough, we will not find justification, per se, of
our abstract ends. For the most part, I believe we can nevertheless be content with
these far reaching or more basic ends. That I would like something to live for should
be innocuous enough not to need justification. The problem with it, if there is a
problem, will unlikely be found at this abstract level. The problem, if there is a
problem, will be found in how I attempt to realize that goal. Wanting more to live for
is not necessarily satisfied by becoming a thief, especially if one spends much time
in prison as a result. The problem is not in the abstract goal of wanting something
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to live for, it is in the execution of that goal. I agree with Frankfurt, then, that "loose
ends" are not a problem, either for models of rationality or models of morality.
We have yet to solve the problem facing considered preferences, however.
If preferences are subjective and relative, on whose criteria can we distinguish
considered from unconsidered preferences? As Baier noted, "There does not seem
to be any genuine empirical way to determine when someone has sufficient
experience or has reflected sufficiently to see whether or not he has a fully, or even
sufficiently, considered concrete preference."  No one other than the agent herself136
can determine whether her own preference is sufficiently considered. Gauthier,
importantly, recognized this. "For if it be agreed that values are subjective, then
there is no ground for appeal beyond what a person acknowledges." And if this is
true, then we can not accept the qualification that Gauthier adds, "given that she
reflected sufficiently and is fully experienced."  It is this qualification that137
introduces an objective or standard-bound imposition on what it is to be rational --
independent of the person's own values. Should her values be not sufficiently
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preference" (Morals by Agreement, 33). It may be true that I prefer to
smoke yet value my health. Hence, the prima facie preference to smoke is
not one's considered preference that "involves the endeavour to maximize
value" (33). But there are instances where value is clearly not the
measure of one's considered preferences. I value great music. I may even
prefer to play the piano. But all things considered, I do not prefer to
take the time to learn. Thus, although I value piano playing, my
considered preference is not to play.
reflected upon or based on insufficient experience, they are her values,
nonetheless.  If values are subjective, then it must be left to the actor to decide on138
the degree of consideration she has given to her preferences. If we leave it to the
actor, only she will be the qualified judge on whether she has given the matter
sufficient reflection. As outsiders, we cannot circumscribe her actions based on our
ideals of considered preferences. An implication of this strict preference-based
model, the considered preference model, is that if she does not make any further
reflection, then it is precisely because she assumes (or does not think otherwise)
that she has sufficiently reflected on the matter. Given this, so long as she acts on
a preference, it is symptomatic that she deems that preference to be a sufficiently
considered one. In thinking that it is considered enough, the phenomenological
account of that preference is that it is considered. By this account, every preference
of hers would be considered (to her) -- no matter how "unconsidered" they may
seem to someone else or even to the same person at a later time. The only way,
then, to conceive of "considered preferences" as a meaningful distinction is to base
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the criteria of consideredness on external factors. This is a problem for the
considered preference view. One must either abandon preference-based ethics and
adopt standard-bound ones, or abandon the reliance on considered-preferences
in favour of a model permitting unrestricted preferences. I opt for the latter.
Although an individual may change her mind about how considered a
previous preference really was, this does not unite a subjective account of
preference with considered preferences. Gauthier insists "that the preferences be
held in a considered way, and this is not a matter of what considerations the person
cares to give, but what would in fact survive adequate experience and sufficient
reflection" -- which he admits to be "vague standards but not dependent on
individual whim."  They are certainly vague standards but they do not succeed in139
severing individual whims from what may count as sufficient reflection.  It is true that
I may prefer not to act on whims, and this preference may itself be derived from
experience -- experience that showed me that whimsicality rarely satisfied my
preferences. Alternatively, I may prefer to act on whims more than acting on the
choices that my staid reason dictates. According to zen masters, for example,
spontaneity reveals one's true preferences more than one's culturally influenced
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deliberative practices.  Here, especially, one's preferences are revealed in action140
rather than attitude -- which Gauthier admits is perfectly possible.141
Of course, if considered preferences -- those that survive experience and
reflection -- could be revealed through whimsicality, this does not say they are
dependent on whimsicality, I admit. But if considered preferences are denied any
tie to individual whim, then the concept of considered preferences can not be
subjective. If subjectivity means that the individual is the judge of what counts as
true or real or considered for her, then if the individual decides to act on a whim,
whimsicality and subjectivity are linked and can not be severed by the agent -- at
least at the time of acting. If it is one's preference to act on that which one might
later regret (and term it as mere whim), it is nonetheless rational to act on it -- for
that is one's preference. This is in direct opposition to Gauthier's conception of
rationality. He believes one is rational only so long as one furthers one's considered
preferences. "If we may suppose that her revealed preference would not survive
reflection unopposed, then we may agree that her choice is not fully rational."142
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Given that one has a preference, whether it is based on mere whim or studious
reflection, and one wants to further that preference, and it is rational to do that
which one wants, then it is rational to further that preference -- considered or not.
This must be the case so long as rationality is strictly instrumentally conceived.
 From this we see why Schmidtz and Baier and Taylor and Gauthier wish for
a more reflective model of rationality; a model that can critically assess ends as well
as means. I have argued above that these attempts fail. They either offer no
emendation to the standard instrumental model or they incorporate normative
assumptions that do disservice to the goal at hand; grounding morality on rational
self-interest. 
An objection to my dismissal of these notable attempts can arise from
observing how people decide between two or more preferences that are mutually
exclusive. In such cases, one must determine which preference, or end, one wants
to satisfy the most. One would expect that if we are able to make such choices, then
we must be able to critically reflect in ways more noble than the bare means-end
model allows.
This is not so. That one has to choose between preferences is simply
tantamount to saying it is rational to satisfy that which one prefers and most rational
to satisfy that which one prefers most. And this need not entail the introduction of
considered preferences in the requisite sense. It is something even Taylor's weak
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evaluator has the capabilities of achieving. In debating between the desire to
smoke, say, and the desire not to smoke, one's action (smoking or not smoking) will
be based on that preference (whether first or second) which takes precedence --
that preference which "wins out." This "winning" preference (again, regardless of
whether it is a first or second-order preference) is the occurrent preference. To
decide, for example, that one will not smoke will not necessitate that the desire to
smoke will never reappear in the agent's list of preferences. And that is why the
emphasis on occurrent preferences is all that we can admit. I call this the occurrent
preference model of rational self-interest.
5.2 HEDONISM AND DEATH
My account of self-interest is hedonistic to the extent that the judge of desire
fulfilment is the agent herself. Since the notion of hedonism carries with it some
sense of advocating debauchery, let me clarify the hedonistic aspect of my theory
as being phenomenologically dependent. This means the same thing. What counts
for me as preference satisfaction is my belief or feelings at the phenomenological
level that my preferences or aims have been satisfied. We make this distinction
since it is possible that my aims have not in fact been satisfied; I might merely
believe, erroneously, that they have been. A phenomenologically independent
model of preference satisfaction may be called, after Parfit, a success theory. Aims
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are satisfied if and only if they have been satisfied in fact, whether or not the agent
is aware of it. It is rational on the hedonistic model for a philosopher to pursue a
thesis that he believes to be sound, even if in actuality it is not. A non-hedonistic
account will claim that philosopher irrational, since he has not in fact achieved his
goal, which we assume is to defend a sound thesis, rather than to merely believe
that his thesis is sound. The standards of non-hedonistic versions necessarily lie
with a judge external to the agent, and are for that reason dismissed on my account.
Parfit disapproves of the hedonist version of self-interest. Hedonist preferences
concern only those features of our lives that are introspectively discernible. Since
we assume the death-state is not introspectively discernible, no one can have
preferences about events or states of affairs after one's death. Since this is patently
false (we write wills and name beneficiaries in our life insurance policies), the
hedonist account of self-interest must be false.143
To maintain a hedonistic version of self-interest, then, it is incumbent on me
to explain how it is nevertheless rational to have eschatological concerns given
nihilistic beliefs about the death state. It is quite easy, really. One's concerns on the
occurrent preference theory are not concerns of immediate occurrent satisfaction.
Simply, they concern present aims. I may have an aim now about what will happen
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tomorrow, and I will therefore, other things being equal, be rational to pursue that
aim, even if there is a chance I will be dead tomorrow. That is, rational acts are not
defined by satisfaction, but by anticipated satisfaction. Thus I need not ever actually
satisfy, in the phenomenological sense, my aims to rationally pursue them.
This is all very well for aims that might be curtailed by death, someone might
object, but if the aim is conditional on death, this is a different matter altogether. The
satisfaction, phenomenologically speaking, is impossible. Thus even aiming at it is
irrational.
I must remind my interlocutor that our aims are not restricted to self-
satisfaction only. Parfit admits as much. "I could be purely self-interested without
being purely selfish."  For example, my love for family and friends affect what is in144
my interests. So being self-interested does not deny I will act in the interests of
others, so long as doing so is not against my interest. This shows that acting for
interests other than your own is not irrational, so long as it is not contrary to your
interests. Since nothing that occurs after your death can be contrary to your death-
state interests, then arranging for any satisfaction of interests after your death will
not be irrational on the occurrent preference model at least from the perspective of
your death-state interests (which we assume to be nil). What then decides what
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post-mortem planning is rational and what not? One's present aims. If you see that
you do not need your wealth, and you care enough for someone else or some
organization, then you are free and rational to arrange that this beneficiary gets
your possessions when you know you will no longer desire them. We do not, then,
have to give up the hedonistic understanding of self-interest-satisfaction to explain
actions the satisfaction of which can occur only after one's death.
5.3 TIME INDEPENDENCE
Given that preference satisfaction is phenomenologically dependent and rationality
is viewed strictly on an instrumental model, preferences will necessarily be time
independent. This is important. 
Parfit defended a version of the self-interest theory that is in certain respects
like mine. He called it the Present Aim Theory. According to it, we should each do
what will best achieve our present aims.  "In the case of reasons for acting that are145
based on value-judgements, or ideals, a rational agent must give priority to the
values or ideals that he now accepts."  The emphasis on our present aims,146
coincides with my emphasis on occurrent aims or preferences. The occurrent
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preference theory of self-interest is restricted to preferences held in the present.
Thus, neither my model nor Parfit's will demand that we value a long term goal over
a present goal. The motivation is the same for Parfit and me: we want a completely
reductionist system; thus we cannot demand more of our subjects than they are
willing to act on. If a present aim has more weight to the agent at the time of acting
than some aim that cannot be satisfied until the future, there is nothing that requires
the agent to forgo the present desire in favour of the future one. Both present aim
theorists and occurrent preference theorists ask: "Why should I give weight now to
aims which are not mine now?"  147
The occurrent preference theory of self-interest is restricted to preferences
held in the present. Preferences held in the present are not the same as
preferences that demand satisfaction in the present, however. We have seen this
when we considered the rationality of forming and pursuing preferences the
satisfaction of which could not be achieved until after one's death. There are other
sorts of preferences we form in which we expect only future gratification. At times,
these "present-future preferences," as I shall call them, may conflict with desires the
satisfaction of which are more immanent. Parfit is right to emphasize that there is
nothing inherently rational that we should always forgo our near-sighted interests
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at the expense of future interests, but he understands "future interests" not merely
as interests one has now that will not be satisfied until the future. Rather, he views
these as interests one does not have now, but which one might have in the future.
Let us call these "future-present interests." He, like me, rejects our putting any
weight on such kind of things. But we often have preferences now the satisfaction
of which will only be in the future. These present-future interests, on mine and
Parfit's theory, are part of the compendium of one's occurrent preferences. 
It is a misconception, therefore, to believe these theories claim that it is
necessarily rational to act on present urges that make longer-range plans difficult
or impossible. If the longer range plan is one of the present aims or occurrent
desires, then it is not clearly rational to forgo that. One problem for this view, then,
is an apparent lack of prescriptive assistance. Nothing in the occurrent preference
model is going to decide one way or the other over competing desires. The decision
is a subjective matter concerning the agent alone, or so I claim. This is wholly
unsatisfactory to many people, especially those whose intent it is to ground
normative ethics on rational self-interest. If my model of rational self-interest cannot
decide between competing occurrent desires, how is it going to advocate morality
over immorality? This evidently was a worry of Parfit, and succumbing to this worry,
he took a route very different than my plan here. 
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Parfit distinguishes three varieties of the present-aim theory: an instrumental
version; a deliberative version; and a critical version. The instrumental version
coincides with my occurrent preference model. What each person has most reason
to do is whatever will best achieve his present or occurrent aims. It is instrumental
in the sense that the aims are treated as given. Any aim can provide good reasons
for acting and no aim can be claimed to be irrational. The deliberative model
parallels Gauthier's considered preferences model. Some aims may not provide
good reasons for acting. To judge whether this is so, an agent is required to
consider the aims he would now have if he knew the relevant facts and was thinking
clearly. Parfit's model is neither of these. He opts for the critical model. According
to it,
Some kinds of aims are intrinsically irrational, and cannot provide
good reasons for acting whether or not they passed the deliberative
test. What each person has most reason to do is whatever will best
achieve those of his present aims that are not irrational.148
Not only are some desires intrinsically irrational, according to Parfit, other desires
are rationally required.  "It is irrational to desire something that is worth not149
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desiring -- worth avoiding."  There is no way this position can be maintained150
without abandoning the reliance on individual preferences. The basis for such a
claim can only be a standard-bound one; to make judgments on an individual's
preferences from without, rather than from within. Adopting the critical present-aim
theory is to abandon entirely a present-aim theory, or so it seems to me. Parfit
solves one problem by reintroducing another. It is for this reason I have called my
theory something different than Parfit's. My occurrent preference model could be
instead called, following Parfit, the Instrumental Version of the Present Aim theory.
This would not be a good advertising move, since Parfit is critical of that model. Let
us briefly see why he is, and whether he is right.
Parfit introduces a variety of intuition-pumps to help support the need for a
critical present aim theory.  Imagine being future Tuesday indifferent. You are
indifferent, we are asked to believe, about whatever happens on Tuesday. If we
consider an event identical in every respect except that it falls now on a Tuesday,
and now on a Wednesday, this future Tuesday indifferent individual will regard
these otherwise identical events differently. If it is a pleasurable event, and he has
a choice, he would prefer it to occur on Wednesday so that he could enjoy it. If it
is a painful event, like an operation, he would prefer it to occur on a Tuesday, since
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indifference is better than pain. What if, Parfit, asks us, he has a choice between
a painful operation on Wednesday and a much more extremely painful operation
on Tuesday, where the results of the two operations are identical. Our Tuesday
indifferent man will prefer the more painful operation on Tuesday, and this Parfit
reasons is extremely irrational.  Is he right? I don't think so.  However odd, it is not151
irrational on the instrumental version. In fact, it is quite rational. If the man is
indifferent to anything that happens on Tuesday, which we're led to believe, then
it cannot be the case that the pain, measured phenomenologically at least, is
greater on Tuesday than on Wednesday. Even if the pain would be far greater to
anyone else, given his Tuesday indifference, it can not be painful to him. If I am
indifferent to the pain on Tuesday, but not indifferent to the pain on Wednesday,
then I too would choose the operation on Tuesday over Wednesday. It is only
peculiar if I were not in fact Tuesday indifferent.
Parfit did not see it this way because he ruled out both the hedonistic and
instrumental interpretations of self-interest. On most objective criteria, the Tuesday
indifferent man is irrational. But I have defended the hedonistic version against
Parfit's complaint, and moreover, the hedonistic version of self-interest is more
consistent with contractarian strains of thought. Keeping a hedonistic view of self-
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interest, we have no grounds to adopt Parfit's critical version of the present aim
theory. In fact, because our intuitions are different depending on whether we have
ruled out the instrumental-hedonistic version or not, using this thought experiment
to support throwing out the hedonistic-instrumental model is simply an exercise in
question-begging. 
Perhaps the Tuesday indifferent case is too peculiar to be of much use. Parfit
used it as a foot in the door technique. His belief was that we would all see such
preference ordering to be utterly irrational. Once we accepted that, then he could
show that in reality we have certain similar beliefs. For example, we have a
tendency to prefer pains, otherwise avoidable, in the future to lesser pains in the
present. To claim these sorts of things are irrational, as Parfit evidently wants, is to
bring back the Prohibition era. Hangovers are unpleasant, and could have easily
been avoided by abstinence. Unwanted pregnancies, overeating, not saying no to
one's boss, all would become irrational acts and thus susceptible to outlaw. A more
realistic theory, sensitive to psychological realism, will not be so strict with
preferences.
We can now see that the occurrent preference theory is different than Parfit's
present aim model in two respects. The occurrent preference model is instrumental





It is rational to follow what is in our interests, and if this is best done by curtailing
certain of our other interests, so be it. Curtailing one's interests in order to fulfil
other interests one has is not a criticism or refutation of the self-interest theory,
since the bottom line remains the satisfaction of whatever is in your interests; ie.,
what we most want or value. To achieve this, we do need a distinction between
greater and lesser wants. But this cannot be decided on grounds external to the
agent. What counts as lesser and what counts as greater must still be a decision
of the agent herself; not some critical theorist on the outside looking in. One's
occurrent preferences are whatever preferences one has come to embrace.
One thing I have not done yet is defend what is becoming more and more an
antiquated theory of rationality: the instrumental model. I have discussed various
authors' proposals for an alternative theory in chapter four. That these fail in one
respect or another does not all by itself justify my maintaining an instrumental





6.1 THE INSTRUMENTAL MODEL OF RATIONALITY
The occurrent preference model follows from adherence to the standard model of
rationality; i.e., the instrumental model. This standard model has been criticized,
however. A purely instrumental model of rationality is not going to back, at least
easily, reasons to be moral. On the standard model of rationality, which I endorse,
rationality, strictly speaking, can not care less whether one annihilates the human
race so long as one fails to prick one's finger. To be moral, on the other hand, an
individual must be more far-sighted than the strict instrumental model requires.
If what matters is what would in fact survive adequate reflection, then we are
asked to imagine hypothetical situations rather than the real -- and this has the
danger of allowing paternalism when we link our model of rationality to morality. It
is illegitimate for a state to speculate what an individual would have preferred if he
had considered it more. That is a task we can do for ourselves, but not for someone
else. I might here specify strangers, especially. For our friends, those about whom
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we know a fair amount, it may appear less obvious that we can not speculate about
what would be beneficial to them. We may believe ourselves to be doing a friend
a favour by interfering in one of his actions on the basis that he, in this case, did not
fully consider the repercussions against his other preferences by following this
particular one. Nevertheless, our friend is the final judge on whether we helped him.
And this is the point I wish to emphasize: the sovereignty of subjectivity --
subjectivity that Gauthier himself endorses.152
Speculating on our own hypothetical preferences will not make them any
more considered, however. Preferences that are classified as "considered"
according to personal speculation simply equates "considered preferences" with
those upon which there is no further personal deliberation. This will admit such a
wide range of preferences that speaking of "considered" preferences becomes
unintelligible. My claim in the preceding chapter was that if preference ordering is
strictly subjective, then a "considered" preference is simply the occurrent
preference that survived whatever amount of reflection one happened to have given
it (which, note, may be no reflection whatsoever).
If the purpose of rationality is to further one's subjective preferences, it ought
not matter what those preferences are (whether considered or not). If on a whim
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Malcolm Lowry's ex-consul prefers to ride the ferris wheel, then he was rational
(although drunk) to buy a ticket and strap himself in -- even if, moments later, he no
longer had that preference and wondered if he ever had it. That the content of one's
preferences are left unspecified is how the economists envisaged rationality. To
allow the content of rational choice to be restricted, as Gauthier, Baier, Schmidtz,
and Taylor want, is to be open to the charge that one's concept of rationality
introduces a priori normative assumptions.
One possible way to rescue the notion of considered preferences is to argue
that the criterion for distinguishing a considered from an unconsidered preference
is to wait and see whether the occurrent preference was in fact satisfied by the
decided action (or preference choice followed by action to satisfy that preference
choice). If not, then the preference was not, after all, considered. There is some
indication that Gauthier was thinking along these lines. He admits that "some
processes of preference formation may eliminate any self-critical capacity" and that,
as a consequence, "they would be ruled out but ruled out not in themselves but for
their effects."  But this is really the criterion of rationality simpliciter. Any153
(considered or unconsidered) preference will do: if they are satisfied; the action was
rational. If not, then the action was, after all, irrational. If the preference was
Murray 132
      Kurt Baier, "Rationality, Value, and Preference", Social Philosophy154
and Policy, 5, 2, 1988, 42.
satisfied, but led to other preferences being unfulfilled, we may again say that the
action was irrational so long as the unfulfilled preferences were preferred over the
fulfilled preference even at the time of choice. If two preferences are negatively
related (e.g., the preference for smoking and the preference for health), and the
second preference is more preferred, then it turns out to be irrational to have
satisfied the first. This follows without appeal to considered preferences. Plainly, if
preference ordering is strictly subjective, then a considered preference is simply the
occurrent preference.
Clearly, to conceive of rationality as furthering one's preferences, some
weighing of one's preferences must be done that is determined not by an
antecedent criterion but by the agent herself. Once a given preference is weighted
above the others, it is rational to maximize that one. To retain a concept of
rationality that is a mere preference maximizing tool, and hence contentless, we can
not determine in advance what preference ought to be given more weight. We can
not even decide that the preference reflected upon the most ought to be given more
weight. As Baier noted, some things will not change no matter how much more
reflection one makes upon it.  The reflection required in determining that 5 + 7 =154
12 is minuscule compared to the reflection required in assessing whether 37,698
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x 43,621 = 12,375,855,018. That the latter is therefore more "considered" is absurd.
Certain Eastern philosophies, moreover, urge spontaneity as the surer guide to
one's true preferences.
It appears, then, that we can not get any closer an approximation of the
criteria for rationality than the standard instrumental model. All that we have is that
if an act does not further the preferences one had intended to further, and no
external countervailing circumstances are to blame, then there was some
irrationality present. As Gauthier recognized, we can not be any more specific given
that what is rational is at least some fit between an act and an intention. We can not
say, "the act was irrational," for example, without adding, "given the preference
intended to be satisfied." Alternatively, we could say, "the preference itself was
irrational, given the act committed." At least in one circumstance this alternative
view will not be wrong. Preferences must be able to be furthered if what is rational
is to further one's preferences. But this is not at all what Gauthier means by
"considered," and nor is it what Schmidtz had in mind by introducing maeutic
ends.  The restriction is indeed very weak, for the criterion in deciding whether a155
given preference is rational must still be subjective. If one believes an act, x, will
satisfy one's intended preference, one is certainly motivated -- and rational -- to
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enact x given one's beliefs.  And if after the act (which may fail to satisfy the actor's156
preference according to outside observers), the actor nevertheless believes that his
(unrealizable) preference was satisfied, then the preference (and the act) was
rational given that an act could satisfy it according to his (albeit errant) estimations.
Thus the weak criterion that a preference must be realizable is itself limited to solely
the actor's estimations. Otherwise, we would call those great athletes, artists,
explorers, and scientists irrational for trying to accomplish that which others
deemed impossible. The point, here, simply, is that preferences are not the sole
factor of rationality. Rationality concerns the relationship between a preference and
an act. And this is so since it is rational to further one's preferences.
6.2 INFORMATION
I claimed above that rationality concerns the relationship between preferences and
acts. Acts must be conducive to furthering the given preference and the preference
must be such that one can realize it. There is concern, however, that this is not a
sufficient picture of rationality. Due to lack of information, or misinformation,
perfectly reasonable acts may fail to satisfy what Baier would consider perfectly
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reasonable preferences. For this reason, some find it difficult to assess the
rationality of acts without accounting for the availability of correct information. It
would appear that information also plays a role. 
Let us assume that under normal conditions, C , it would be rational for Betty1
to cross the bridge to satisfy her desire to reach the opposite side of the river. In
condition C , unbeknownst to Betty, the bridge is out. Crossing the bridge in C2             2
yields a result contrary to her interests: she falls into the river. Both the act and the
preference are identical under C  and C , yet the result is disastrous in C , not in C1  2        2    1.
If we are to assume that Betty's crossing the bridge in C  was irrational, since it2
failed to satisfy her preference, then we must introduce information as a third
condition of rationality.
This example exhibits a common fact of life; what satisfies a preference one
day will not necessarily satisfy the same preference another day. Actions have to
be assessed, and this must be done relative to available information. Introducing
information as a condition of preference satisfaction, however, looks disastrous for
a moral theory based on occurrent preferences. The moral emphasis on occurrent
preferences depends upon a purely means-end instrumental model of rationality.
What is rational for an agent to pursue is whatever best satisfies that agent's naked
preference. I have throughout Part II of this thesis resisted the temptation to
interpret what we mean by naked preferences as those preferences individuals
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ought to hold. Yet, introducing the criterion of information on rationality does just
that; at least if there is any externalist stricture on what counts as correct or
adequate information. If so, we cannot hope to ground a rationalist ethic on
occurrent preferences alone.
If morality can be enforced through social sanction, and what is moral is
contingent on what is rational from the individual agent's point of view, and we
discover that what is rational for that individual may well be not what he is aware
of, given misinformation or lack of information, then we may legitimately intercede
on that agent's behalf, even if that agent resists our interference. By the introduction
of the concept of information in our notion of rationality, we have quickly moved
from a fundamentally non-interfering philosophy to paternalism.
There is no need for paternalism, however. The role of information comes in
at two distinct levels of discourse: rationality and morality. It is important to keep
these separated. At the moral level, information does play a role. If Betty has paid
a toll to use the bridge to reach the other side, she should expect the bridge will
actually reach the other side. Her expectation arises from the implied agreement to
pay to reach the other side. She paid, therefore she expects and is in fact entitled
to reach the other side. If she is prevented from receiving her expectations in this
case, she is entitled to receive compensation. One cannot be compensated without
being informed of the need for compensation. She is entitled to information that the
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bridge is out. Although she does not expect a cluttered list of things not expected
to happen to the bridge during her crossing, she does expect to be informed of
anything that is expected out of the ordinary. It is out of the ordinary for a bridge to
be out. Hence, Betty has a right to expect a sign, at least, telling her of this
extraordinary fact. The toll operator has a duty to inform Betty that the bridge is out.
If the bridge is publicly owned; that is to say every citizen has paid taxes to
erect that bridge, the state in general has the obligation to inform Betty, and other
tax-payers, that the bridge is out. This does not necessarily mean, however, that
any passerby has a duty to tell her the bridge is out. Admittedly, this complicates
matters. It may seem that although society in general has a duty to inform Betty, no
one in particular has this duty. And this is tantamount to predicting that no one will
in fact tell Betty, unless human nature is such that a certain number of us often act
in the interests of others without being coerced. This may well be true. No moral
theory will forbid anyone from imparting information on willing listeners. Moral
theories differ, however, on whether there is a duty of a particular passerby to tell
Betty that the bridge is out. The principle that "the parties involved are responsible"
is problematic for democratic societies in which the claim is that everyone is
involved. The more involvement, the more diffuse is the responsibility. This speaks
toward privatization, but this is not my concern at this point. My main concern in this
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section is not with the moral implications of information. Rather, I am interested to
know whether information should be factored into our concept of rationality.
Information at the level of rationality is a different matter. According to one
interpretation of the standard instrumental means-end model, what is rational to do
is whatever will satisfy one's preferences. The converse of this is that whatever
does not satisfy one's preferences is irrational. Taken strictly, then, Betty's crossing
the bridge in C  is irrational, since it did not satisfy her preference. This is an absurd2
result (as I shall demonstrate below) and can be avoided quite simply if we take the
instrumental model of rationality to claim that what is rational to do is whatever will
satisfy one's preferences under normal circumstances. Under normal
circumstances, it is rational to cross the bridge. Notwithstanding the disastrous
results occurring from crossing the bridge in C , the act is no less rational for that.2
How is the result absurd if we fail to interpret the instrumental preference-
satisfaction model of rationality without this implicit appeal to normalcy? Ignoring
the normalcy clause is to adopt a view of rationality that claims only acts which
successfully achieve preferences are rational. Parfit defends a "success" version
of rationality,  but I have already argued against it on the grounds that it appeals157
to standards separate from the occurrent preferences of the agent, and thus
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abandons the neutral means-end model.  Another problem with it is that it is simply158
too restrictive. Many countervailing factors may intervene in the fulfillment of one's
desires, and some of these have nothing to do with either the aim or the means
under normal circumstances. If a bomb were placed under the bridge and exploded
while I was crossing it, the failure of satisfying my goal can not be because I was
irrational. If I go out on my lawn to relax and am hit by a drunk driver off course, I
cannot be claimed to be irrational merely because I did not achieve a relaxed state.
Under normal conditions, my actions would have achieved my aims.
These last two examples, more than showing the absurdity of success
theories of rationality, indicate that we require a view of rationality that does not
demand strict requirements about information. Richard Brandt, for example,
declares that an act is rational if and only if it is accompanied by full information.159
We do desire moral culpability for failing to provide information in certain cases. If
every accident was your fault for being irrational (for failing to recognize the
relevant information that indicated the accident was imminent), then no one can be
culpable for harms. Had you known that I was going to shoot you today, you would
not have come. Since you came, your coming was irrational. Since we are not
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responsible for irrational acts of our neighbours, I cannot be responsible for
shooting you. Clearly, this is preposterous.
Arguments that are unsound are not necessarily invalid and we may be
justified in holding a belief even if the belief turns out to be false. In logic and
epistemology, then, we do not hold success theories of validity or of justification.
Neither should we hold success theories of rationality. Demanding that the criteria
of rationality includes correct information makes the theory of rationality a success
theory. This is so because any failure of a plan has a cause. Any cause can be
understood in terms of information. Had this information been available to the
subject, she would not have enacted that plan. Rationality must be less restrictive
than that. A rational act appropriately uses the normal information at hand; no more
is required. There can be no appeal to types of information that one should possess
(at the level of rationality).
Information must play some role, however. What if Betty simply ignored the
sign clearly posted that the bridge was out? We want to say, I presume, that Betty
is irrational for ignoring that information since it has direct relevance to the
satisfaction of her preference. We want to limit the criterion of information in
regards to rationality to only that which is normal to the situation at hand, and no
more. What counts as "normal," however, is difficult to define in general terms. The
normalcy condition of relevant information permits acts that are accidentally
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unsuccessful to be nevertheless deemed rational. That information plays some role
secures the occurrent preference model against the charge that they hold every act
to be rational simply for its having been acted. Rationality is properly open to public
scrutiny. What I have argued for in the preceding chapters is that one's preferences
are not open to public scrutiny. One's acts are, however. And one way acts go
astray is through faulty information. The relevant information must be acquired or
maintained by the agent in an epistemically responsible manner. What counts as
epistemically responsible is also, unfortunately, open to debate.
The role information plays in theories of rationality is akin to the role the
world plays. It is rational to satisfy my preference. To do this, I need to take some
stock on the available means of satisfying my preference. As Gauthier recognized,
part of this includes anticipating the preferences of others. Another part of the
means to satisfying my preferences includes inspecting the available information.
A sign claiming: "Bridge out!" is one of the pieces of information the subject utilizes
in determining how best to get to the other side. She ignores this at her peril, given
her own preferences. Rationality utilizes the available information. To ignore
relevant information that is present is counter to rationality. This, however, is not a
stringent requirement. There is nothing inherent in the concept of rationality, nor
could there ever be, that determines in advance according to some standard what
sorts of information is required for every potential act. Rationality is as neutral to the
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content of information gathered as it is to the aims of the individual. Merely, albeit
importantly, there must be some strictures on how that information has been
gathered. It is not a good sign if it comes about through hasty generalizations, or
messages from one's dead mother in dreams. Actions are cognitively accessible to
epistemic criticism precisely in regards to how the information is gathered or
maintained.
On the other hand, if rationality requires epistemically approved information,
in what sense is this requirement not stringent? Even if the role information plays
in rationality is delegated solely to whatever the individual singles out under normal
conditions, there may be good reason to take stock of more information. The more
information one has, up to a point of saturation, the more likely it is he will satisfy
his preferences. Rationality's goal, recall, is to further preferences. If it is the case
that gathering more information serves rationality's purpose, why then, an objector
may persist, does rationality not require it?
There is a practical problem. How far afield does one search? Searching for
information is understood as instrumental to achieving one's preferences (unless
one prefers to search for information for its own sake). The longer one searches,
the longer one must wait to satisfy the original purpose. Searching for information
without limits will be counterproductive to the goal of satisfying one's preferences.
How can we rationally put a limit on information searches? What would the general
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rule look like? There are three options: (i) antecedent time constraints; (ii)
impositions of quantity of information; and (iii) degree of conviction.
(i) How much time should we devote to information gathering? It will depend
on how damaging preference-unfulfillment is, how impending the choice is, and how
ambiguous the existing information is. How are these determined? By observing the
external world. But to what extent are we required by rationality to make these initial
observations? Asking this, I hope the reader sees, is peculiar. Surely these things
are just given in context of the choice situation. If these are parts of the concerns
that constitute the choice context, they are not themselves requirements of
rationality, but the things with which rationality works; just like the preferences. As
rationality cannot determine what preferences to have or not to have (other than
showing which can and which cannot be realized in the world) rationality also
cannot determine the urgency of the felt need of preference satisfaction, nor the
seriousness the preference has for the individual. Nor can rationality determine that
choices must be made under situations of clarity, since we often do not have the
luxury of acting with clarity. If this is so, then time factors are a variable dependent
on the given preference and the existing context in which it is embedded. It cannot
then be a general criterion of rationality.
(ii) For information to be a condition of rationality, it must be a condition that
is general enough to apply in all choice situations. Claiming that acts are rational
Murray 144
only so long as they have gathered x number of information bits is arbitrary. Such
an imposition cannot successfully be applied across the board, unless the number
is low enough to permit acting immediately on the following sort of algorithm:
preference = {want ice cream}
information = {see ice cream}
action = {eat ice cream}.
If this thought matrix has considered the requisite amount of information, then the
level of information needed to be gathered is satisfied by all acts except for blind
stumblings. Moreover, imposing a criterion of information on our concept of
rationality in this manner ignores quality of information. One good piece of
information may surely suffice, especially over five more bits of false, irrelevant, or
redundant information.
(iii) The last possible rule for information gathering says something like:
gather information until you are satisfied. Typically this is true. We gather more
information only if we are not satisfied with the information that we presently have.
And we stop gathering information when we think we have enough under the
circumstances. Placing the emphasis on personal satisfaction conceives the
concept of rationality in a hedonist manner. The deciding vote is the rational agent
herself. This has been precisely my point all along. If the agent herself determines
the appropriateness of her information, then no external standard of appropriate
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information can have weight over the individual. To recognize this is to concede
that correct information is not a necessary criterion of rationality.
Let us return to Betty's situation. Should she cross the bridge? Is there any
other information that is relevant? In fact, yes, but ex hypothesi it is unknown to her.
Hence, the need for further information is not seen as needed by her. Betty is still
rational for crossing the bridge, given her aims and given the information she had.
If either she gets new information, or alters her preference, then we must reconsider
the rationality of her continuing across the bridge. It is to her advantage, we might
say, for her to have the added information, but this does not detract from the
rationality of her action; we are assessing her action from her own standpoint, and
not from someone else's. It is rational to assess the information one has, but no
stipulation can be made at the level of bare rationality to seek out more information.
What is irrational is to act contrary to one's occurrent preferences and given
information.
The problem with incorporating information into the model of rationality, even
to the limited extent that I have tried here under conditions of normalcy, is that it is
not clear that many of us can meet the requirements most of the time. This would
be tragic for an occurrent preference model. A moral theory that pretends to appeal
to the preferences individuals actually have will fail to convince if it demands
epistemic responsibility beyond psychologically realistic boundaries. If what it takes
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to be epistemically responsible is more than many of us are in fact, it fails to be a
motivating model. Nevertheless, we need a model of rationality that permits criticism
of the connections between means and ends. Information plays some role in this,
but it is a limited role, restricted to what is available given the immediate context.
6.3 INTRANSITIVITY AND INDIFFERENCE
The instrumental model of rationality has recently been under attack from another
quarter. The instrumental model of rationality has it that an act may be rational so
long as it furthers one's preferences. According to von Neumann and Morgenstern,
however, those preferences must themselves meet certain conditions.  These160
constraining conditions are completeness, transitivity, reduction of compound
lotteries, continuity, substitutability or independence, and monotonicity.  Most of161
these assumptions or axioms have met with some complaint.  For example, many162
now believe that intransitive preferences are far more common and reasonable than
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previously suspected, and that therefore no proper theory of rationality should
exclude them.  The implications of a view of rationality that embraces intransitive163
preferences have not yet been fully catalogued, but I wish to point out here that
permitting rather than forbidding intransitive preferences fits rather than clashes
with the occurrent preference model.
It has generally been thought that so long as one's action can reasonably be
expected to satisfy one's preferences, that action is rational. On this model, there
is no constraint on what those preferences are, so long as they can in general be
satisfied. Preferences that cannot reasonably be satisfied are alone deemed unfit
candidates. Typically, this has been thought to be the case with intransitive
preferences. If one's preferences are intransitive, then no action can satisfy one's
preferences, since necessarily, another action or choice would always be
preferable. If Hector prefers A over B and B over C, but C over A, he will have no
rational choice available. If he chooses B, he is worse off than had he chosen A.
Had he chosen C, he is worse off than had he chosen B. But if he had chosen A,
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he is worse off than had he chosen C. It is no wonder, then, that so long as Hector's
preferences are intransitive in this way, he is considered (or until recently would
have been considered) irrational for having such ill-ordered preferences. There is
a constraint, then, of sorts, on the preferences an individual may have to be
counted rational. An individual's preferences must be well-ordered on the traditional
instrumental model of rationality.
Schumm shows how otherwise normal and reasonable preferences,
intermixed with indifferences, can create intransitivity. Imagine we have three boxes
to choose from. In each box there are three marbles (or Christmas ornaments, or
socks, or what-have-you) of three colours each: red, blue, and green. The marbles
are identical, but the hues are slightly different. Box 1 contains r1, b1, and g1, Box
2 has r2, b2, and g2 and Box 3 contains r3, b3, and g3. Our supposition is such that
of the three red marbles, you prefer r1 over r2, but are indifferent between r1 and
r3 as well as between r2 and r3. Since r1 is in Box 1, and r2 is in Box 2, then
everything else being equal, you would prefer Box 1. Everything else is not equal,
however. Of the green marbles, you prefer g2 over g3, but are indifferent to the
subtle hues of g1 over g2 or g3 over g1. Thus, looking only at the desirability of the
green marbles, you would prefer Box 2 over Box 3, since you prefer the green hue
of the marble in Box 2 over the green hue of the marble in Box 3. Meanwhile, you
happen to prefer the blue colour of the marble in the third box over that of the blue
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marble in the first box (b3 over b1), but cannot tell b1 from b2 or b2 from b3. Given
these preferences and indifferences, one can see from the chart below that there
is no box that will be most preferred.
Box1 Box2 Box3 Box1
r1 > r2 = r3 = r1
b1 = b2 = b3 > b1
g1 = g2 > g3 = g1164
If you are given a choice between only two boxes, your preferences can yield
a choice. You would prefer Box 1 over Box 2, because you prefer r1 to r2 and are
indifferent to the differences between g1 and g2 as well as between b1 and b2. If,
on the other hand, you were given a choice between Box 2 and Box 3, you would
prefer Box 2 because although you are indifferent between the reds and the blues
in the two boxes, you prefer the green colour in Box 2 over the green colour in Box
3. If, instead, you were given only the choice between boxes 1 and 3, you would
pick Box 3 because you prefer g3 over g1 and for all intents and purposes you
cannot tell the other colours apart. What this particular preference ordering means,
however, is that although you will prefer Box 1 to Box 2, and Box 2 to Box 3, you will
prefer Box 3 to Box 1. This proves that your otherwise reasonable preferences are
intransitive and thus incapable of yielding rational choice.
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What Sobel and Schumm have appeared to show, then, is that intransitive
preferences, that can obviously yield no rational choice, is a result of occurrent
preferences. So long as preferences are unconstrained, it is not the case that
rational choice can follow in all cases. The question I wish to address concerns the
implications of permitting intransitivity in our model of instrumental rationality.
Previous attempts at preserving the standard consequentialist models of
rationality against this (or similar) problem(s) have been somewhat ad hoc. If part
of the definition of rational preferences is that they be action-guiding, then however
reasonable the origins of such intransitive preferences, it is not rational to maintain
those preferences. Hansson, for example, adopts this approach.  Gauthier, too,165
in solving prisoner's dilemmas opts for altering one's preference schemas on the
basis that the old preferences are unproductive (if not intransitive).  David166
Schmidtz argues that a proper model of rationality can assess the preferences or
ends one has on the basis of higher-order, or maieutic ends.  However reasonable167
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these approaches appear, they put the cart before the horse. We now no longer
define rational acts according to preferences held, but determine what counts as
rational preferences according to a preconceived outcome -- an outcome
independent of one's occurrent preferences; preferences that may in fact be
intransitive. Rationality on such a view loses its tie with preferences and becomes,
instead, standard bound.  To preserve the concept of rationality as a tool to satisfy168
(or maximize) preferences while at the same time admitting that many common
preferences are ill-ordered is to concede that rationality cannot be action-guiding
in all circumstances. 
Nothing should be surprising in this admission. Moreover, there should be
nothing damning against a preference-based model of rationality that concedes that
rationality cannot be action-guiding in all circumstances. The commonality of
intransitivity of preferences stems, we have seen, from indifference. That we are
indifferent between two options makes it impossible to discover a uniquely rational
choice between them. That is not unusual. There is not any rational choice to make
between them on the simple grounds that we have no preference to satisfy between
these two options. The instrumental model of rationality is not stymied because of
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the existence of indifferences. It may yet be rational to choose one of them, rather
than none of them. A simple reminder is the tale of Buriden's Ass. Being indifferent
between the two haystacks, the ass cannot make a rational choice. Failing this, it
remains standing in the middle like a computer program in a loop, unable to execute
any further command. The result is it starves, having failed to choose either. If the
sole preference of the ass was to eat from the best haystack, and that both
haystacks were equal, then its preference, as put, could not be rationally satisfied.
It is highly unlikely, however, that eating from the best haystack is the only
operative preference the ass has. A higher-order preference, operating
simultaneously with the preference to eat from the best haystack and in fact fuelling
that preference, is the preference to simply eat. Given this higher order preference
of the ass, the ass's indecision is clearly irrational.
There is a difference, of course, between indifference and intransitivity of
preferences. In cases of indifference we admit that no choice will ever be the most
preferred choice, and acting on one rather than another does not mean we will
inevitably be disappointed by that choice. This is not the case with intransitive
preferences. Acting on one of a set of intransitive preferences means that we will
necessarily be disappointed. Since we will be necessarily disappointed by any of
our choices, however, we are indifferent to that set of choices.
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The emphasis on occurrent preferences, recall, requires there be no external
constraints on preferences. So long as one's actions satisfy one's preferences, that
action is rational. And since moral acts are a subset of rational acts, at least within
the narrow ethics tradition, then the same applies to moral acts; that they satisfy
individual preferences. If one's preferences are intransitive, however, no action can
satisfy one's preferences; another action or choice would always be preferable. As
we have seen, making a censure against intransitive preference orderings would
be arbitrary and post hoc. The desire to avoid such imposed strictures against
individual preferences fits with the occurrent preference model. The occurrent
preference model wishes to place no constraint on individual preferences, and nor
need they. So long as one's preference orderings are intransitive, that individual will
be unable to effectively pursue her preferences. The constraint on rationality is her
own; it is not imposed on her from theoreticians. It is simply the imposition of
constraints on preferences from theory, rather than the subject, that is disapproved
of by the occurrent preference model. No pretensions are made that everyone have







In chapter four, a distinction was made between preferences that were considered,
and preferences that were not. The argument there supported abandoning the
recent move in contractarianism to base ethics on considered preferences. In
chapter five we introduced the theory of occurrent preferences. Now we are in a
better position to see more fully why reliance on considered preferences becomes
no longer a preference-based theory. Reliance on considered preferences as a
basis for moral theory introduces standards by which we evaluate individual
preferences. Reliance on standards despairs of the original goal to link ethics to
individual preferences; it does not embrace that goal.
Without reliance on considered preferences, it appears we cannot escape
prisoner's dilemma situations. Yet reliance on considered preferences leaves the
very origins and impetus of contractarianism; to ground morality on individual self-
interest. Thus we are at a crossroads. Should contractarians abandon their original
goal of linking ethics to individual preferences? Or can a wholly preference-based
version of contractarianism succeed at grounding morality?
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I shall argue for the latter. In this chapter, I propose a theory that is
preference based without reliance on considered preferences and that is
nevertheless sufficient to engender moral constraints on human action. I call it
"occurrent preference-based contractarianism" to distinguish it from theories that
place constraints on preferences. For short, we may refer to it as occurrent
contractarianism.
7.1 OCCURRENT CONTRACTARIANISM
Self-interest must be determined by the individual alone. What the experts decide
is in my interest may be of no interest to me. Basing morality on self-interest is the
fundamental germ of contractarianism, and any reading that subverts this is to be
resisted. Contractarianism must remain preference-based, rather than standard-
bound, in order to remain consistent with the notion that morality should be
motivating to rational self-interested people. Occurrent contractarianism is an open-
ended preference-based ethic that defines legitimacy according to the occurrent
preferences the concerned parties actually have. We do not care whether their
preferences are considered to the requisite degree or not, so long as those are the
preferences they actually have.
One's occurrent interests are whatever interests an individual happens to
hold, somewhat consistently, over a period of time. They are not simply "current"
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interests, for occurrent interests are a little more steadfast than current interests.
But neither are they standard-based interests, for it is still questionable whether one
should hold these interests occurrently given someone's estimation of
reasonableness. Occurrent interests may well collide with standard-based interests.
It may be in my occurrent interest to smoke, for example, but it is not likely to be in
my interest according to a standard of health. If goodness is defined by one's
occurrent interests, then it is good for me to smoke (ignoring the complication of
second-hand smoke). Whereas, if we look to see what is good for me in reason if
not in passion, then it is bad for me to smoke. There is danger of false stepping if
we move from the one (grounded in human psychology) to the other (more morally
appealing) without further ado.169
Moreover, and importantly, the criteria for consistency and duration is not a
theoretical imposition about the sorts of preferences rational or reasonable
individuals should possess. It is personal experience that determines the success
of particular preferences. Preferences, let us not forget, are useful to individuals
only so long as they can be satisfied. The satisfaction of preferences is not solely
an individual matter. It depends on their social-psychological environment. The
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individuals then, in this sense, do not choose the preferences that they hold
somewhat consistently over a period of time. These preferences evolve, as it were,
from the social, psychological, and historical factors in which the agents are
embedded. Occurrent preferences are fashioned from the individual's abilities to
satisfy initial preferences within the constraints of the real world. It is important to
recognize that this constraint, although external, is not theory-driven. It is therefore
not standard-based in the relevant sense. Occurrent preferences accrue from
personal experience alone. The individual is still the sole judge.
I cannot say that Hobbes was either a standard-based contractarian or an
occurrent contractarian. Reading Hobbes as a standard-based contractarian,
although consistent with his premise that people would agree to a sovereign in
reason if not in passion,  is not consistent with his premise that people define what170
is good based on their own interests.  We could make this consistent by claiming171
that what we mean by people's "own interests" are what they would agree to in
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reason. But this does not capture the flavour of the psychological premises Hobbes
endorses, for we are given the distinct expectation that an individual's notion of the
good is sacrosanct no mater how perverse or unreasoned. The interests that
defined individual good, at least in the Hobbesian state of nature, must be occurrent
interests. To remain consistent with Hobbes's methodology of deriving an ethic from
non-moral beginnings, we must, then, never supplant our occurrent interests with
standard-bound ones.
7.2 HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACTARIANISM
Occurrent contractarianism places great emphasis on the preferences individuals
actually have. Recent trends within the contractarian tradition focus on hypothetical
preferences, preferences individuals would have if suitably placed. At first glance,
this appears to be opposed to occurrent contractarianism for hypothetical
preferences are, by definition, not the preferences individuals happen to have, but
merely suppositions about what preferences they would have under different
circumstances. This is mistaken. Satisfactory versions of hypothetical
contractarianism must be dependent on occurrent preferences, not supplant them.
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Recall that the acid test for morally permissible acts under hypothetical
contractarianism is in deciding what would be reasonable for an individual to have
consented to, suitably situated and with sufficient knowledge.  Two problems172
emerge for the hypothetical approach to contractarianism. One is that the
agreement falls out of the picture entirely. Someone may explicitly agree to
something, but had he been suitably placed and possessed sufficient knowledge
he may not have made that explicit agreement. Buying a used car, for example,
especially for the mechanically disinclined, is often a matter where further
information would have affected the agreement. It is no longer clear, then, whether
there are grounds to claim the bargainer is not liable to fulfilling his agreement. On
the one hand, he made the agreement and thus is liable. On the other hand, had
he been suitably placed, he would not have made such an agreement, and thus,
hypothetically speaking, the contract is null and void. Under hypothetical
contractarianism, moral grounding may have nothing whatsoever to do with the
agreements in fact. For this reason, Harman believes Gauthier's book, Morals by
Agreement, is a misnomer.  Hypothetical contractarianism, then, looks more like173
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an appeal to standard-based ethics since moral permissibility is no longer founded
on the preferences individuals happen to have, but on those they ought to have,
given suitable placement. The issue is not did they agree, but should they have.
Whereas under preference-based versions of contractarianism the agreement is
what is sacrosanct. So long as the people agree, we must take it that they, at any
rate, believe their agreement is in their best interests, given their situation.
Otherwise they would not have agreed to it.174
The other problem follows from removing the emphasis on agreements.
Instead of agreements, the morality of actions must be based on what is rational,
or reasonable, for the concern is what rational people, suitably placed, would
reasonably agree to. Clearly these concepts have an important link to morality, but
they cannot be a grounding for morality without the concept of agreement. Rawls,
for example, considers that what is reasonable includes proposing fair terms of
cooperation with others and being willing to abide by those terms.  It is true that175
reasonable and fair proposals offered by individuals willing to abide by the terms
of the proposal will increase the likelihood of an agreement. And this is important
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given individuals' desires for the mutual benefit accrued from agreements.
Nevertheless, the proposal must be accepted, not merely proposed, and certainly
not refused, if acting on it is to be considered moral. However reasonable an offer
is, we cannot act on it if it does not meet with the agreement of all concerned
parties. Agreement cannot be taken out of the picture.
 Perhaps most problematic for the standard-based model that bases interests
on what is rational is the plain fact that we are not, after all, very rational.  Given176
this, what people agree to if they were rational, amounts to saying what is moral is
what people will not likely agree to in fact (being not rational). And this unmotivating
notion of standard-based agreement is not worth the paper it’s not written on.
Both problems are due to a misread, fortunately. Hypothetical
contractarianism is applicable where we do not know of the reactions of others.
There is no data on their occurrent preferences. Nevertheless we can imagine in
certain cases how they would likely react, assuming a certain degree of normalacy.
Occurrent contractarianism cannot be action guiding should the actor be
considering the likely preferences of others for an act not yet committed. Here,
hypothetical contractarianism appeals to the likely preferences rational individuals
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would hold. Nothing that I have said about occurrent contractarianism will run
counter to this notion of hypothetical contractarianism.
Likewise, the complaint that hypothetical contractarianism idealizes
rationality beyond practical import is mistaken. Quite the opposite is the intent.
Under hypothetical scenarios, we are concerned not with what is rational for people
to prefer, per se, but what people will likely prefer. Since there is some degree of
guess work in such vague considerations (recall that we are considering the
reactions of others to acts we are merely considering committing), we assume the
agents are rational -- not to the degree that their preferences are likely to be
different than what they are under occurrent conditions, but simply to rule out a
range of possible abnormal preferences. I cannot decide that it is morally
permissible for me to burn down Betty's house because I assume Betty would like
that. What I must assume is that she would not like that. If she really did like her
house being burnt, that would be merely bizarre, and could not by itself justify my
burning her house down if I had no antecedent reason to suspect that preference.
We want to constrain hypothetical scenarios to reality or to real occurrent
preferences as much as possible. The claim, "...what people would rationally prefer
under suitable circumstances..." is not meant to rule as inadmissible the majority of
human preferences. The complete opposite is its intent: to include real preferences
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of the majority of real people. These normal run-of-the-mill occurrent preferences
are precisely what contractarianism is asking us not to violate.
Not all hypothetical versions of contractarianism, I admit, is as strongly
committed to psychological realism as Gauthier's model. Rawls's version, for
example, is not. When Rawls speaks of people being "suitably placed" he means
something quite different from Gauthier. All Gauthier means is a qualifier in the
lines of "all other things being equal." If for some reason Betty thought I was
suggesting to leave her alone forever, while I really meant to burn down her house,
we can say she was not suitably placed to properly hear my request, and thus her
affirmative response is not to be taken at face value. Rawls's notion of being
suitably placed means precisely not the normal state of affairs. He means, what
would people agree to, not under their normal situations, but under a veil of
ignorance.  The "suitable place" in Rawls's case is a place no one has ever been177
in, could be in, nor, given their occurrent interests, would they ever want to be in.
We should be wary that hypothetical contractarianism can come in two forms,
realistic (or occurrent-preference sensitive) and unrealistic (or occurrent-preference
insensitive). 
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7.3 SENSITIVE STANDARD-BASED CONTRACTARIANISM
In part two, we dismissed standard-based contractarianism in favour of preference-
based contractarianism. Perhaps there are two types of standard-based contractar-
ianism. One may be more sensitive to occurrent preferences than the other. The
less-sensitive one may find grounds to do something to you against your occurrent
wishes even if you never come to see the benefit of it. This insensitive version is
simply standard-bound paternalism which I have already argued is antithetical to
contractarianism proper. The more-sensitive one, however, may claim we or the
state are permitted to do something to you against your occurrent wishes so long
as you will, in time, come to appreciate it. Let us imagine that Scrooge will thank us
later if we now abduct him and force him to work for Mother Theresa in Somalia.178
So long as Scrooge will himself thank us in time, once he has undergone the
appropriate change, then it is morally permissible to abduct him now on this more
occurrent preference-sensitive standard-based contractarian grounds. Of course,
if we abduct him now he will be screaming and kicking. His occurrent preferences
we ignore.
Occurrent-time-sensitive standard-based contractarianism, however, violates
the same basic contractarian tenet as the insensitive version. Both amount to
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denying the contractarian premise that people decide their own good, and that
morality is simply a device to secure the free pursuit of those goods, no matter what
they are. If this is the germ of contractarianism, even this more sensitive standard-
based contractarian doctrine abandons contractarian principles for having the
standards decide the good of the people rather than the people. Let me explain.
7.3.1 Drug Rehabilitation
Preferences are to some degree fluid, and are subject to change given the
circumstances one is in. That I prefer Betty and not her identical twin Sue may be
partly due to the happenstantial fact that I met Betty in a certain circumstance and
Sue in a different circumstance. Circumstances influence preferences. This
psychological fact lends support to the claim that it is perfectly legitimate to force
one person into a situation knowing that through the process that person's
preferences will come to change, and in time appreciate that coercion. Forced drug
rehabilitation, for example, seems like the sort of thing that can be justified on this
occurrent-sensitive but standard bound version of contractarianism, as with many
therapeutic treatments. Importantly, forced drug rehabilitation and non-consensual
therapy do not seem to be justifiable on straight occurrent contractarian grounds.
A dark side to occurrent-time-sensitive standard bound contractarianism is
that this is the principle of all hypnosis or brain-washing techniques. We cannot
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justify lobotomy merely on the grounds that after the operation the patient can be
made to be happy with it. So the justifiability of what we may call "therapeutic"
coercion must be grounded on a principle other than what the individual will feel
about it after the event. This principle can only be standard-bound, not occurrent
preference-based. Drug addicts typically feel horrible at certain times. During these
times, they are quite capable of wishing to no longer be drug addicts. They may
even voice this preference. That they nevertheless remain addicted is precisely part
of being addicted. That we take the initiative to lock a drug addict in a room and
forbid his taking more of the addicted drug may well be in line, then, with one of the
addict's occurrent preferences. This is the reason for its justifiability, if it is justified.
Therapy appeals directly to one of the patient's occurrent preferences, not to what
their occurrent preference would be after the transformation.179
7.3.2 Surprise Parties
There are still some hard cases, however. A surprise party for Betty is an innocuous
activity that appears to be justified, if justified at all, only by the welcome it would
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receive after the fact.  Perhaps Betty has never voiced her desire for a surprise180
party. Giving her a surprise party, then, can not seemingly be justified in the
occurrent lines as described above. With subtle imagination, we can see that
surprise parties and non-consensual therapeutic procedures, if they are to be
justified at all, can be justified on occurrent grounds solely. To give a surprise party,
I am not acting on an unrealistic assumption of what Betty's response will be.
Rather, knowing Betty the way I do, I can safely bet she would enjoy a surprise
party. I make this educated supposition based on her occurrent preferences which
I know. For example, she likes parties. That there is room for an occurrent
justification can be more easily seen by trying to justify giving a surprise party to a
stranger. If fifty percent of the population dislike surprise parties, I have a fifty
percent chance of failure in pleasing the stranger. Going ahead with it, then, would
be difficult to justify on occurrent grounds. If he is pleased after the fact, and thanks
me for it, this is more by fluke than providing justification to my actions. Or consider
giving a surprise party to someone we have good reason to suspect greatly dislikes
such things. I submit that we would not be justified in doing so even if the recipient
changed her mind after the event.
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The difference in the antecedent justification between the three cases (giving
a surprise party to someone who likes surprise parties, to someone we have no
idea whether they like surprise parties, and to someone we have good reason to
suspect greatly dislikes surprise parties) must be based on the occurrent
preferences of the individuals we are dealing with. This should indicate that these
cases are not to the point. They do not show where "considered" preferences trump
occurrent ones, not in these otherwise innocuous scenarios, let alone in cases of
much greater social significance.
7.3.3 Suicide
The above response can also be employed in the following sort of case: What if
someone you know quite well intends to commit suicide, and you know they would
rather not kill themselves if only they had more time to think about it under better
situations. Does occurrent contractarianism forbid interfering in such cases? If so,
so much the worse for occurrent contractarianism.
The answer is that stopping your friend from suicide does not (at least
necessarily) abrogate occurrent grounds for contractarianism. If you know someone
quite well, this means, we assume, you also know their occurrent preferences.
Recall that occurrent preferences are not mere whims, although they can be. They
tend to be longer standing dispositions and preferences. To know someone and to
Murray 170
      For an informative discussion on this matter, see Gerald Dworkin,181
The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989, 115-120.
know she is in a particular circumstance that would prevent her from recognizing
her own occurrent preferences gives you reason to step in. So long as we act on
occurrent preferences we know she endorses, this is consistent with occurrent
contractarianism. You are acting on what you have good reason to assume to be
her occurrent preference; what she would likely prefer given normal circumstances.
Acting on realistic or occurrent-preference-sensitive hypothetical preferences does
not violate the intent behind occurrent contractarianism. There would be a violation
of occurrent contractarian thought if we act instead on merely attributed
preferences; preferences she may not endorse, but which we have falsely attributed
to her. Pseudo-psychological claims to unearth one's "true" occurrent preferences
from beneath the veneer of suppression are to be suspected. It is not an occurrent
preference unless it is actually endorsed by the agent herself.
7.3.4 Unconsciousness and Consent
What about operating on unconscious patients? Do doctors who operate without
consent violate contractarian moral codes? In practice, unconsciousness is equated
with consent.  We assume that the patient would consent to be treated if he were181
conscious. Being wrong about this does not mean the operation was not justified,
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after all. We were justified, but wrong in this case. And this shows that justification
of acts on others is grounded on occurrent preferences, and not on the preferences
people have after the fact. For we do not say the operation in this case was
unjustified merely because it failed, or had the unconscious patient known, he
would have refused. The operation was justified based on assumed occurrent
preferences, or hypothetically defined occurrent preferences. And we were justified
in making that assumption given the occurrent preferences most people have for
survival.
Showing the justification of drug rehabilitation, surprise parties, preventing
suicide attempts, and operating on unconscious patients does not require an appeal
to standards beyond normal or hypothetical occurrent preferences.
7.4 FURTHER CONSTRAINTS?
Occurrent contractarianism has other problems, mind you. The largest is its
apparent inability to ground any duty to stick to one’s agreements. That I borrow
money today on the condition of repaying it with interest on Tuesday may well be
in my occurrent interest today, but not necessarily in my occurrent interests on
Tuesday. Basing morality on occurrent interests seems, in fact, to be the very
antithesis of what we want. Occurrent interests are notoriously vain, base, ignorant,
lazy, sensuous, and short-sighted. Morality, one would think, is designed to
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overrule these sorts of petty motivations. Moreover, even granting that not all
occurrent interests need be immoral, the very fact that I may have conflicting
occurrent interests does not bode well for a theory that hopes to be action-guiding.
Surely some constraint on occurrent interests is needed if we wish to base the
institution of morality on them. That it appears in my self-interest to burn Betty's
house down does not make it thereby morally permissible to do so! 
Further constraints are typified by Gauthier's proposal of considered
preferences. I believe, however, that further constraints on occurrent interests are
unnecessary within the occurrent contractarian tradition. Contractarianism is not a
form of ethical egoism. It does not say simply: "Do whatever is in your occurrent
interests, however unconsidered." This is the state of nature, after all, and contrac-
tarians are anxious to escape the state of nature. The reason contractarianism is
not a form of ethical egoism is because of its emphasis on agreements. As Gauthier
argues, the moral sphere is not a parametric game, where actors take themselves
to be the sole variable in a fixed environment. Rather, agents interact with others,
and interaction involves strategic choice,
in which the actor takes his behaviour to be but one variable among
others, so that his choice must be responsive to his expectations of
others' choices, while their choices are similarly responsive to their
expectations.182
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What is in my interest must be tempered by necessity with what is in your interest.
If we wish to interact, our individual interests must be compromised somewhat. My
planned behaviour toward Betty is inadmissible, not because it is not in my
occurrent interest; nor because it is not in my considered or standard-based
interest, but simply because it is not (or not likely to be) in Betty's interest.
Occurrent self-interest is already naturally constrained by the social-psychological
conditions in which we find ourselves. Occurrent contractarianism emphasizes the
furthering of self-interest (at least as far as morality is concerned) within the
confines of an interpersonal arena.  183
The contractarian credo is this: Whatever an individual has agreed to is
morally permissible, so long as the agreement was voluntary and no one not party
to the agreement was adversely affected. It is necessarily morally permissible since
morality for contractarians concerns human interaction. That an agreement was
made shows that all parties concerned agree. There is no more to morality than
making sure this minimal condition is met in any interaction. Or at least, any further
demands of morality become less motivating from that point forward. Occurrent
self-interest comes into the picture as a matter of psychological realism. What I
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would agree to will be whatever improves my baseline by my own estimations. It is
mere psychology to point out that this is the motive behind our actions. Where
agreement is, there self-interested motivations are satisfied. Hence, the agreed
upon arrangement, whatever it is, is necessarily rational. And so long as
cooperation, as evidenced by making and abiding by agreements, is the
cornerstone of morality, rationality and morality have a clear link.
Morality is tied to occurrent preferences, however, only so long as
agreements are kept. But the rationality behind making agreements is not
necessarily the same thing as the rationality behind keeping agreements. In the
following chapter, I shall explain why it is rational that we would adopt an
enforcement structure to ensure against defection, while at the same time explain
why this does not abrogate the supremacy of occurrent preferences.
      Anthony de Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public184
Goods Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, 100.
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Chapter 8
HOW PREFERENCE-BASED CONTRACTS ARE BINDING
The genesis of contractarian theory is to ground ethics on individual preferences.
Contractarianism is committed to being a preference-based moral theory. In order
to serve the fundamental purpose of concerned parties, contractarianism must in
some manner give rise to a choice-rule which is preference-dependent and
standard-independent. The rule must produce the social choice from the orderings
of the individual preferences. It must not produce it from anything else. Domain
restriction contradicts this principle. It entails that preference does not prevail;
rather some standard does. As de Jasay recognized, if a standard is decisive, it
either produces what is preferred, in which case the standard is redundant, or it
overrides preferences and produces a standard bound social choice.  Hence no184
meaningful, non-pious domain-restriction can be implicit in contractarianism. De
Jasay remarks:
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In sum, the conditions under which a social-decision rule would be
unanimously preferred or judged indifferent to another require that,
one way or another, those called upon to choose the rule should
ignore their particular preferences and interests, becoming either
superhuman Founding Fathers or subhuman zombie clones of each
other. Failing this, the social-choice rule must itself be selected by
non-unanimous `social choice'; the logical and moral circularity
involved gets no less unsatisfying for being disguised.185
Standard-bound contractarianism is inconsistent with the raison d'etre of contractar-
ianism: to have social choices made under a rule which selects states of affairs for
how well they are liked (preference-based rule) instead of for what they are
(standard-bound rule).  I have argued in the preceding chapter for a version of186
preference-based contractarianism I call occurrent contractarianism. In this chapter,
I shall explain how contracts are binding for a preference-based version of
contractarianism.
There are two issues at stake here. On the one hand, we want to know how
it is in an individual's occurrent interest to stick to his agreements when it entails
paying debts. The second involves enforcement. How can a model relying solely
on occurrent preferences permit enforcement to protect against defectors? I
conclude that an enforcement agency is needed to ensure against agreement-
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defectors. Nothing that I say in this chapter makes a commitment on the necessity
of a state, however. Enforcement may be supplied by private agencies. And if
enforcement is equipped by a state rather than a private agency (or agencies),
nothing of what I say here constrains me to any claim about the power of the state
beyond the minimal role of contract enforcement. Speculations on these issues are
reserved for part four of this thesis.
8.1 PROMISES, DEBTS, AND ASSURANCE
Occurrent contractarianism faces the following difficulty: Contracts remain
sacrosanct even if preferences change after the fact. To defend the sanctity of
contracts is seemingly to abandon hope of grounding them on individual
preference. How then, on the view of occurrent contractarianism, are contracts
binding?
Recent attempts at grounding contractarianism on individual preferences
have, it seems to me, failed for clandestinely adopting "standard-bound" policies.
To do so abandons contractarianism; not saves it. The problem is, can we support
a preference-based contractarianism without slipping into standard bound appeals?
Claiming that it is in my self-interest, simpliciter, to keep a promise seems
unsatisfying since in many cases it is not, unless we broaden our "self-interest" to
include some notion of what is really in my self-interest and admit that this may be
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contrary to what actually is in my self-interest. The problem with this has already
been stated.  We move from preference-based rationales to standard-bound ones.187
Another possible answer is to tie the moral obligation of adhering to one's compacts
by the antecedent moral obligation not to harm another. This too fails. If contracts
are binding because of the harm principle, then it would appear that the basis of
morality is not contracts, but simply the harm principle. Contracts would be
legitimate so long as they are not in violation of the harm principle. If so,
contractarianism would be redundant; it would be entirely subsumed under the
harm-principle. In point of fact, it is the reverse. The harm principle is not the
foundation of morality if what we mean by "foundation" is an underlying non-moral
reason to be moral. The appeal of not harming another, all by itself, is a moral
appeal. How we ground morality, according to contractarians, is by claiming that it
is in our self-interest to accept a universalized rule not to harm people. Since we
are roughly equal with one another, we would fare worse if harming others were the
norm. The chances of our being harmed would be greatly increased, and any net
benefit would be greatly reduced. The harm principle, then, is legitimized precisely
by what people (would) agree to. It would be circular, then, and of the vicious
variety, if we attempt to defend the enforceability of contracts (an aspect crucial to
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the justification of contractarianism as a whole) based on the harm principle, while
at the same time maintaining that the harm principle is itself justified on
contractarian grounds.
The harm principle, moreover, cannot limit acceptable contracts because, by
itself, it is not sufficient. We need a further criterion to decide what counts as harm.
An identical act in identical circumstances may count as "harm" for one group but
not another. To forbid certain acts on the grounds that some are believed to be
harmed by acts otherwise deemed innocuous would not meet with general
agreement. Pornography, for example is considered a "harm" to some groups, but
it is non-contractarian to thereby forbid it among all groups. That would be
paternalism. To accommodate what counts as harm in a way consistent with how
disparate people actually feel about the matter must be decided on an ad hoc basis,
and this can only be successful if we leave it to the individual preferences of
concerned parties.  We have moved from the "harm-principle" as being a188
constraint on contracts, to contracts being a constraint on the "harm principle."
8.1.1 Defaults
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De Jasay has claimed, and rightly so, that there are two sorts of defaults and that
only one needs to be enforced. In first-degree defaults, the unfairness is "benefit-
based," that is to say, there is benefit in defaulting. On the presumption that we are
all utility maximizers, there is a motive for pursuing any benefit, and hence
enforcing adherence to contracts is necessary when benefits from defection is
perceived to exist.  Second-degree defaults, however, do not require enforcement189
or punishment. This is when all parties to the agreement mutually defect. The end-
product is the status quo. No one is worse off, although they are not as well off as
they might have been.  The distinction is that first-order defects are unilateral190
defects, and second-order defects are cases where the contract has been mutually
annulled.
8.1.2 Spot and Forward Contracts
There is a further distinction important to contractarians which is helpful in seeing
the viability of preference-based contractarianism. The distinction concerns the
timing of the contract. In a spot contract, no time elapses between the promise and
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the performance of an agreement, and all performances occur simultaneously.191
Most ordinary exchanges are spot contracts. For example, giving a clerk money for
a pair of boots is a typical example of a spot contract. The performances of each
party to the agreement are mutually conditional upon the other party's performance.
Spot contracts are intrinsically self-enforcing since neither party to the contract
values what he has to give up more than what he stands to get.  In a half-spot,192
half-forward contract, one half of the agreement is performed immediately, but the
other part of the bargain will be performed at a later time. The second performance
is contingent on the first performance, but not vice versa. The second is deferred
consideration. The lending of money and the future repayment of the debt is an
example of a half-spot, half-forward contract. These hybrid contracts are intrinsically
not self-enforcing since there is no natural incentive to repay debts. In a forward
contract, two simultaneously deferred performances are promised. All forward
contracts are spot exchanges at a future date. Forward contracts have some
tendency to be self-enforcing since we assume the promising is on the grounds of
all parties benefiting from the expected exchange. They are not intrinsically self-
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enforcing, however, since the future brings with it many unknown intermediating
factors. Like the spot exchange, defection from forward contracts will not likely be
of the first-order.193
8.1.3 Assurance
De Jasay attributes Hobbes's mistake in assuming contractarianism leads to
absolute sovereignty on his failing to accommodate well the distinction between
spot and forward contracts.  If spot-contracts are self-enforcing, then agreements194
and cooperation are possible in the state of nature; something that Hobbes was
unwilling to admit. It is not at all clear that Hobbes was wrong on this, however. De
Jasay is right that spot-contracts are intrinsically self-enforcing concerning the
possibility of any first-degree default. If you fail to give me the money, I will not give
you the boots. But it is not the case that spot-contracts can intrinsically defeat
second-degree defaults. We may both be too suspicious of the other to risk
performing our part of the exchange. It is true that I may want a pair of boots more
than the money in my pocket, but surely I want both the boots and my money more
than one alone. But since you can witness my every action, you will not likely be
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dupe enough to fall victim to any first-degree default in spot-contracts. De Jasay is
right about that, but it does not follow that spot contracts are thereby intrinsically
self-enforcing. So long as we are roughly equal in character traits, you are likely to
prefer having both the boots and the money as well. Or, to put the matter in reverse,
above all you would like to avoid ending up with nothing. Me too. Thus, without
securing against second-order defaults, it is not clear that we can eradicate
ourselves from the state of nature.
To escape the state of nature, it appears we need to enforce against second-
degree defaults as well. The main reason for this is to solve an assurance problem,
not a prisoner's dilemma.  Even if people prefer to make and keep agreements,195
they will be reticent in doing so if they lack assurance that others will abide by the
terms of the agreements. Given this reluctance, and given mutual desires for benefit
through cooperative agreements with others, people will have an occurrent interest
in removing obstacles to agreements. Enforcement against default will achieve this.
So long as there is an enforcement structure against default, it will be in individuals'
interests to voluntarily make and keep agreements.
8.2 ENFORCEMENT
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That people will voluntarily agree to enforcement is true only so long as the
enforcement incurs less cost than the benefit received through agreements. We
have seen two ways in which we cannot explain how or why contracts are held
sacrosanct. Standard-bound impositions fail the contractarian requirement of being
individually motivating. The harm-principle is itself justified by the moral force of
contracts, not the reverse. What we need is a positive account of how to make this
claim without abandoning our reliance on individual preference.
8.2.1 Formalism
De Jasay distinguishes two approaches: formalism and realism.  Under formalism,196
a contract that is recognized to exist is eo ipso binding and entitles the promisee to
enforcement. The adequacy of the consideration is not a factor. As de Jasay
remarks, selling a kingdom for a horse is a valid contract.197
Under a realist interpretation, it is not the form of the contract that is binding:
it is the merit of the case at hand that earn these contracts the socially bestowed
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rank of enforceability.  In other words, teleological considerations are what matters198
in deciding the enforceability of contracts.
De Jasay rejects formalism. It is apparently unfair. "Where neither party has
performed and neither has suffered from reliance on the other's expected perfor-
mance, where is the basis for prescribing a remedy?"  De Jasay sees formalism,199
then, as forcing people to abide by contracts made where all parties have expressly
vowed to annul the contract. If this is indeed an implication of formalism, de Jasay
is right to reject it. There need not be such an implication, however. Recall the
distinction between first and second-degree defaults. Since mutual defection is as
having no contract at all (the status quo), enforcing against that is brute state
control. Being forced to make and keep an "agreement" is not really agreeing at all.
No contractarian, whether a formalist or realist, would accept such an anti-
contractarian resolve to the problem of contract enforcement. It is a solution that is
certainly not preference-based. Thus, only first-order defaults pose difficulties for
contractarians.
If we re-look at what de Jasay finds as intolerable in the formalist position,
it is the supposed enforceability against second-degree defaults, and not first-
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degree ones, for his fear is enforcing that which "neither party has performed and
neither has suffered." If enforceability is attached only to first-degree defaults, then
the disadvantage of formalism, at least that identified by de Jasay, dissolves.
Formalism, as a principle governing when to enforce contracts, can apply to
unilateral breaches only, not mutual breaches. Enforcement against second-degree
default need not be a component of formalism. Making such a move, at any rate,
is consistent with de Jasay's own distinctions.
The formalist claim is that contracts are enforced when they are "recognized
to exist." Typically, contractarianism recognizes any contract so long as all parties
voluntarily agreed to it and it entails no relevant externalities. If second-order
defaults occur, there is no reason to count that as a contract, rather than as a new
contract absolving the first. It is possible, then, to define what counts as a contract
formally without making merit-based constraints.
8.2.2 Enforcement
One qualification needs to be made. Enforcement comes in varying degrees from
imprisonment to social segregation to mere pitying glances. My discussion of
enforcement under the formalist position so far collapses all these sorts together.
A further distinction is required to decide between which first-degree defaults merit
which degree of punishment. Presumably this depends largely on the costs of
entering the agreement itself, as well as on the costs of the varying types of
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enforcement. This has a merit-based look to it with one crucial difference.
According to a formalist understanding of the justification for contract-enforcement,
enforcement is not an external constraint on bargains as much as it is one of the
conditions the bargainers place on the contract. Thus, the type of enforcement is
as much a part of the contract as any other aspect of the agreement constrained by
the preferences of the individual bargainers.
8.2.3 Realism and Utilitarianism
The formalist interpretation is consistent with contractarianism. The realist
interpretation, on the other hand, leaves contractarian lines in favour of utilitarian
ones. Agreement falls out of the picture in favour of what benefits society as a
whole. Following de Jasay, there are three ways of interpreting what counts as
"merits," and none accommodate preference-based contractarianism. (i) The first
way decides the merits of a contract according to the aggregate social cost-benefit
analysis entailed from it. Contracts are enforced so long as they are good for the
aggregate society. Not otherwise. Since the ability to rely on agreements is
convenient for society, it makes good sense for it to help out with enforcement.  (ii)200
The second way comes from recognizing that respect for contracts in general is
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good for society. Hence it is legitimate to induce respect by force. By accepting the
benefit of contracting, an individual effectively incurs a liability to contribute to its
production by helping others keep their agreements, helping victims get
recompense, and ensuring the inadmissibility of free-riding.  (iii) Alternatively, the201
realist position may treat each case on its own merits. Contracts would be enforced
only if default by the promisor gives him an unfair advantage or constitutes unfair
treatment of the promisee.202
The third option appears to be the least utilitarian of the three. Merits rest on
the harm principle, and this is decided according to the individual situation, not how
it relates to society in general. I have already mentioned why grounding the
enforceability of contracts on the harm principle is unsatisfactory. The determination
of what counts as "unfair treatment" can only be based on some standard-
approach, and not on individual preference.  If so, preference-based203
contractarianism must reject it. Alternatively, "unfair treatment" may best be viewed
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as the occurrence of first rather than second degree default. If it is, this can be
accommodated by formalism.
The second merit-based position is an implicit appeal to the problems of
free-riding. On the basis that we cannot have free-riders, then everyone must chip
in. De Jasay recognizes a problem with this assumption.
To say that an outcome where free riders benefit from contributions
of others is inferior is open to challenge. It could be defended by
arguing either that unfairness is sufficiently bad in itself to outweigh
the cost of reaching a different outcome, or that in the presence of
free riding, contributions will be inadequate. Neither argument is very
strong; one of the flaws of contractarianism is to treat them as self-
evident propositions.204
A more general problem with this second merit-approach is that it too abandons
preference as a basis of morality. That I prefer to contribute to x does not in any
way necessitate that I also prefer to contribute to y. It raises the problem of
"implicit" contractarianism. This is the claim that because I have not rebelled
against one part of the state's laws, I thereby automatically accept all of the
state's laws. This reasoning evidently was good enough for Socrates, but it
abandons the appeal to preferences individuals hold. This version of realism is
wholly unrealistic.
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The first merit-based approach appears quite sensible, except for the
reliance on the good of the "aggregate society." One of the problems of
utilitarianism is precisely its abandoning reliance on individual motivations in
favour of the good for society as a whole. This approach needs to explain why I
should be more concerned for the aggregate society (to which I for the most part
had no choice in belonging) over my own interests. Contrary to Mill, it is not at all
obvious why from the premise that "each person's happiness is a good to that
person" we can infer that "the general happiness is therefore a good to the
aggregate of all persons." If instead, we place the emphasis on individual
preferences, this merit-based account for the enforceability of contracts has
promise. It would make acceptance of contract enforcement dependent on the
individual's interest in having contracts. Making that adjustment, however,
removes any distinction it may have had with formalism. It is formalism, and not
the realist positions, that recognizes the importance of individual preference and
takes as a marker of individual preference any contracts drawn up. To ensure
the furthering of individual preferences people would agree to enforce contracts.
It is the very nature of contracts, in other words, that they are enforceable.
Entering into a contract is not only to accept the particular conditions drawn up,
it is also to accept precisely the enforceability of those conditions.
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David Schmidtz argues in a similar vein. Contract enforcement can be
provided noncoercively. The legitimacy of using force as the instrument of
contract enforcement derives from the consent of the involved parties. "An
agency that enforces compliance by the principals is doing only what the
principals have hired it to do."  The enforcement agency collects the debt from205
the reneger plus an added fee for the enforcement service. The full cost of
enforcement, therefore, is on the shoulders of the defectors, not the compliers.
No one with sincere intentions to oblige the dictums of their own voluntary
agreements need fear the costs of enforcement. If one does not like the attached
threat of enforcement, now is the time to withdraw or re-bargain; not afterwards
(unless it can be mutual). The formalist aspect of contracts sufficiently answers
why contracts are enforceable while at the same time maintaining that their
enforceability is not counter to individual preference.
8.3 AGREEING TO ENFORCEMENT
Ideally, what we want to make formally binding are voluntary, part-forward
contracts devoid of significant externalities. No external party can step in and
say what contracting parties should have done. Spot contracts that are defaulted
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(which we assume will necessarily be second-degree defaults) are permissible,
since it leaves all relevant parties in the status quo. It is enforceable that the
poor man pays the rich man, so long as the poor man entered the agreement
willingly (given his situation). What preference-based contractarians need to
explain is how this enforcement is itself preference-based. For the simple reason
that it evidently needs to be enforced is sufficient indication that it is not in the
defector's interest.
The formalist resolve is this: Enforcement against first-degree defaults will
make second degree defaults intrinsically unappealing to all parties: and this will
be so independently of the timing of the contract. If I enter the contract in the first
place, I believe I will do better through the exchange than without the exchange,
and the same applies to you. So long as a formal system can enforce
compliance, I need not fear your first-degree default, and I have incentive not to
commit first-degree default either. Again, the same applies to you. The dominant
choice is to comply, and this is so for both of us. Hence, so long as a formalist
structure is in place, contracts will be intrinsically self-enforcing. As this will be
better for us all, individually defined, it is in our interests to erect a formalized
contract-enforcement institution.
8.4 A PARADOX RESOLVED
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There is the paradox that we could not agree to erect this formal institution prior
to the formal institution itself, and that if we could, then we can make and keep
agreements without any such formal structure. This is certainly a problem when
what we need is an entire society's agreeing on erecting a sovereign, while at
the same time admitting that such harmony among disparate peoples is not
possible prior to a sovereign's governance.  Fortunately we do not need such206
wide scale unanimity concerning contract enforcement. Once we accept the
formal first-degree default contract-enforcement structure, we are not committed
to an absolute sovereign. It does not follow that the sovereign can now
command obedience in any domain of our lives. The domain of contract-
enforcement is not restricted, true, but the structure does not grant power to the
sovereign beyond imposing voluntary, individually chosen contracts to be
binding. There is no appeal to a standard in judging these disparate contracts.
The content of the contracts, as well as the degree of enforcement for violations
of those contracts, are entirely left up to the preferences of the concerned
individuals given their situation. The domain of potential contracts is
unrestricted. Power remains with the individual, not with a sovereign. The
enforcement aspect of agreements is built right in to spot contracts, so we can
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see at least one sort of contract that does not require an antecedent agreement
about enforcement. Without requiring this antecedent agreement prior to spot
contracts, the paradox does not apply to spot contracts. Under the formalist
interpretation of contract enforcement, we can also see that the paradox does
not apply to half-forward, half-spot contracts. The first actor has reason to
include in his bargain the element of enforcement. Otherwise he risks being
made worse off than the status quo. He does not need unanimity about this
particular in his proposal among every potential bargainer. He requires
agreement only from his co-bargainer. His co-bargainer has no reason to reject
the enforcement rider, so long as he has any chance of benefiting from the
exchange. Since we assume individuals do not willingly enter contracts unless
there is hope of benefit to them, an enforcement rider built into the proposed
contract should not involve any cost to those who do not defect. In time,
enforcement aspects being implicit in any bargain will become merely part of the
convention of contracts. The paradox that is problematic for Hobbes, then, is not
problematic for preference-based contractarianism.
8.5 SUMMARY
A number of distinctions among contractarian lines of thought were made in this
chapter. To begin with, there are standard-bound and preference-based
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versions of contractarianism. This follows from the schism between Locke and
Hobbes. Locke introduced standard bound restrictions on the sovereign's power.
Although we want to restrict Hobbes's sovereign, I have argued that this can be
done while remaining true to preference-based contractarianism. The problem
with preference-based versions, however, is that they are difficult to support the
needed enforcement of contracts. To put this in Hobbes's terms, reliance on
mere preference-based contractarianism without an absolute sovereign makes it
difficult to escape from the state of nature. De Jasay believes this problem can
be circumnavigated by appealing to a realist recognition rule. It is the merit of
the case at hand that earn these contracts the socially bestowed rank of
enforceability. Realist versions for how contracts are binding are utilitarian,
however. As such, they appeal not to individual preferences, but some
conglomeration of preferences. As these cannot be assessed by appeal to
individuals, for that would be measuring individual preferences and not
conglomerate preferences, the appeal is to standards of social import. Thus,
realist interpretations abandon the underlying core thesis of contractarianism:
the appeal to individual preferences. I have defended, instead, a formalist
account of the enforceability of contracts, supporting this by the degree to which
it furthers individual preference.
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"Occurrent contractarianism," as I have called it, is rooted in our social-
psychological state. Given the characteristics we have, and given the social
situation in which we are embedded, the best resolve we have of furthering our
individually defined preferences is to adopt and adhere to a moral system.
Occurrent contractarianism remains true to the original contractarian insight; that
morality is a rational institution, capable of being designed for and adhered to





I have remained adamant that self-interest is the sole guiding force of our moral
motivation. This means, crudely, that it is in our self-interest to be moral. This
certainly follows if we understand self-interest in non-hedonistic terms. We can
see clearly that the addict's life would go better by undergoing a painful period of
self-effacement. After the transformation from addict to non-addict, he will
himself, undoubtedly, appreciate this as well. Let us grant all that. The trouble is,
I have adopted a hedonistic account of self-interest. The non-hedonistic
account, I have argued, is a standard-based view of self-interest, which I reject.
How then, are we to deal with the addict. How are we to deal with the adamant
rapist?
Dismissing the notion of "considered preferences" leaves contractarians
with the problem Gauthier, Frankfurt, Butler, Baier, Taylor, and Schmidtz were
individually trying to solve. Surely morality cannot be grounded on self-interest if
self-interest includes acting on whims and impulses that will counteract self-
interest in the long run. Acting on short-sighted self-interest is precisely what
makes the prisoner's dilemmas so intractable. The moral choice, we know, is
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cooperative behaviour. If there are no restrictions on individual preferences, dim-
sighted individuals may defect from prisoner's dilemmas, and it would be silly to
claim therefore defection is the moral choice. We can see that cooperation is
better for the individuals than mutual defection. But, according to my analysis
above, claiming that therefore cooperation is what is "really" in the players'
interests is to introduce standard-bound or objective criteria, and doing so
abandons individual preference entirely.
Let us imagine that Joe (not his real name) has an occurrent preference
to rape a particular girl. Given this preference, a particular course of action may
be planned that would ensure his success. Approach her stealthily from behind,
hit her over the head, threaten her further with a knife, etc. The satisfaction of
Joe's occurrent preference through this stipulated action indicates its rationality.
Since morality, as we've so far described it, is at least partly a rational act
satisfying an occurrent preference, it would appear that the rape of the girl is
morally permissible. It is not, of course. It is immoral not merely because we
know rape is immoral in the real world, for at the level of theory inception, we
have as much reason to change our current moral intuitions as the theory,
should conflict between the two arise. At least we make no presumptions in
favour of folk-ethics.  In this case, however, there is no conflict; theory and folk-207
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ethics coincide. The rape can not count as moral on occurrent contractarian
grounds. Recall that for contractarians, what is moral is not simply what satisfies
an individual's occurrent preferences, but what also does not interfere with
relevant others' occurrent interests. We shall assume that rape is not in the
interest of the girl. Since she is a relevant other in this scenario, her objection
has weight enough to stymie our calling Joe's act moral.
"True enough," Joe may say, "but who cares. I agree it is not a moral act
according to your theory, but why should that daunt me? Look, you've told me
about the importance of pursuing one's occurrent preferences; well, here is my
occurrent preference, so I'm going to pursue it. Your own theory tells me that no
one can get on a high horse to tell me what occurrent preferences I ought to
have." If my theory has nothing to say to this man, it fails its task. So in this
chapter, I explain how occurrent preferences are key, but why nevertheless, self-
interested rational individuals should wish to alter some of their occurrent
preferences when carrying them out violates the contractarian credo. To help me
in this task, I will appeal to recent works in game-theory. 
9.1 A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
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Recent work in game theory, starting from David Gauthier's seminal work in
Morals by Agreement,  and developing further in Peter Danielson's work,208
Artificial Morality,  has attempted to show how moral dispositions win-out over209
immoral dispositions through repeated prisoner dilemma situations. From this it
is speculated that morality, being the rational choice for survival, is a successful
evolutionary strategy for homo-sapiens.
There is much in these works, I believe, but there is also, it appears to
me, much fudging. The issues are complicated, the limiting assumptions
contentious, the variables many, and the values plugged in to the formulas
appear arbitrary and post hoc. In this chapter, I wish to raise the difficulties with
game theoretic approaches, without yet disparaging the whole project. Failing
hard and fast solutions, my conclusions here are tentative. I gain some hope for
their being coincident, at least, with Gauthier's and Danielson's central
conclusions: that it is rational to change one's stripes. 
9.1.1 Gauthier's Model
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Gauthier and Danielson agree that the people (or entities) with cooperative
dispositions do better than those without. Doing better typically means getting
higher scores in an interactive prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. The moves of the
game are to cooperate or to cheat. It is thought that successful cheating on your
part yields the most points for you. Keeping at merely an ordinal ranking, we will
give the successful cheater 4 points. Cooperation is good too, but not as good.
Typically cooperation is better than the status quo, otherwise we would not
waste our time. Cooperation, then, gets 3 points, while the status quo, which in
these games is unsuccessful cheating or mutual defection, gets 2 points. The
worst outcome for a player is to be cheated. That means, while you play the
cooperative moves, your opponent cheats on you. Being cheated is worse than
the status quo, and thus gets only 1 point.
In a two by two matrix, the possible outcomes look like this:








Table 9.1. The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) Matrix
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A's outcome values are shown in the upper right corner of the cells, and the
outcome values for B are in the lower left hand corner. The problem, one can see,
is that if B were cognizant of his expected outcome values in this game, he would
cheat. That is, no matter what A does, plays fair or cheats, B will do one better by
cheating than by playing fair. Let us imagine that A plays fair. If B plays fair, he gets
3 points, which is good. But if he cheats, he gets 4 points, which is better. So, if A
plays fair, B will cheat. If, on the other hand, A cheats, then of B's two responses
(play fair or cheat), again B's best response is to cheat. Cheating, when A cheats,
gives B 2 points rather than 1 point had he played fair. The result is that it is rational
for B to cheat, no matter what A does.
This is an awkward conclusion for those of us who wish to show that it is
rational to be moral. What the prisoner's dilemma seems to show is the reverse:
immorality is what is rational. But wait! If B can reason in this way, so too can A.
Thus, in the same way that it is rational for B to cheat, the dominant strategy for A
is to cheat as well. What this means, in this game, is that A and B will each get 2
points. In other words, they will each and seemingly forever remain at the status
quo. When there is a strategy that could leave them both better off (both playing
fair, and each getting 3 points), it makes one wonder if A's and B's reasoning really
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discussion in "Rationality within Reason," The Journal of Philosophy,
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is all that rational. Recall, rationality is a tool to yield the most (or an adequate
number of ) utiles possible, where utiles are scores of preference satisfaction.210
David Gauthier reasoned that if we take two types of players and run a
number of the PD games with them, the type of player that is more willing to play
fair is going to win out (in other words gain more points) over one who is going to
cheat whenever he can. For this outcome, a limiting assumption needs to be made.
As put so far, anyone who plays fair against a cheater is going to do far worse than
that cheater. The cheater will get 4 points in that interaction, while the cooperator
(as we shall now call the person who plays fair) will get only 1 point. Although
aware of this, Gauthier believed that so long as the intentions of the players were
known before-hand by the other players, then it would be wise to cheat with those
you knew were going to cheat and cooperate with those you knew were going to
cooperate. There is a sense in which we bring in Newcomb's paradox to get this to
work. At face value, it would seem that if you knew your opponent was going to
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cooperate, it would be better for you to cheat (you would get 4 points rather than
3 points). The assumption prevents this, however, for your opponent's intention to
cooperate is dependent on your intention to cooperate. If you now change that
intention to an intention to cheat, your opponent now knows this, and so too, he will
cheat. Thus, the only way you can gain the maximum points is for you to adopt, first
off, an intention to cooperate with other cooperators. Your opponent now sees this,
and if he is like you, which is also assumed from the assumption of equal rationality,
he will form the intention to cooperate as well. Voila, you each get 3 points. This,
note does better than the person who decides to cheat regardless of the other's
intention so long as other players have only the intention to cooperate with other
cooperators and not the intention to cooperate unconditionally. Given the condition
of the transparency or omniscience of players, cheaters can expect only mutual
defection, not unilateral defection, and thus will receive only 2 points.
Gauthier has names for these different players. A Straightforward Maximizer
(SM) will cheat in all cases. He reasons that whatever the other player does, he
does better to cheat. A Constrained Maximizer (CM) forms the disposition to
cooperate only with other cooperators. CMs will not fall prey to SMs, for CMs will
cheat with SMs. And for interactions with other CMs, they each will reap the
rewards of 3 points rather than the 2 points that SMs are destined to earn.
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The conclusion is that over repeated games (with many players) CMs earn
more points than SMs. Thus, it is more rational to adopt the CM disposition than the
SM disposition. The moral of the story is that this parallels real life; people who
cooperate with others who cooperate do better in the game of preference
satisfaction (or maximization) than those who do not adopt this disposition. Morality
is the rational choice.
Some have disparaged Gauthier's tale. What is this notion of being able to
accurately predict the other's strategy? In real life we are not dealing with the aliens
of Newcomb's problem. I can only know what my opponent's voiced intentions are.
How do I know my opponent is telling the truth? If rationality is not to maximize but
to disaster-avoid, then perhaps it is rational to cheat even if I have the belief my
opponent is telling the truth about his intention to cooperate. Moreover, not all
interactions are what de Jasay calls spot contracts.  More often than not game211
situations in the real world are part-forward part-spot contracts. If he's already given
me the money for services rendered tomorrow, why shouldn't rationality tell me to
cheat in this case? I am assured the 4 points. Why settle for only 3? In brief,
Gauthier answered these sorts of objections by claiming that in the real world,
reputation matters. True, I may get 4 points now in this encounter, but I will be in
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effect branded with a mark that tells my future  opponents that I am an SM, and not
to cooperate with me. If I fear this, as I should, since it has been shown that SM's
do worse than CMs, then I have reason to constrain my motivation to maximize on
particular occasions for the reward over time. Based on the very real aspect of
reputation, as well as the psychologically revealing body language of our species,
this is all we need to indicate what our intentions are to others. We need not be
transparent, Gauthier claims, but we are, in fact, translucent enough to favour the
CM disposition over the SM disposition.212
A more sophisticated complaint about Gauthier's model is that it is recursive,
and hence unworkable. I will cooperate with you only on the condition that you will
cooperate with me. But meanwhile, you will cooperate with me only on the grounds
that I will cooperate with you. We seem to be at a standoff. It is more likely that we
will both defect than that we will both cooperate. On a computer program, for
example, the computers would not know what to do. A's program says: cooperate
with B only if B cooperates with A. But B is not cooperating with A right now.
Instead, it is waiting for A to cooperate with B. But A is not doing that, because it is
waiting to see if B is going to cooperate with A, etc. etc.
Murray 205
      Danielson, 12-16.213
9.1.2 Danielson's Pluralistic Model
Peter Danielson agrees with the main thrust of Gauthier's work, but argues that it
is not complete.  There are more dispositions than just two. For example, to213
understand Gauthier's CM, we needed to contrast it with another disposition, a
disposition that cooperates with whoever whenever. Danielson calls this disposition
an Unconditional Cooperator (UC). Gauthier's CM cooperates with both CMs and
UCs, since Gauthier's CM has the program to cooperate with other cooperators.
Because CM is a broad category for dispositions that constrain their maximization
programs for the better, Danielson renames Gauthier's CM as Conditional
Cooperator (CC). This CC cooperates with other cooperators. Thus, CC will
cooperate with other CCs as well as with UCs. Meanwhile, UCs will cooperate with
other UCs, CCs, and even, foolishly, with SMs. Because UCs cooperate with SMs,
even though they know they will be cheated as a result, this will in turn benefit SMs,
who will start doing better. CCs get 3 points for every interaction with CCs and UCs,
while SMs get 4 points for their interactions with UCs and 2 points for their
interactions with CCs and other SMs. Although SMs do not do as well as CCs with
the introduction of UCs, they do better with UCs in the population than without for
obvious reasons.
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This is not Danielson's stopping point. With the introduction of UCs, a more
rational disposition emerges: what Danielson calls Reciprocal Cooperators (RC).
Unlike CCs, who cooperate with other cooperators simpliciter, RCs cooperate only
with those whose cooperation is dependent on their cooperating. RCs differ from
CCs in that, although CCs will cooperate with UCs, RCs will not. They will not
because UC's cooperation is independent of RC's cooperation. Since UC is going
to cooperate anyway, why settle for only 3 points out of an interaction with them,
when one can, without cost, get 4 points. Cooperating with UCs simply makes no
sense. Danielson's RC disposition does better than either the dispositions of CC,
SM, or UC. For where SMs and CCs get an average value of 3 each for every
encounter with either UCs or CMs (2 and 4 for SM and 3 and 3 for CCs), RCs do
one better. They get 3 for their encounters with CCs and 4 for their encounters with
UCs. The superiority of the RC disposition is not altered by including interactions
with RC. Both RCs and CCs get 3 points for their interactions with other RCs.





The rationale here goes as follows: The lower case letters represent the population
size of each disposition in the game. "c" is the population of CCs. "r" is the
Murray 207
population of RCs. "u" is the population of UCs, and "s" is the population of SMs.
If a CC meets another CC, we expect 3 points. If the CC meets an RC, again 3
points. If that CC meets an SM, then only 2 points. That CC would get another 3
points for an encounter with a UC. But since he cannot compete with himself, we
subtract the 3 points he would have made.  Now if there are 10 CCs, 5 RCs, 3 SMs,
and 2 UCs in this population, the score for each disposition would be:
RC = 4(2)+3(10+5)+2(3)-3 = 56
CC = 3(10+5+2)+2(3)-3 = 54
SM = 4(2)+2(10+5+3)-2 = 42
UC = 3(10+2)+(1)(3+5)-3 = 41 
The moral in this case is not as clear cut as Gauthier's. In Gauthier's there
was a simple parallel to be drawn between doing better in the two-disposition PD
and being moral in the real world. Being moral is to cooperate and to retaliate
against non-cooperators. But Danielson has shown that it is not precisely the nicest
guys that finish first. The rational disposition is RC, but this does not quite map onto
what we normally consider moral in the real world. We do not think that it is moral
to rob Mother Theresa simply because she's a do-gooder.
9.1.3 Chicken
In the game of chicken, two contestants race their cars toward each other. The
winner is he who swerves away last. I win if I keep straight while he swerves. Next
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he rules out simultaneity (Danielson, 166).
best for me is if we both swerve at the same time. That would be a tie. Third best
is if I swerve and he keeps straight. Although I remain unharmed, I lose the game.
The worst outcome for me, however, is if we both keep straight and our cars ram
into each other and we die or suffer terribly. A decision matrix for the chicken game,
thus, looks like the following:








Table 9.2. The Chicken Game Matrix. (4 least favoured; 1 most favoured.)
The dominant strategy is for us both to swerve.  But then the dominant214
strategy of the game is not to win. This is peculiar. Of course, swerving at the same
time is difficult to do, even if it were coordinated. Given this, one could hope to
swerve slightly after one's opponent. This would be, in effect, keeping straight and
winning. Of course, assuming both contestants are equally rational, the other
contestant will be thinking the same thing. The result is that both will be waiting for
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the other to swerve first, and thus, both will swerve too late. It appears that self-
interested, instrumental rationality dictates the worst outcome, and not the dominant
strategy in the game of chicken. 
In real life, however, we have a decision to make prior to this matrix. The
dilemma comes only once we have already committed ourselves to play. And this
presupposes a certain character trait that I think most rational adults do no not
have. The decision matrix to make prior to engaging in the game of chicken is
represented in table 9.3 (on the following page). Given that playing the game of
chicken is likely to yield the worst outcome for equally rational players, it can be
determined in advance that playing the game is worse than not playing the game.
True, A would save face if B also did not play. A does not "lose," though, because
he did not enter the matrix of the game which is required for there to be a loser.
This slight embarrassment, at any rate, is petty compared to the expected outcome
from playing. This is one problem with these matrices, that they cannot adequately
represent cardinal ranking. A's declining to play does not, all by itself, preclude B
from playing. B can always try to find some other sucker. Thus, given the slight
disutility in declining when the other wants to play, it is not quite the case that
whatever B does, A would do better by not playing. B, knowing that A will not want
to play, may broadcast his request to play, even if B himself has no intentions on
playing. Notwithstanding the annoyance of dealing with someone such as B, given
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the great negative weight of playing and crashing, it is better for A not to play. Since
we assume equal rationality in A and B, B should be reasoning the same way. The
dominant strategy is not to play. And this shows that the problem with the game of
chicken is that it already assumes irrational players.








don't play 3 1
Table 9.3. Payoffs for playing the Chicken Game (4 = least favoured; 1 = most favoured.)
This analysis does not change if the object of the game of chicken is not to win,
per se, but to impress sideline spectators. In such a case, it would seem that the
rational move in the game of chicken is to have both players coordinate prior to
the game when each player is to swerve. But so long as B is going to stick to the
prearranged point of swerving, it would be better for A to swerve after that point
in order to impress the spectators the most. Since we assume B is as rational as
A, B will be thinking much the same thing, and A should realize this. Should
there be any suspicion that the other player will swerve later than the pre-
appointed point, it will be more rational not to play rather than to play. Whether
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or not the spectators are actually impressed by chicken games, to try to impress
someone by the game of chicken is a sign of irrationality, given any desire to
survive. Declining is the rational resolve.
The literal game of chicken, then, is not a problem for rationality.
9.1.4 The Threat Game
This analysis goes too fast, however. The chicken game models threat
situations. It is precisely the point that since it is irrational for you to engage in
chicken games that it becomes rational for me to threaten chicken games for my
own profit. Because you see it is in your best interest not to play, I can use this
to my advantage. Let us imagine, rather than the chicken game, that I have
strapped to my belt explosives, and I threaten to set these off in your vicinity if
you do not give me $1,000. You cannot merely refuse to play in this situation.
That is to be interpreted as calling my bluff. The result for failure to play, then,
may be your death. Deciding whether or not to play is not an option for the
threats the chicken games are attempting to model. Threat exchanges are
situations in which it costs you to fail to play. You are held at ransom. But since it
costs you more to play (risk of death), I can count on your paying me the ransom
for not playing. Your rationality dictates it. The problem, we see, is that
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rationality encourages bullies in these threat games. It pays to threaten. This is a
problem for rational-based morality. What is the solution?
Acting on threats are understood in chicken games to be not only disadvanta-
geous to the threatened player, but also to the threatener. It is not a threat,
otherwise. It is not a chicken game. You must intend to do an action it does not
advantage you to do. This fact makes it possible to respond to our question
above. Acting on one's threat is not rational. If you call my bluff, I have a choice:
to follow through on my threat or not to. According to the matrix below (table 9.4)
following through on my threat intention gives me my worst outcome. Chickening
out gives me a better outcome. Hence, rationally, I should chicken out.








Table 9.4. The Threat Matrix. (4 least favoured; 1 most favoured.)
It follows that if you threaten me, it is rational for me to call your bluff. It will be
rational for you at that point to chicken out and I get my best outcome. If you can
predict this outcome, then it was not rational for you to threaten in the first place.
If we cannot rationally carry out our threats, it is irrational to threaten. We see that
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      Gauthier argues along these lines. "If it is not rational to act on215
one's threat because of the costs to one's life going as well as
possible, it must not be rational to sincerely make the threat in the
first place" (David Gauthier, "Assure and Threaten," Ethics, 104, 1994,
719). But Gauthier fails to consider the problems with this response
that I raise below.
      See, for example, Duncan MacIntosh, "Persons and the Satisfaction216
of Preferences: Problems in the Rational Kinematics of Values," The
Journal of Philosophy, 40, 4, 1993, 177.
entering the game of threat, no less than entering the game of chicken, is irrational
at the outset.215
I have moved too fast once more, unfortunately. Insincere threats against
gullible players may be quite prosperous. I may have no intention on carrying out
my threat, but so long as I can convince you that I am serious, you will not likely risk
calling my bluff. Moreover, if I can actually alter my disposition to in fact enact on
called threats, and publicize this, then my victims need no longer be merely gullible
players. If self-effacement achieves my desires, rationality will in fact dictate this
character transformation.216
To successfully threaten someone, you must make them believe that you will,
in fact, carry out your threat. Since it is patently irrational for you to do so, you must
convince the other player that you are, in fact, irrational. If I know I am encountering
an irrational individual, obviously I can not trust that he will do the rational thing. If
you threaten me and convince me that you will carry out your threat even if it is
against your interest, then I may do better by not calling your bluff. If you can
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convince me, in other words, that the top right hand corner of the threat matrix
(table 9.4) is an impossibility, then if I call your threat I am committing myself to
accept my worst outcome, given your irrationality. But since I can do better by
paying you off for my not playing, it is irrational for me to call the bluff of a madman.
Madmen, then, do very well.
Can you convince me that you are irrational? Quite likely not everyone will
be able to. They will have to suffer along with the rest of us without resorting to
threats to get our way. The problem of threat remains, however, so long as self-
effacement to a disposition conducive to irrational sincere threats is conceptually
possible. Is it conceptually possible? The claim is that sometimes it is rational to be
irrational. If whatever furthers your preferences is rational, and being x (in this case
being irrational) does this, then being x (in this case being irrational) is rational.
This is peculiar, since under this guise, being irrational is being rational, and hence,
it is not the case that one ever gives up one's rationality.
What if I reason in this way, and therefore call your bluff? What are you to
do? So long as you did not somehow hard-wire yourself into acting on your threat,
it will be rational for you to back down. But is it possible to hard-wire yourself in the
requisite fashion? And if it is possible, is it rational to do so knowing that you will be
unable to back down when it is in your interest to do so?
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Let us say a pill is invented that, when swallowed, produces this hard-wire
effect.  So long as you broadcast that you have taken the pill, this should deter217
anyone from calling your bluff. Thus, you should have no need to ever back down
yourself. After considering this, you take the pill, and will irrationally stick to your
guns. You will blow us both up if I don't give you the $1,000. Assuming this is
possible, might we also assume I can take a similar pill? It would not be to my
advantage if I wait to transform myself only after you do so first. Two unconditional
threateners competing against each other in the threat game will do very badly
indeed. Perhaps, however, precisely to avoid being taken advantage of in threat
games, I have taken a threat-enforcer pill prior to your arrival. Now I am hard-wired
to always call someone's threat; and I publicize this fact. If you knew this, you would
not target me. I can thereby successfully avoid threats.
Barring the annoyance that we are leaving reality behind in this answer,
there is a further problem; the invention of yet another pill. Nothing prevents a
further disposition being somehow fashioned that ignores all unconditional bluff-
callers. The taking of this pill is also, of course, broadly advertised. If enough of
these absolute threat masters exist in the population, it will no longer be rational to
adopt the unconditional bluff-caller disposition.
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In the above speculations, we have immersed ourselves too much in the
artificial world. In the real world, there are psychological, biological, and
sociological constraints on the kinds of dispositions we can successfully adopt. This
means, unfortunately, that we may acquiesce to insincere threats. And doing this
makes it rational for more insincere threateners to evolve. What is not accurately
portrayed in the ordinal ranking of the matrices above, however, is that in threat
games, mutual defection (where threats are acted upon) are exceedingly costly. In
many cases, the cost is far greater than the benefit from success. This needs to be
factored into the formula before one can decide whether to become a sincere
threatener. There will be some who decide the risk is worth it. To alter our own
dispositions to counteract such defectors will quite likely be too high a price to
demand. That means, unfortunately, that we must be willing to tolerate some degree
of threat; and that this toleration itself creates a niche for others to capitalize on the
perceived benefits of threat. It is difficult to say, at this point, where the line of
toleration ends, and what precisely it is that keeps the numbers of sincere
threateners low. Is it that the threshold of retaliation is itself low, or that the
biological and social-psychological factors are at work to make the necessary
adjustments toward irrationality implausible? I agree with Danielson that rational
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moral players must be willing to tolerate some unfairness in the world simply to
avoid costly sanctions.218
9.2 RESULTS
This does not quite mean we have no definitive answer to give to our troublemaker,
Joe, introduced at the beginning of this chapter. Even if it is the case that Joe is in
such a condition that it is rational for him to adopt a cooperative disposition over a
defecting disposition does not mean that Joe will of his own choose not to rape that
poor girl. We can say it is rational for him to refrain from rape even by his own
estimations, as spelled out through game theory analysis and given certain
specified variables, but he may nevertheless decline to listen. In such a case, why
do we have a right to intercede? It would go against occurrent contractarianism if
this right to intercede in Joe's libidinous pursuit is grounded in what is in Joe's best
interest according to our conception, and not his own occurrent interests, however
deranged. The right to intercede then, comes from where?
The answer is that to violate Joe's occurrent interests in this case is in our
interest simpliciter. Recall at least some of what we learned from game theory: it is
wise to cooperate with other cooperators, but not wise to cooperate unconditionally.
Murray 218
We are no dummies; we refuse to cooperate with other cheaters. Joe is a cheater,
and therefore it is wise not to do business with him. Nor, if we can help it, do we
allow Joe to do business with us. Whatever his occurrent preferences are, he is not
one of us. Just as we should not flinch if a CM does not cooperate with an SM, we
should have no pangs in violating Joe's occurrent preferences.
The formalist constraint on contracts and agreements help not only to assure
fair dealings with one another, but it also acts to rid us of the defectors.
Our game analysis, although not yet complete, has taught us that it is not
rational to be a UC and we will not forget that lesson now in our dealing with the
Joe's of this world. For this reason, it is quite consistent for occurrent contractarians
who preach general tolerance of occurrent preferences to nevertheless intercede
in cases where the furthering of an individual's preferences violates the preferences
of another. Recall, morality enters the picture in cases of interpersonal relations.
Maximizing occurrent preferences will necessarily have to be tailored to fit with the
occurrent preferences of one's partner. Rationality says: maximize your occurrent
preferences. Morality says: Yes, so long as they concur with related others's
occurrent preferences. And game theory adds: true, but not to the point where we
no longer satisfy our occurrent preferences at all. 
The rapist violates the victim's occurrent preferences. That society should
care and intercede is in the interests of the citizens should they desire to live in
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recently. See Peter Danielson,  "Evolutionary Models of Cooperative
Mechanism: Artificial Morality and Genetic Programming." To appear in P.
Danielson (ed.) Modelling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995. See also Peter Danielson, "Evolving
Artificial Moralities: Genetic Strategies, Spontaneous Orders, and Moral
Catastrophe," read at the conference on "Chaos and society" at the
Université du Québec à Hull, June 1-2, 1994.
peace. That we can force defectors to curb particular occurrent preferences under
occurrent contractarian theory is because we are not so irrational as to allow
defectors to harm us. A morality consistent with occurrent preferences does not
demand that we be a society of UCs.
There is one other important lesson game theory has taught us. It is not so
much that we rationally ought to change our occurrent preferences from immoral or
amoral to moral ones, but that evolutionary processes naturally favour selection of
moral occurrent preferences. Morality is evolutionally successful.219
219
Chapter 10
COMPLICATIONS FOR GAME THEORY
The account of game theory in the preceding chapter is still too elementary. There
are a number of things that it does not take into account. It does not take
probabilities of accurate appraisal of one's co-player into account, for example.
Instead, Danielson's depiction assumes for simplicity transparency among
competitors. It also assumes ordinal ranking only. The outcomes will be different if
we can somehow take into account cardinal ranking of the outcomes for the players.
It is true that I may value successful cheating over cooperating, but by how much?
And will this neatly map onto the cardinal values my competitor places on cheating
and cooperating? We know, for example that prison is a deterrent for middle-class
people, but it does not appear to carry the same value for the destitute living on the
streets, or for members of gangs in which prison records are a status symbol.
Another problem is the lack of a significance test. Should I clearly value 56 points
over 54 in the above scenario? Under what conditions should differences of such
slight proportions matter? Moreover, we will get different outcomes depending on
different distributions of the other dispositions. A lone CC in an SM population does
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      Peter Danielson, Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual220
Games, London: Routledge, 1992.
      RC = Reciprocal Cooperator. UC = Unconditional Cooperator. CC =221
Conditional Cooperator. For an account of these dispositions, see my
chapter 9, section 1.2.
no better than the SMs. An SM in an otherwise pure UC population does extremely
well. How are we to calculate the population distributions of the varied dispositions
to successfully link game theoretic results to real world applications? Lastly, some
cost must be applied to the extra scrutiny necessary for RCs and CCs compared to
the unconditional responses of SM and UC. What criteria can we apply that will
adequately translate to our real world situation?
Let us look at these complications one at a time.
10.1 TRANSPARENCY
Danielson assumes "transparency" for his model, as well he might, since he is
working with virtual robots rather than people.  If I am an RC, I can make the220
distinction between encountering a UC and a CC.  Failing this, RC can not be221
shown to be a rational improvement over CC. As people are not transparent,
however, it is not wise to assume transparency in order to get us out of self-
defeating PD situations if the goal is to show why people developed morality (or
would develop morality) as a rational response to PD situations. True, this was not
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Danielson's goal, but it is mine. We need, then, to alter the payoff formula slightly
by introducing Gauthier's more realistic assumption of "translucency."
To account for translucency, we will require probabilities in the payoff
formula. The difference between transparency and translucency is that one's
reading of another's disposition under transparency conditions is 100% accurate.
It is less than 100% accurate for translucency conditions. It must be more than 50%
accurate, however, since that is no better than chance. Setting the precise
probability of success is somewhat arbitrary, I'm afraid. Moreover, some people may
be better at it than others. An interesting exercise, in fact, is to wonder how much
one's detection abilities determine what disposition one should rationally assume.
For example, although an RC may clearly do better than a CC, I may be unable to
successfully distinguish between the variety of cooperating dispositions. UCs, CCs,
and RCs may all look alike to me. If I do no better than chance in distinguishing
between CCs, UCs, and RCs, the most rational disposition I can adopt is CC.
Laying aside this worry of how to properly account for the level of translucency, for
now let us say the translucency condition is 80% accurate.
There is some reason to suspect we do better than this for we are not fooled
in 20% of our encounters. A number of things can be said in defence of setting the
translucency level at the 80% mark. That we may not be fooled in 20% of our
encounters is not evidence that we are not mistaken in 20% of the encounters. For
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Behaviour on Attributions," Psychological Reports, 48, 1981, 299-304. 
      A complication is the reasonable supposition that we are who other223
people think we are. Being treated like a crook may well make us a
crook, and likewise, being treated as a good guy may well make us behave
that way as well. See for example, Mark Snyder, Elizabeth Decker Tanke,
and Ellen Berscheid, "Social Perception and Interpersonal Behaviour: On
the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes," Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 1977, 656-666.
one, as will be evident presently, some mistakes do not matter. Also, wary of this
20% error rate, we may decide not to engage in some games with some people,
preferring to play with those we have more assurance will play fairly. If so, our
success rate of detection is based on a biased sample. Lastly, there are a number
of studies that show how easily people are influenced by irrelevant information. For
example, attractive people are given the benefit of the doubt.  Favourable actions222
of attractive individuals are attributed to the individual themselves. Unfavourable
actions of the attractive people are blamed on external factors such as the situation,
other people, or some accident. The reverse is the case with unattractive people.
Bad acts are thought par for the course for them, and good acts are a result of
external factors. On the assumption that looks have little to do with disposition,
mistaken identity would likely be greater than 20%.223
Although I can not unequivocally state that an 80% chance of mistaken
identity is an accurate appraisal, we need to agree on some weighting of which any
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      For an explanation of this formula, minus the .8 translucency224
condition, see chapter 9, section 1.2.
      Assuming equal distributions of RC, UC, and SMs in the population.225
Complications arising from violations of this assumption are discussed
in the following section.
encounter in our game-theory tournaments will have to take account. One might
expect this is easily done by multiplying the population of any one disposition by
whatever the probability of successful detection we assign (for now on, we assume
.8). Although this approach lowers the total scores, it does not alter the ranking.
The formula for CCs scores would become 3[c(.8)+r(.8)+u(.8)] + 2[s(.8)] - 3,  which224
equals 38.6, still slightly lower than RCs altered scores at 39.4. But it is not that
easy. For if an encounter with a CC normally would give another CC 3 points, we
need to take into account the chance of its being specifically with an SM instead.
Only in the chance that the CC unilaterally cooperates with an SM, will the CCs
scoring for that encounter differ. Under conditions of translucency, for every CC
encounter with whom he believes to be another CC, there is a 20% chance of this
encounter being with a non-CC. Since a non-CC could be either an RC, UC, or SM
in our scenario, we assume a 6% chance of its being with an RC, a 6% chance of
its being with a UC, and a 6% chance of its being with an SM.  Once we recognize225
this, notice how this now favours SMs 6% more for every encounter with a non-SM.
That is to say, although CCs and RCs stand to be dealing with an SM without their
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it matters what constitutes the overall population. If somehow we know
everyone is a CC or UC, there is little risk in cooperating. Although in
a population of CCs and UCs and under conditions of opacity, SMs will do
very well. This caution is unnecessary if we assume complete opacity:
the agents will not know what population distribution they are facing.
      Danielson, 158-159.227
knowledge 6% of the time, while they lose 6% of these encounters (getting 1 rather
than 3, or for the RC's belief of dealing with a UC, 2 rather than 4), the undetected
SM stands to gain 4 rather than 2. Thus, by introducing the translucency condition,
SMs stand to benefit. And the lower the percentage of accurate detection of
dispositions, the better the odds favour the SM disposition. For example, under
conditions of complete opacity, the risk may be too great to cooperate in any
encounter,  thus making the SM disposition attractive. Under translucency226
conditions, the SM disposition will be more rational than under conditions of
transparency. Importantly, the RC disposition fares worse under conditions of
opacity.
Danielson was not unaware of this, mind you. He did recognize that under
conditions of translucency, rather than transparency, RC will likely pay higher costs
than CC.  He did not attempt to provide a formula for this, however. Instead, he227
assumed the following table of outcomes would be likely after the appropriate
scrutiny costs have been incurred:
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original table. Danielson's payoff structure in his table was as the
following: being cheated = 0; mutual defection = 1; cooperation = 2; and
cheating = 3. To match our payoff structure, I have altered these scores
so that 0=1, 1=2, 2=3, and 3=4. Also, instead of SM, Danielson speaks of
unconditional defectors (UD). UDs are not identical to SMs, in that SMs
might actually cooperate if they knew that the others would cooperate if
they did and SM acted first in a part-forward, part-spot contract. This
is so because SMs wish to maximize, and they wouldn't maximize by
defecting in such a situation. UDs, on the other hand, are hard-wired to
defect whatever the situation. For this difference to be applicable,
however, part of the condition is that SM knows what the other player
will do. Such knowledge requires transparency. In our discussion, we are
considering the costs of translucency, and so we shall assume UDs are
SMs for all intents and purposes.
Agent UC CC RC SM
______________________________________________
UC 3 3 1 1
CC 3 2.75 2.75 2
RC 4 2.5 2.5 2
SM 4 2 2 2
______________________________________________
Table 10.1 Danielson's Concocted Scrutiny Costs228
Applying these costs to our variables above, we have the following tournament play
scores:
CC = 3(2)+2.75(10+5)+2(3)-2.75 = 50.5
RC = 4(2)+2.5(10+5)+2(3)-2.5 = 49
SM = 4(2)+2(10+5+3)-2 = 42
UC = 3(10+2)+(1)(3+5)-3 = 41
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      Since he "concocted the outcomes,...not much hangs on them,"230
Danielson, 159.
Danielson admits this much: "[G]iven differential epistemic costs, the superiority of
RC over CC is weakened."  It is not merely "weakened," however, it shows that CC229
is the superior strategy. At least CC is the superior strategy given this rather
arbitrary concoction of scrutiny costs.  It seems too important a point to let hang230
like this, however. Rather than a mere guess at the extent of the costs of scrutiny,
we need a concise formula for working out the full ramifications and complications
involved in introducing translucency conditions. What follows is my attempt at doing
so.
10.2 THE MAKING OF THE TRANSLUCENCY FORMULA
The translucency formula is an addendum to the already existing transparency
formula. It is simpler to do it this way, as the reader will no doubt soon appreciate.
For RC, for example, every encounter with one whom he suspects to be a UC,
yields a 20% chance of getting only 2 points, since if the UC is a CC or another RC,
they will see his intention to defect, and thus they will defect as well. Meanwhile an
SM would defect anyway. Thus, so long as an RC fails to accurately assess the
other player as being a UC, he will get 2 points in that encounter. In his encounters
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with persons whom he suspects to be CCs and RCs, there is a chance that they are
actually SMs, thus he would only get 1 point for those encounters. If an SM
encounters a player whom he suspects to be a UC but is really another SM, then
rather than 4 points, the SM gets only 2 points. Thus SM loses 2 points for every
encounter with an SM that the SM suspects to be a UC. Assuming the calculations
for encounters under transparency have already been tabulated, we need subtract
or add points according to the patterns revealed under our translucency condition.
The following table is a helpful guide to the alterations needed for any situation of
mistaken identity with the four dispositions so far identified.231
SM RC CC UC SM RC C C
UC
SM   SM n/a = = +2 RC   S M n / a  = =
+2
SM   RC = n / a = + 2 RC   RC -2 n/a =
=
SM   CC = = n/a +2 RC   CC -2 = n / a
=
SM   UC -2  -2  -2  n/a   RC   UC -2 -2 - 2
n/a




      In this table, the notation, " " indicates the relation232
"mistakenly believes he is encountering." Thus, "UC   SM" reads,  "a UC
mistakenly believes he is encountering an SM."
SM RC CC UC SM RC C C
UC
CC   SM n/a = = +2 UC   SM n/a = + 2
+2
CC   RC -2 n/a = = UC   RC = n/a + 2
+2
CC   CC -2 = n/a = UC   CC -2 -2 n / a
=
CC   UC -2 = = n/a UC   UC -2 -2 =
n/a
 CC Total score =  -4   UC Total score =  0
Table 10.2 Expected values for Translucency Conditions ( ) 232
Whether the UC gains any points, loses any points, or remains at the same
point structure he would have received under conditions of transparency will be
determined by which disposition he is really encountering. For example, when an
SM believes incorrectly that he is encountering a UC, but he is really encountering
another SM, he does not stand to gain the 4 points SMs usually get for their
encounters with UC, but instead will only get 2, since his co-player is really an SM.
Thus he stands to lose 2 points, since the scoring under the transparent condition
has already been calculated. 
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      Another point may also require clarification. In the case where a233
CC, say, believes he is encountering a UC but is really encountering an
SM, the CC will lose 2 points. But there is no apparent avenue for the
SM to receive those 2 points in that transaction. This is not true.
Rather than SMs gaining points by this formulation, the CC and RC
dispositions lose points. Thus, although I spoke originally of the SM
"gaining" points under translucency, this formulation takes that into
account by SMs relative performance compared to the performances of the
other dispositions in the tournament. When our task is to determine the
dominant strategy, this difference in scoring should not matter. A point
differential of 2, say, still exists, whether it is because the SM
competitor loses 2 points, or an SM gains 2 points. If as well as the CC
losing 2 points, the SM gains 2, this means we are doubling the effects
of translucency in favour of SM, and this is illegitimate.
Most of the scoring should be straightforwardly understandable. One aspect
may need further explaining, however.  An RC mistakenly believing he is233
encountering a UC but who is really encountering a CC loses 2 points. One might
suspect he should lose only 1 point, for an encounter with a CC normally gives him
3 points, which is only one less than the 4 points he gets in his encounters with UC.
But we must make an assumption consistent more with transparency conditions.
We assume the RC is mistaken, not the CC. But if the CC thinks the RC is going
to cooperate in this encounter (as they would under transparency conditions) he
would be mistaken, for the RC is going to defect, thinking he is dealing with a UC.
Thus, we assume, however clumsily, that the misidentified co-players (the CC in
this case) can accurately assess the intentions of the misinformed player, rather
than the disposition. Thus, we assume the CC will be able to tell that the RC will
defect in this case. Hence the CC will defect as well. It is for this reason they each
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get 2 points rather than 3 points. As 2 points are two less than 4 points, we must
deduct 2 points from the RC under these and similar situations.
We see from the chart that RC stands to lose the most points under
conditions of translucency. CC also loses points, but not as many. SMs and UCs
lose no points whatsoever. Their scores remain identical to scores under conditions
of full transparency. This should not be surprising, since there is no scrutiny cost
for either UC or SM. Moreover, with the added feature of needing to distinguish CCs
from UCs, which CCs need not bother with, the chart also captures the differences
in scrutiny costs between CCs and RCs.
But the story is not yet done. We can not simply deduct 8 points from RCs
total score under the transparency conditions (giving RC 48 points), and 4 from CC
(giving CC 50) as if that is all there is to showing CC to be the superior strategy,
contra Danielson. Not only do we need to take the probability of mistaken
identification for every encounter into effect, we need also take into account the
probability of the mistaken encounter being with this particular disposition. To do
this more complicated step, I propose the following formula:
T + ( )(r-1)(D-1).i
where T = transparency outcomes;   = the translucency modification scores derived
from table 10.2; D = the total number of dispositions in the pool; and r = the
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probability of correctly identifying the other player's disposition under conditions of
translucency. Thus, D-1 = the number of dispositions that one's co-player might
actually have in case one misidentifies the other player's disposition. In our
scenario, so far, there are 4 dispositions. One of those four dispositions has been
accounted for already under the transparency calculations, thus the possible
dispositions under a mistaken encounter is 3. The probability of being mistaken in
a given encounter is represented by the notation: r-1. Our going assumption was
that for every encounter we suffer 20% chance of being mistaken. Hence r-1 = .20.
To understand how translucency is going to effect our players, we need to multiply
the scores shown in table 10.2 with this formula. The result is:
CC Total score =  T + ( )(r-1)(D-1) = 54 + (-4)(.2)(3)c
RC Total score =  T + ( )(r-1)(D-1) = 56 + (-8)(.2)(3)r
SM Total score =  T + ( )(r-1)(D-1) = 42 + (0)(.2)(3)s
  UC Total score =  T + ( )(r-1)(D-1) = 41 + (0)(.2)(3)u
Which works out to: 
CC Total score =  51.6
RC Total score =  51.2
SM Total score =  42
UC Total score =  41
CC still wins out, albeit not by much. Unfortunately for CCers, the story does not
quite end here either. We need also take into account population differences of
Murray 232
      With a population of 10 UCs, 10 SMs, 10 RCs and 10 CCs, the234
following scores will result: CC = 104.6 [3(10+10+10)+2(10)-3+(-
4)(.2)(3)]; RC = 112.2 [4(10)+3(10+10)+2(10)-3+(-8)(.2)(3)].
dispositions. If the population were equal among all dispositions, say 10 UC, 10
SM, 10 RC, and 10 CC, then the above translucency formula for modifying the
transparency calculations would be sufficient (with appropriate modifications to the
transparency figurings to take into account the different populations).  If there is234
less chance for certain mistakes to occur, as there would be if there are less of one
disposition than another, a further calculation needs to be made; this:
(d/n)
where d = The number of players with a particular disposition in the pool; and n =
the total number of players in the entire pool. Thus, d/n = the likelihood of an
encounter with a player with a particular disposition.
We cannot simply multiply the total score above with d/n, since d/n must be
calculated at the level of individual interaction. The above transparency scoring
chart needs to be altered to take population distributions into effect. Assuming our
populations are as originally recorded (10 CCs, 5 RCs, 3 SMs, and 2 UCs), the
translucency modification chart taking d/n into account will be as shown in table
10.3 (on the following page). Note how in some cases, I used d-1/n. This is
necessary because although you may not know which disposition you are actually
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dealing with, you know it is not yourself. We must subtract 1 from d when d is the
number of players with the same disposition as the player under investigation.
SM RC CC UC
SM   SM n/a = = +2(2/20)
 SM   RC = n/a = +2(2/20)
 SM   CC = = n/a +2(2/20)
 SM   UC -2(2/20)  -2(5/20) -2(10/20) n/a    
 SM Total score = -1.2
_______________________________________________________
  
SM RC CC UC
RC   SM n/a = = +2(2/20)
RC   RC -2(3/20) n/a = =
RC   CC -2(3/20) = n/a =     
RC   UC -2(3/20) -2(4/20) -2(10/20) n/a
RC Total score = -2.2
_______________________________________________________
SM RC CC UC
CC   SM n/a = = + 2 ( 2 / 2 0 )
CC   RC -2(3/20) n/a = =
CC   CC -2(3/20) = n/a =  
CC   UC -2(3/20) = = n/a
                                        
 CC Total score = -0.7                
_______________________________________________________
  SM RC CC UC
UC   SM n/a = +2(10/20) +2(1/20)
UC   RC = n/a +2(10/20) +2(1/20)
UC   CC -2(3/20) -2(5/20) n/a =
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UC   UC -2(3/20) -2(5/20) = n/a
 
UC Total score =  +0.8    
Table 10.3 Expected Values for Population Sensitive Translucency Conditions [( )(d/n)]i
Accounting for these population sensitive figures [( )(d/n)] in our translucencyi
formula, [(D-1)(r-1)] and attaching these to the transparency scores (T) gives this
final result:
RC Total score =  56 - 2.2(3)(.2) = 54.68
CC Total score =  54 - 0.7(3)(.2) = 53.58
  UC Total score =  41 + 0.8(3)(.2) = 41.48
SM Total score =  42 + 1.2(3)(.2) = 41.28
And this, after all our intense calculations, keeps RC on top of CC, contrary to
Danielson's concocted figurings. But note, by hardly any margin at all. Moreover,
our formula relies on the somewhat arbitrary figure that encounters under
translucency conditions are 80% accurate. If we do worse than that, RC will not do
as well.
The final formula for introducing the complications of translucency into game
theoretic analysis is the following:
T + [( )(d/n)](r-1)(D-1)i
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The benefit of this formula is that it is applicable to any type and number of
dispositions, any population size, and any outcome values.
10.3 OUTCOME VALUES
Gauthier and Danielson in their models use ordinal rankings. Ordinal rankings do
not take into account the possibility that I may prefer mutual cooperation two times
more than mutual defection, or being exploited 2 times worse than remaining at the
status quo. More so than the translucency figure, however, we seem to be unable
to non-arbitrarily decide a workable formula using cardinal ranking. The best we
can do is hope for randomization effects to work the results out in the end. I mention
this for two reasons. Game theory is constrained to work with ordinal rankings only
to be accessible to all peoples. It may work out in the end on the liberal assumption
that people are basically alike. Nevertheless, I think we are wise to keep this defect
in the back of our minds when we assess the applicability of game theory analysis.
For although there may be no grounds to this, we can work it out so that the wisest
disposition is to be (or remain) an SM, so long as we adjust the outcome values
sufficiently. Consider this pattern:









Table 10.4. Altered outcome values of the PD.
In this case, our scoring outcomes between the various dispositions (ignoring
translucency) would look like this:
RC = 10(2)+3(10+5)+2(3)-3 = 68
CC = 3(10+5+2)+2(3)-3 = 54
SM = 10(2)+2(10+5+3)-2 = 54
UC = 3(10+2)+(1)(3+5)-3 = 41 
True, this does not make SM the favourite disposition, but it does, at least, make
it as favoured as CC. If our goal is to reduce the SMs in the world, increasing the
payoff of successful cheating is not going to accomplish this.
One thing we can change, however, is the outcome values. If mutual
defection equals the status quo, why not assign this a 0 rather than a 2? Adjusting
the other scores to maintain the same ordinal ranking, we would then have this new
scoring pattern: Being cheated upon = -1; mutual defection = 0; mutual cooperation
= 1; successful cheating = 2. True, this will not alter the outcome pattern by itself.
RC will still come out on top, and UC on the bottom.
RC = 2(2)+1(10+5)+0(3)-1 = 18
CC = 1(10+5+2)+0(3)-1 = 16
SM = 2(2)+0(10+5+3)-0 = 4
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      Danielson, 98.235
UC = 1(10+2)+(-1)(3+5)-1 = 3
10.4 POPULATION
Altering the population will alter the outcome. If we start with a state of nature we
have SMs and no one else. How will the invasion of a CC or RC affect this? Not at
all, until we have at least one other CC or RC (assuming a UC just cannot survive
yet). Then these CCs and RCs will start doing better. When will an RC start
outshining a CC? Only once a UC enters the picture. But UCs cannot enter the
picture until the SMs have been significantly reduced in comparison to CCs. Again,
this should not alter the basic claim that RCs do a bit better than CCs so long as
there are UCs. But how do UCs enter the picture?
Danielson argues that a new disposition can "invade" a current population
only so long as the new disposition does at least as well as the current leader.  So235
long as the entire population is comprised of CCs, then UCs can invade since they
can do as well as CCs. But how likely is it the case that the entire population is
comprised of CCs? One plausible story, and the one I take Danielson to be
assuming, is that once CCs invade a population of SMs, they can eventually
displace SMs completely. This would leave a pure population of CCs. Now, I do not
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      Danielson, 101.236
believe this story is realistic. Even if it were, however, there is a problem. UCs,
under this picture, can invade only so long as SMs are displaced by CCs. RC is a
superior disposition to CC only when a certain number of UCs exist in the
population. But once RCs invade, then just as the SMs were dislodged, so too
should the UCs be dislodged. But dislodging UC dethrones RC.
Danielson argues against the claim that UCs will simply die out on the basis
that there is no necessary connection between interest and survival.  If there is no236
necessary connection between interest and survival, there is no grounds to suspect
SMs will disappear after a CC invasion. But so long as there are SMs in the
population, UCs cannot invade, for they cannot do as well as the best disposition
(CC in this case). UC, then, is an illegitimate addition under Danielson's scheme.
And depriving RC of UC fodder deprives RC of its top dog status.
Perhaps this requires further explication. If the task is seeing the survival
benefit of becoming "moral," we should start off with the state of nature where we
assume everyone is an SM. If everyone is an SM, everyone gets zero points. If we
introduce one CC, he will still defect with defectors, and so everyone still gets zero
points. If we introduce instead one UC, he will not survive. If we introduce instead
an RC, again everyone will keep at zero points. The outcome distribution cannot
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change until more than one new disposition is introduced, for example 2 CCs, or an
RC and a UC. But at this stage, there is no survival value for a UC, and without
UCs, there is no point to being an RC. 
Let us, then, introduce 2 CCs. Without the translucency supposition, the two
CCs benefit by 1 point each, which is better than the zero points for all the SMs.
This slight advantage is considerably lessened once we introduce the translucency
clause. Our translucency formula, recall is:
T + [ (d/n)](r-1)(D-1).i
Assuming there are 10 SMs and 2 CCs in our population, for each of CC's
encounters with whom he suspects to be another CC, CC stands to lose 2 points.
 = -2. r-1 is still .2. There is a 20% chance of being mistaken in any encounter. Dc
is the number of dispositions in the tournament. Here there are only two, and thus
if an encounter is not with a CC, it must be with an SM. Since in this case there are
10 SMs out of a total of 12 players in the tournament, for a mistaken encounter to
really be with an SM (d/n) = .83. The formula takes into account the probability that
among all players in the tournament, the mistake is going to cost in this encounter.
In this case, the price of translucency is going to cost CC 2(.2)(1)(.83) = 0.3. No
other encounters will make a difference whether it is under conditions of
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      For example, when SM believes he is encountering another SM, but is237
actually dealing with a CC, no difference in score is to be expected
because we assume the CC will see that SM plans to defect and thus CC
will defect as well. 
translucency or transparency.  Given our hypothesized population, the outcome237
looks like this:
CCs = {1(2)+0(10)-1} - {2(.2)(1)(10/12)} = .17
SMs = {0(2+10)-0} - {0(.2)(1)(2/12)} = 0
CCs do better, but almost insignificantly so. It would not clearly be irrational for the
two CCs to switch back to being SMs. CCs start clearly doing better only so long
as there are a sufficient number of them. This fact, unfortunately, introduces an
assurance problem. Ignoring the complication in getting enough CCs, let us see
how many CCs in relation to the population of SMs there would need to be. Let us
try half. Hence think of 10 SMs and 5 CCs. The outcome is the following:
CCs = {1(5)+0(10)-1}-{2(.2)(1)(10/15)} = 3.7
SMs = {0(5+10)-0}-{0(.2)(1)(5/15)} = 0
CC is looking to be more rational than SM the more CCs there are relative to SMs.
If the population of SMs are equalled by CCs, say 10 each, the following scoring
occurs:
CCs = {1(10)+0(10)-1}-{2(.2)(1)(10/20)} = 8.8
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SMs = {0(10+10)-0}-{0(.2)(1)(10/20)} = 0
The advantage in being a CC grows exponentially the more CCs there are relative
to the SM population. Minimally CCs do better than SMs so long as there is there
is at least 2 CCs and any number of SMs. There is thus no assurance problem in
getting more CCs to join once there are at least two. Is there an assurance problem
for those first two CCs? If the player I thought was going to be a CC, changes his
mind, we are assuming an 80% chance of the other CC responding accordingly, i.e.
defecting. Is it worth the risk? The danger is this, for a single CC in a population of
SMs:
CCs = {1(1)+0(10)-1}-{2(.2)(1)(10/11)} = -0.4
SMs = {0(1+10)-0}-{0(.2)(1)(1/11)} = 0
So long as .04 is a significant loss to players, it would appear there is an assurance
problem to get the CC disposition to enter the game. Once the population consists
of any number of SMs and any number greater than 2 of CCs, it is clearly rational
to become a CC, and hence there is no assurance problem. But there does seem
to be an assurance problem for the first two CCs, given the condition of
translucency. It may well be wiser to remain an SM and await the arrival of CCs
before you change your stripes. But so long as everyone is doing this, we are back
in the PD.
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What about the other dispositions? We know that RCs do not do better than
CCs so long as there are no UCs. But what can impel anyone to become a UC? Or,
to put the case differently, how many CCs relative to SMs need there be before it
is safe for some UCs to appear? In one sense this question seems moot if our task
is to see whether it is rational to adopt "moral" dispositions over immoral ones as
far as evolutionary survival is concerned. We already have our answer: Yes, so
long as you can convince one other to do so as well.
Below is the situation with one lone UC trying to enter a population of 10
SMs and 10 CCs. First, we need the score differentiation table.
CC SM UC
CC CC n/a -2(10/21) =
CC SM = n/a +2(1/21)
CC UC = -2(10/21) n/a
_____________________________________________
CC SM UC
SM CC n/a = +2(1/21)
SM SM = n/a +2(1/21)
SM UC -2(10/21) -2(9/21) n/a
_____________________________________________
CC SM UC
UC CC n/a = =
UC SM +2(10/21) n/a +2(0/21)
UC UC = -2(10/21) n/a
Murray 243
Table 10.5. ( )(d/n) for a population consisting of 10 CC, 10 SM, and 1 UC.i
The resulting outcome is this:
CCs = {1(10+1)+0(10)-1} -  = 10
SMs = {2(1)+0(10+10)-0} - = 2
UCs = {1(10+1)+-1(10)-1} - = 0
Clearly UCs cannot invade individually. But like the CCs, can they do so in groves?
Below is the situation with ten UCs trying to enter a population of 10 SMs and 10
CCs.
SMs = {2(10)+0(10+10)-0} = 20
CCs = {1(10+10)+0(10)-1} = 19
UCs = {1(10+10)+-1(10)-1} = 9
The invasion of UCs places SMs back on top. This is no good for so long as there
is a significant difference between 19 and 20, this may entice a number of CCs to
switch back to being SMs. We would have a cycle where SMs become the dominant
group, wiping out UCs in the process, at which point it becomes rational for a group
of CCs to reenter the picture. This scenario, if true, reveals an instability of
dispositions. People will change their behaviour patterns between CC and SM,
much in the way Hume figured would happen under differing circumstances.
Danielson's RC may in reality be indecisive CCs at a time in history where SMs and
CCs scores are evenly (or relatively evenly) split.
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      In fact, UCs may do better given the low computation costs of UC238
compared with CC (see ahead to my discussion of computation costs,
chapter 10, section 6).
At the minimal level where CCs start doing better than SMs, no one can
afford to be a UC. Not only that, CCs have reason to prevent UCs from invading
since they do worse (10.8 compared to 11) while SMs benefit (10 rather than 6). At
what point can someone rationally choose a UC disposition over a CC or SM
disposition? We know that if the entire population were CCs, then one might as well
be a UC. A UC will not do worse or better than a CC in a population comprised
solely of CCs and UCs.  What if CCs outnumber SMs 2:1? Let us assume there238
are 20 CCs, 10 SMs, and 1 UC. We would have the following outcome:
CCs = {1(20+10)+0(10)-1} = 29
SMs = {2(10)+0(20+10)-0} = 20
UCs = {1(20+10)+-1(10)-1} = 19
The problem is that UCs do better only so long as there are enough of them. But
the more UCs there are, the better the SM population does as well. 
A lone UC does worse than either an SM or a CC, but he does considerably
better than UCs do in the previous scenario.  It appears UCs do better the more
UCs there are, just as with CCs. The problem, though, is that SMs become the
dominant strategy the more UCs there are. This defeats the purpose of becoming
a CC. CC, then, would need to discourage UCs, and a good way of doing that is by
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      Danielson calls this disposition "Unconditional Cooperator239
Protectors" (UCP), in Danielson, 118.
becoming an RC. This should deplete the UC population, thus diminishing the gains
for SMs, thus depleting the SM population as well.
10.5 KING BREAKERS
Not only can we reduce the rationality of RC by ridding UCs, we could also imagine
a new disposition entering the picture. Let us imagine that someone is bothered by
RC's superiority on the basis of RC's shafting innocent UC. He is so bothered by
this, he considers boycotting games with RC. Otherwise he is a CC at heart, will
cooperate with other cooperators, except those who defect against those who
cooperate with other cooperators. Let us call this disposition "Principled
Cooperators" or PC.  PC will not do as well as the top dog, but his presence,239
especially if there are enough of likeminded PCs, can clearly affect RC. So long as
there are any RCs, PCs and RCs will counteract each other's success. I assume
that PC does not take advantage of RC. RC, we shall imagine, can recognize PC
and fail to cooperate with them. Since, PC and RC counteract each other in this
way, CC will rise to the top niche, ousting Danielson's favourite RC. Assuming there
are as many PCs as RCs (5, in our example) and the remaining numbers are the
same (10 CC, 3 SM, and 2 UC), the following scoring will be this:
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CC = 3(10+5+5+2)+2(3)-3 = 69
RC = 4(2)+3(10+5)+2(3+5)-3 = 66
PC = 3(10+5+2)+2(3+5)-3 = 64
UC = 3(10+5+2)+(1)(3+5)-3 = 56 
SM = 4(2)+2(10+5+5+3)-2 = 52
With the introduction of PC, CC becomes once again the dominant strategy.
Danielson makes a worthwhile objection against this sort of addition, however. Any
superior position given the available population can be targeted by some further
invention. King-breakers, as he calls them, then will be disallowed. For artificial
morality this is a necessary requirement, I think. For our goal of tying game theory
to the real world, however, we have a different restriction: namely what sort of
dispositions are out in the real world. My principle cooperators are problematic for
it does not seem individually rational to be one. The need to implement such an RC
breaker seems to merely enhance some people's suspicions that the rational move
is not necessarily the moral move. That a PC is moral, may not be in question. That
it is rational is. 
But Danielson's restriction on introducing dispositions gives the PC an in.
That is to say, so long as we do not start with CCs, but have PCs invade at the
outset, a PC invasion in a population of SMs is rational. The outcome will be exactly
the same as CCs. UCs can enter into the picture as well (or as badly) as they can
with CCs. But now an invasion of RCs cannot dislodge the current top dog, PC, and
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thus RCs would be disallowed in the game according to Danielson's rule. Taking
our original population and size, and substituting PC for CC, the outcome would be
this:
PC = 3(10+2)+2(3+5)-3 = 49
RC = 4(2)+3(5)+2(3+10)-3 = 46
SM = 4(2)+2(10+5+3)-2 = 42
UC = 3(10+2)+(1)(3+5)-3 = 41 
What this reveals is that PC, not RC or CC, is the dominant rational strategy. Being
that it is also the dominant moral strategy, this is good news for those of us who
wish to show that morality is the rational choice.
I do not think this objection is very telling, mind you. What it reveals is not
that Danielson's RC is not as rationally superior as he makes out, but that it is
rationally superior given the parameters of the opening populations in the game.
We need next wonder whether we should be content with this opening position.
What criteria do we have to evaluate it? Danielson claims only validity, and not
soundness. But how do we extend the analysis to soundness when there appears
to be an infinite number of possible starting points and possible first invaders? A
solution is to evaluate the plausible opening dispositions according to some
measure of verisimilitude. Game theory is not meant to be historically accurate,
however, and so it is difficult to judge precisely what this means. I am content, at
any rate, to begin with the SM disposition. After all, if it is rational to construct a
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      Some may contest that what is evolutionally possible is whatever is240
computationally possible. So long as evolution proceeds through both
survival and random mutation, the RC and PC distributions are possible
at the second entrance level. To rule them out of hand at the second
level entrance stage is to erroneously regard evolutionary processes in
the Lamarkian fashion rather than in the modern Darwinian sense. My
point still stands, I believe, for I focus on probability.
moral society from this starting position, we have shown a lot. But why should we
have CC invade rather than PC? One possible answer is that PC makes no sense
without RC. Otherwise, we could simply have RC invade. So we limit our second
entry to the sole disposition that is minimally designed to do better. CC fits that bill.
UC does not, since although it is a simpler design than CC, it cannot survive in a
population of SMs. So we have two criteria for entrance taken from biology: survival
and simplicity. RC and PC could survive as second entrants, but have
complications that at the second entry stage are unnecessary, and hence
biologically unlikely.  After SM and CC are on the stage, again neither RC nor PC240
will evolve, for RC requires UC in order for it to be rational to develop the further
complication, and PC requires RC for its evolution. But here we seem to run to a
standstill, as noted earlier in this section. UC cannot do as well as CC and thus
should not be allowed to enter the game. And lacking UC, we lack the evolutionary
niche appropriate to RC. We can only allow RC to enter so long as we loosen
slightly our criteria of third level entrants to allow UCs to enter. But once we've
loosened our criteria to this extent, then there can be no objection to bringing in PC.
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Consider the following loose criterion for entrance:
C1: A disposition can successfully invade a
population so long as it does at least as well off as the
poorest members of that population.
The rationale here is that if these members are surviving, however poorly, then so
too can others at their subsistence level. A reasonable complaint against this in
terms of realism may be that although the poorest members of a population are
currently surviving with scarce resources, they may no longer be able to sustain
themselves within a larger population. We shall therefore tighten our loose criterion
for entry to this:
C2: A disposition can successfully invade a
population so long as it does better than the poorest
members of that population.
For us to allow UC into the game, UC must do better than the worst disposition. Can
UCs enter a population of SMs and CCs under this entrance test? If there are 5
CCs, 5 SMs, and 2 UCs, the scoring under conditions of transparency, is CC = 28,
SM = 26, and UC = 23. Since UCs do not fare better than SMs, they could not enter
this population. Is there a population distribution of CCs, SMs and UCs in which
they could enter? Yes. Imagining that there are 10 CCs, 2 SMs and 2 UCs, UC can
score better than SMs. Hence, we know that under certain population conditions,
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      There are other costs as well. Danielson notes costs of exposure.242
Exposing one's intentions, necessary for all but the SM disposition,
runs the risk of not only being then exploited, but also being thrown
questions which will put them in endless loops (see Danielson, 156). But
this is not the computation cost I am concerned with here.
UC does better than SM, and so can be allowed to enter the tournaments. Now RC
storms in.
The point is that only by lowering our standards of entrance can Danielson's
RC enter the game. There is no population arrangement with SMs, CCs, and UCs
where UCs do better than the other dispositions. Lowering our standard of entry,
however, also lets in PC, since PC does better than the lowest disposition in the
pool. Once PC is allowed to invade, this upsets the apple cart of RC. CC becomes
the dominant strategy, not RC.
10.6 COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
Computational costs will differ for the different game strategies. Recall Danielson's
introduction of concocted  scrutiny costs.  This is ambiguous. There are costs of241
making mistakes in one's detecting other disposition types and there are costs of
simple processing.  The first sort of costs come under the rubric of translucency242
costs, already discussed. The second sort of costs are computation costs that
would be incurred even under conditions of transparency. Danielson did not need
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Viminitz has indicated to me that this does not mean that all possible
algorithms for CC and RC will invariably show RC's algorithms to be more
complex than CC's. We can imagine, for example, CC executing exactly
RC's algorithm, and then adding a new algorithm to count any disposition
to cooperate at all as meriting cooperation now. In such a case, however
redundant it is for CC, RC would have less computation than CC.
to make this distinction since he was dealing with a virtual world where computation
is free and fast. People are not so lucky.
UC and SM require no added processing at all, and hence no difference in
scores is to be expected. CC needs to distinguish between cooperators and non-
cooperators, and thus require some computation costs greater than UC or SM. RCs,
meanwhile require further computation than CC. Not only do they need to
distinguish cooperators from non-cooperators, and thus incur the same computation
costs as CC, they also need to distinguish conditional cooperators from
unconditional cooperators. Thus RCs should be expected to suffer the most
computation costs, CC next, and UC and SM none at all.243
We need to decide two things: what the costs are that we should assign and
whether these costs differ according to the different dyads being assessed.
Concerning the first, if we incorporate Danielson's figurings from table 10.1, CC
incurs a computation cost of 0.25, while RC suffers a cost twice that.   One might
object that this cost has already been accounted for by our discussion of
translucency. Translucency costs are incurred from mistaken encounters, and not
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otherwise. Computation costs, on the other hand are to be added for each
encounter, regardless of which disposition one is encountering, and regardless of
correct or mistaken identity. Danielson's explanation for why RC should have a
greater cost than CC is because "RC pays even higher costs than CC, since it must
test agents counter-factually: asking not merely `[would] you cooperate', but `would
you still cooperate were I to defect'?"  This is not the rationale for the greater costs244
incurred by conditions of translucency. Thus we are left to wonder whether
Danielson's scrutiny costs are not my computational costs. This would seem to
follow given that the extra computation involved is because of the requisite scrutiny
needed by CC and RC players. Moreover, as I have argued, my formula for
translucency does not yield the same result as Danielson's scrutiny costs in table
10.1. Nevertheless, I am not convinced Danielson's concoction of scrutiny costs can
be incorporated as our computational costs. For one, Danielson also remarks that
"responsive agents, because they pay costs of exposure and scrutiny, will do
relatively less well as we move from perfectly transparent conditions."  whereas245
my computational costs should be in effect even in conditions of transparency; no
difference in computation costs is to be expected between conditions of
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transparency and translucency or even opacity. Those differences are matters of
the effects of error, not computation. Another problem with assuming the figures in
table 10.1 are computation costs is that we would expect CC and RC to suffer
computation costs in every encounter, not just those with CCs and RCs. This
follows because CC still must distinguish between SM and UC in order to know how
to act in this encounter. SM and UC do not. This is likewise the case with RC. Not
only must RC be able to distinguish SM from any other disposition to avoid being
cheated, RC must also distinguish between CC or RC and UC. And this is the case
whether or not their detection is 100% accurate.
Although we are not yet sure how high these computation costs are, we can
see that it may be deemed too much an effort to be an RC for some people -- even
if after the process they are always right in their detection. The computational
burden may be too great. Especially since the overall score of CC and RC without
incorporating computational costs are not that far apart.
Our problem is assigning some value to these costs. We can assume that
encounters will differ in time constraints. Some games require immediate action,
others not. When time constraints are not a factor, greater computation is available
at relatively little cost. When time is a factor, however, individuals may not be able
to afford the extra computation necessary to be an RC. It is unlikely, given the
variability of time factors in encounters, that computation costs are as high as the
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      It is worse with the original scoring that Danielson uses. If RC246
normally gets 2 points with his encounter with CC, and loses 0.5 points
in the encounter, computation costs are 25% of the profit.
      Where CC normally would earn 3 points, he now earns 2.9 points -- a247
3% computation tax. Instead of RC earning 3 points prior to the
computational costs, he now earns 2.8 points -- a 7% tax.
computation costs Danielson projects in his scrutiny cost table (table 10.1). In our
scoring system, table 10.1 indicates that RC incurs a cost that is 17% of his total
intake with every CC player.  Surely this overstates the case. Let us assume that246
a reasonable cost per encounter for CC is .1, and .2 for each encounter for RC.247
Because these costs are not differential costs, as is the case for the costs of
translucency, we can apply this added cost quite simply.
T  - C (n-1)i  i
where T is the Translucency score for the given disposition, C  is the computationi         i
cost assigned to the given disposition (.1 for CC and .2 for RC and 0 for UC and
SM), and n is the total number of players in the tournament. Our scoring outcome,
then, looks like this:
CC's score = T  - .1(n-1)c
RC's score = T  - .2(n-1)r
UC's score = Tu
SM's score = Ts
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The result, with our standard population of 10 CC, 5 RC, 3 SM and 2 UC,
and assuming conditions of translucency, is the following:
CC's score = 53.6 - .1(19) = 51.7
RC's score = 54.7 - .2(19) = 50.9
UC's score = 41.5
SM's score = 41.3
CC, albeit not by a lot, is revealed to be the dominant strategy. 
I will not stand firm on this quibble. The costs of computation may not be as
large as I make out. I have chosen a small fraction as the cost, but perhaps it is
even less than that. Moreover, some people may be better suited to greater
computation, meaning that computational costs are not the same for everyone.
Perhaps for those more equipped, RC is the dominant strategy. My point is to
complain that we cannot be as confident in the results of game theory as previous
game theoreticians have been.
10.7 CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding this last comment, there is a general trend from game theoretic
approaches to morality that is encouraging: dispositions that approximate morality
also approximate rationality. I temper my conclusion far more than Danielson or
Gauthier do because there are many variables that cannot be accommodated
across the board. Which disposition is most rational depends on which dispositions
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are already in the population; which dispositions are allowed to enter the
population; what the population size is for each disposition in the tournament; what
outcome values we assign for each encounter; whether players are transparent or
translucent, and if they are translucent, to what extent are they accurately readable;
and what particular costs players incur, if anything, for the more complicated
calculations necessary for CC, RC, and my king-breaker PC. We can be confident
in showing validity, as Danielson recognized, but given the enormity of variables in
which we are dealing when we try to tie game-theoretic findings to real world moral
problems, we are much less confident in claiming anything close to soundness.
If there is any one point important to these findings, however, it is to see the
benefit of changing our stripes from straightforward maximization to one or another
form of constrained maximization.
256
PART IV




THE STATE AND PROPERTY
11.1 HOBBES
By far the most well known objection against Hobbes's account of
contractarianism focuses on the inadequacy of an absolute sovereign. That we
must unconditionally submit to the sovereign strikes many not only as
unpalatable but unfounded. 
For Hobbes, one should obey the moral codes of the sovereign because
one will inevitably suffer otherwise. The sovereign did not create the State of
Nature as a threat. It is not a Mafia ethics that Hobbes advocated. Rather,
individual suffering is the natural condition and the sovereign is the solution.
Without the sovereign, one would be left to defend oneself continually against
the threat of men. One immediate problem is that if people are as vicious as
Hobbes makes out, why should the sovereign be any better? In fact, we have
every reason to assume life under the sovereign would be far worse than in the
State of Nature. The sovereign's character would be the same as any man and
his power would be immensely superior. We have, in fact, elected the Thrasy-
machean brute to rule us. It is for this reason that Locke sarcastically remarks
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      John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government, Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986248
[Originally published as Two Treatises of Government, 1690] VII, 93 (53).
      "They that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, and return249
to the confusion of a disunited Multitude, nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to
another Man, or other assembly of men" (Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan, Buffalo, New York:
Prometheus Books, 1988, xviii, 90-91). See also Leviathan, xv (76). Some feel there are
historical-sociological reasons for Hobbes's insistence on the absolute power of a sovereign, rather
than purely philosophical ones. There was, accordingly, endless insurrection during Hobbes's time,
and an absolute sovereign would clearly put a stop to that. See, for example, Jean Hampton
(Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 110).
According to A.E. Taylor, The Leviathan "was written in a time of revolution and unsettlement as a
persuasive for cessation from fruitless civil strife" (A.E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrines of Hobbes," in
Baumrin (ed.) [Originally published in Philosophy, XIII, 1938, 406-424] 36).
that Hobbes evidently conceives men to be so "foolish that they take care to
avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by Pole-cats or foxes, but are content,
nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions."  An obvious answer to this "who-248
guards-the-guards" problem is to show that the ruler needs to rule well lest he is
dethroned violently; but Hobbes presents the case that we abandon all power to
him, and that it would be immoral to contest the ruler in anything. Hobbes is
adamantly against insurrection of any sort.  Another problem with Hobbes's249
belief that we must abandon all power to the sovereign is that it is inconsistent
with the model of human psychology that Hobbes accepts. Survival, for Hobbes,
is above all a duty to oneself. Thus if the sovereign threatens your own life,
retaliation or avoidance seems called for. To claim either retaliation or even
avoidance as being immoral is to abandon, not secure, the link between morality
and individual rationality. As if these two complaints were not enough, a further
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problem Hobbes faces is this: his claim is that people can not get along well
without a sovereign to oversee their conflicts and settle disputes. Nevertheless,
the claim is that we come to recognize the need for this sovereign, and we all
voluntarily decide to give up our "rights." But how can we come to such an
amicable agreement prior to the sovereign's rule? If we can come to agreement
on that issue, then what need do we have of the sovereign for other
agreements? On the other hand, if we require the sovereign to settle all our
disputes and oversee all agreements, we could never get out of the State of
Nature for there is no sovereign yet to oversee the election of the sovereign. As
Hampton remarks, "Hobbes's account of conflict [in the State of Nature] seems
to generate sufficient strife to make the institution of the sovereign necessary,
but too much strife to make that institution possible."250
Locke can solve these problems because he does not envision the people
relinquishing all of their rights to the sovereign. People merely lend their power.
They are able to do this since Locke's conception of the State of Nature is more
amicable than Hobbes's picture.
Part of the reason for Hobbes's insistence on absolute obedience to the
sovereign was his belief that anything less would revert to utter chaos. What sort
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      Kant agreed with Hobbes on this point. "The permissibility of rebellion would "make all lawful251
constitution insecure and produce a state of complete lawlessness" (Immanuel Kant, "On the
Common saying: 'This May be True in Theory, But it does not Apply in Practice'," in Kant's Political
Writings, Hans Reis (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970 [1793], 82).
      Hampton, 103.252
      Hobbes, Leviathan, xviii (91).253
of ruler would there be if the people reserved the right to govern him
themselves?  Hobbes's belief is that a contract between a ruler and the people251
limiting the sovereign's power will require a judge to decide if there was or was
not a breach. The judge can not have absolute power, however, and is thus
subordinate either to the sovereign himself, in which case the sovereign has
absolute power, or someone above the sovereign has power over the judge; but
then this individual is the absolute sovereign. The point is: since the judge
cannot have full power, he must be limited by a greater power. Just as Aquinas
derived a being called God, so Hobbes derives the necessity of an absolute
sovereign. Anything less is "a recipe for war."  This "infinite regress" argument252
works also for the problem of interpreting rules. People, being what they are, will
interpret rules for their own advantage. If interpretation of rules is left up to
individuals, this will be as having no rules at all. A final arbiter is needed if men
wish to successfully escape the State of Nature.  Only an absolute ruler, acting253
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      Hampton makes an even stronger claim against the logic of the Leviathan (Hampton, 206).255
as final arbiter and final judge, can prevent the return to the State of Nature.
Since prevention of the State of Nature, or war, is the sole purpose of erecting a
sovereign, the sovereign must be absolute.
Hobbes's mistake lies in assuming that because we may need a judge to
judge between the sovereign and the people, that the judge has powers supreme
in all respects to the sovereign.  He neglects the possibility that the judge's254
power may be clearly delimited. That Hobbes requires someone with final
authority over all decisions does not necessitate by itself that authority resides in
one individual. If human nature is really such that we need an arbiter for every
interaction, then we can not settle on an arbiter; nor, for that matter, on the
arbiter's decision. If we require arbiters for only certain situations, then there is
no reason to grant that individual power over more than that decision. Hobbes's
argument for the absoluteness of a sovereign does not follow.255
11.2 LOCKE
Given the incoherence of Hobbes's contention that we must abandon all power
to the sovereign, Locke's solution should be a relief to contractarians. It is not,
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      Locke, 2T, XI, 138 (77).256
      Locke, 2T, VI, 54 (32).257
      Locke, 2T, III, 19 (15).258
however, since he succeeds only by abandoning contractarian grounds in the
process. Locke's solution, in brief, is that people do not "surrender" their power
to the sovereign; they lend it. For Locke, a ruler should not have the ability to
interfere in people's lives. For Locke, "the supreme power cannot take from any
man any part of his property without his own consent.... Men have such a right to
the goods...that nobody hath a right to take them."  As people have this256
property by "right," it is unjust to take it away; not merely problematic to do so.
We need to assess why the sovereign for Locke is limited in this way, and
whether we can arrive at the same conclusion through other grounds more
conducive to contractarianism.
Locke is a contractarian in many respects; but not all. As with Hobbes
(and Hume and Rousseau), he believed people were roughly equal in strength
and mental ability.  Also with Hobbes, he believed there was a close connection257
between self-interest and the laws of nature.  But these two starting points take258
Locke in a different direction from Hobbes. Within Locke's State of Nature there
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      An early argument to this effect can be found in Samuel Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and260
Nations, C.H. and W.A. Oldfather (trans.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934 [1688], 170. For a more
recent argument, see Anthony de Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods
Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, 41-42.
will be frequent cooperation and successful commerce.  Rough equality will259
deter widespread violence, not inflame it. Singleton combat will only have a fifty
percent chance of success given the assumption of rough equality. Thus it would
be foolhardy to attack, especially since it would always be prudent to defend.
Defenders have already lost the status quo (peace), so they have every good
reason to fight. Given this, the incentive structure is biased toward defence, not
attack. Thus there should be less violence in the State of Nature than Hobbes
conceived.  Hobbes believed this fact would not deter attackers because260
attackers would tend to band together, thus increasing their chances of success.
This is true, but true only so long as defenders did not band together. And there
is nothing in Hobbes's argument to make us believe the contrary. It is
conceivable, then, under Locke's account of the State of Nature as it should be
in Hobbes, that people can conspire to hand over power to a sovereign to help
settle disputes and set up a police force. The Lockean State of Nature, mind
you, is not so amicable that there is no need for a sovereign. Although
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cooperation can and does exist in the Lockean State of Nature, it is a limited
sort.
[F]or all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the
greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment
of the property he has in this state [the State of Nature] is very
unsafe, very insecure.261
Where Locke differs from Hobbes the most is in Locke's adamant denial
of the need and justness of a sovereign's being absolute. Granting absolute
power to a sovereign will merely create a Thrasymachean brute and this will be
worse for the subjects than the State of Nature. If people are roughly equal in
strength and ability, at least through confederacy, then nothing prevents a gang
of people from banding together and usurping the tyrannical sovereign. This
would seem to follow given Hobbes's characterization of human psychology.
Hobbes could not accept this, for he thought it was an admission of never being
able to escape from the State of Nature. As discussed earlier, Hobbes believed
that the sole alternative to Absolute sovereignty was the State of Nature, since
any constraints on the Sovereign's power would inevitably, and perhaps quickly,
lead to absolute loss of control. This implication does not arise for Locke (nor
should it have for Hobbes). Rather, the very possibility of confederacy against a
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poor sovereign is precisely what will keep the sovereign in check. The "best
fence against Rebellion" is to rule well.  Peace is best served by granting power262
to the sovereign on condition that he rules well. This is assessed by seeing
whether people live in peace or not. The ruler, then, is seen as an agent of the
people,  conscripted through contractual agreements.  This latter part was263    264
found offensive to Hume, since historically sovereignty was assumed merely
through conquest. I shall take that complaint up later. For now, the point is that
given contractarian premises which Hobbes himself endorsed, the sovereign is
argued to be limited in power.
Following Locke so far, we can successfully defend the limited role of the
sovereign on contractarian grounds. It is not thought necessary, let alone
essential, that contractarianism implies anything about absolute sovereignty.
Contractarianism is the claim that people independently will do better in their
pursuit of their good in a stable, peaceful society than in the State of Nature. So
long as this is secured by a limited sovereign, then it is rational for the people to
obey this sovereign so long as it remains in their considered self-interest to do
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      The Sovereign is "carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest" (Hobbes,266
Leviathan, xix, 98).
so. Apart from Hobbes's belief in the Thomistic infinite regress argument, there
is no reason Hobbes himself should have denied this.265
Hobbes believed that it would not be in our interest to dispel even a
tyrannical sovereign for the only alternative would be the State of Nature.
Although Hobbes's State of Nature is more dire than Locke's, it is still hard to
imagine that it would be worse than wholesale genocide, if such was the practice
of one's sovereign. Hobbes happened to think the sovereign would not behave
this way,  but he cannot argue that without also showing that it is in the interest266
of the ruler to rule benevolently. It cannot be in the interest of the ruler to rule
"well" unless there is the possibility of being deposed, one would think. Even
granting Hobbes the scenario that sovereigns will tend to rule well, or at least
that the State of Nature is worse than any state under a sovereign, it does not
follow that the people can not do better if they dispose of him. There is another
option, surely, than a retreat to the State of Nature. The people could elect
another sovereign. Moreover, if he benefits from being a sovereign, he will want
Murray 267
      Hampton makes this point, 247-248.267
to retain that title. If he is aware of the possibility of dethronement, there is
greater chance of his ruling better. And it is because the method of lending
power, as Locke conceived it, rather than bequeathing it, is conducive to good
rule that it would be in the people's interest to advocate it.267
11.3 LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY
Locke's account shows up more fully the workings of "agreement" and "contract"
in contractarian thought. In contrast, absolute obedience to a ruler in the
Hobbesian sense is merely a slave/master relation. Locke's social contract
theory follows more closely the way agreements in commerce operate. So long
as I have an interest in agreeing to specific terms with you, and you have an in
interest in agreeing to the terms with me, then we both have an interest in
abiding by those terms, lest the other pull out. But pulling out of the deal without
extenuating circumstances would be irrational assuming the interests all
participants have in the deal. Bilateral reneging returns the players to the State
of Nature. So far, we can follow Locke's emendation of Hobbesian
contractarianism. The problem begins, I believe, when Locke takes his argument
one step farther and by doing so leaves contractarian grounds.
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      Locke, 2T, II, vi (9).269
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For Locke, absolute power is not only unnecessary to achieve peace, it is
"unjust."  Unlike Hobbes's account, no man in a State of Nature has the liberty268
to harm another.
The State of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges
every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who
will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions....269
There are no contractual grounds for making this claim hold within the State of
Nature. Not surprisingly, the grounding for it is theological. The quote above
continues thus:
...for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and
infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent
into the world by His order and about His business; they are His
property....270
Hobbes, recall, was looking to derive morality from an amoral state. If Locke was
also trying to carry out this pursuit, he cheats by slipping into the State of Nature
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      "An agency-agreement ought to contain provisions against interference...in religious affairs,273
economic transactions, and private activities" (Hampton, 250, my emphasis).
a priori moral codes. The question we need to address is whether we can derive
the Lockean claim-rights that restrict absolute sovereignty on Hobbesian
grounds. We have seen that a limited sovereignty should serve Hobbes's
purpose. And if that serves the purpose, the people have prudential reasons to
not relinquish their liberty any further than the limited restrictions. But to claim
there is no "right" to do so is what a contractarian seems unable to aver.
Before proceeding, let me review the arguments of this chapter. Hobbes's
position on absolute sovereignty is incoherent. What he could consistently
defend, however, is what Hampton calls the "fallback position."  This, in brief, is271
Locke's claim that people do not "surrender" their power to the sovereign; rather
they lend it. For Hobbesians to agree to this rendition, they must give up
Hobbes's "infinite regress" argument. This was the claim that any ruler who is
subject to checks by the people will be no ruler at all.  Even if contractarians272
adopt the "fallback position" (and doing so naturally follows from the Hobbesian
psychological premises), it is not yet clear that they can make the same
libertarian restrictions on the ruler that Locke makes.  For Hobbes, the ruler273
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must have the power to command his subjects in any area of their lives. This is
wrong. People are able to escape the State of Nature without this need for an
absolute sovereign. For Locke, the ruler must be restricted in his range of
power. This too is wrong unless we qualify it by making it merely a prudential
claim. If we can escape the State of Nature with either a limited or an absolute
sovereign, we will quite likely do better, prudentially considered, with a limited
sovereign. Thus we should restrict the sovereign's power. But making the
stronger claim that an absolute sovereign exceeds the bounds of "Rightness" is
beyond the ability of contractarians to stipulate. Locke can not ground his right-
based position on contractarian grounds.
Hampton admits that on the basis of the agency-relation in the fallback
position, there are clear limits as to how far the government can go. The rulers
fear being dethroned if they step on too many toes.  Once we adopt the fallback274
agency-relation position the power of the ruler is considerably constrained. The
ruler has only the power so long as the people choose to obey his punishment
commands.  Nevertheless, Hampton contends, this power is too much.  I do275        276
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not think this follows. Recall, the agency-relation between the sovereign and the
people is such that (1) people can agree on how well the ruler is performing his
task, (2) that it is in the ruler's interest to perform that task well to avoid being
deposed by the people, and (3) that it is in the interests of the people to depose
the ruler if he fails to satisfy the people's desires, which Hobbes thought was
predominantly the securing of peace. Concerning the viability of (3), the State of
Nature is not the only alternative if we dispose of this ruler; another ruler more
conducive to our needs and desires is what we will be looking for. Given this, the
limitations Locke speaks of will in fact be the limitations of which a Hobbesian
fallback ruler and his subjects will be aware. But if both Locke's position and
Hobbes's fallback position amounts to the same sort of limitations on a ruler,
they arrive at these considerations in different ways. In neat, Hobbes by
self-interest solely; Locke by some other route.
11.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE LIMITED STATE
Locke maintains that no ruler has a right to interfere with the people's liberties or
property. The fallback Hobbes says simply that we have no (considered) interest
in interfering with people's liberties. Locke constrains the sovereign on "moral"
grounds; Hobbes on prudential grounds. The question before us, is this: if there
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exists claim-rights against the ruler interfering in the personal lives of the
individuals, where do these claim-rights come from?
There are two options, as far as I can see. They either come from the
agreements made by the people themselves or they exist prior to and
independently of the agreements. If the latter, these Lockean claim-rights
against liberty intervention exist as constraints on the types of covenants that
can legitimately be made. But if the contractarian credo is as I have expressed in
chapter one (namely: that what is rationally agreed upon by all people
concerned is necessarily morally permissible), we see that a constraint on what
counts as rational agreement goes against this contractarian tenet. It would
mean that these claim-rights pre-exist the agreements. They exist in the State of
Nature. For Hobbes, natural relationships are defined by might, not right, so the
notion of "rights" in the State of Nature is inconceivable.
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is
consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and
Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place.277
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If claim-rights pre-exist society, then the ontogeny of morality pre-exists society.
Such a view is decidedly non-contractarian. For contractarians, morality is
explicitly artificial, created by man and for man for the express purpose of social
living.  By contrast, Locke's conception of the ontogeny of morality has a278
theological basis.
"A Hobbist" says Locke, "will not easily admit a great many plain duties of
morality."  These "duties" that Hobbes fails to recognize hold only for those who279
believe in God.  The duty that Lockeans but not Hobbists are under, then, is280
derived simply from God's being our creator.  God owns us from having mixed281
his labour to create us. If I have a property right in x, that entails that I have a
right to do anything I want with x. Having a right to do anything with x, entails a
duty of others to refrain from preventing me from doing anything with x. This duty
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of forbearance holds also for x should x be a person. And since this is the case
with God having property rights in us, we have a duty to perform according to
God's command.  For Hobbes, the explanation for obedience to God is simply282
fear.  We can clearly see, then, that Locke and Hobbes differ on their reasons283
for acquiescing to God's decrees: For Locke there is a moral reason; for Hobbes
it is purely prudential. If we dismiss the notion of God, as Locke did not consider,
then we lose the moral strictures against the invasion of property rights and
individual liberties. The prudential grounds for the duty of toleration that Hobbes
argues for remain unaffected.
For Locke, men have plain duties even in the State of Nature, much in the
way that Butler saw it. There is a moral order already existing in the State of
Nature and this includes the duty to refrain from preemptive war. For Hobbes,
however, man must create a moral order out of the State of Nature. Even if we
have shown, contra Hobbes's express beliefs, that it cannot be rational within
the Hobbesian State of Nature to resort to preemptive violence, this is
nevertheless an appeal to rationality, not duty.  Furthermore, should one have284
Murray 275
Nature for Hobbes as well. I wish to deny this interpretation in the following section.
the ability to join forces to attack a singleton without threat of confederacy on the
part of the defendant, Hobbesian psychology will decree it rational to do so, and
no added strictures of duty, should there be any, can intercede. The task for
Hobbes and contractarians in general is to construct a moral order to get us out
of the State of Nature; for Locke, evidently, it is to discover an already existing
moral order.
Far be it for me to deny that contractarians recognize claim-rights. The
difference between Locke and Hobbes is how they ground these claim-rights. So
far, I have attempted to show that contractarians in general, and Hobbes in
particular, cannot ground claim-rights in the way that Locke does. What needs to
be shown is whether contractarians can ground claim-rights at all, if they wish
their theory to remain plausible. Claim-rights for contractarians are grounded in
the nature of the agency-agreement itself. This, I believe, requires no further
grounding than the fallback position. Claim rights are born from agreements.
They do not exist prior to agreements. But if this is so, there is nothing in
principle wrong with agreements to have one's liberty curtailed. There is no
"ought" to it. Simply, it is unlikely that that is the sort of thing people would agree
to. If so, Locke's and Hobbes's position amounts in practice to the same thing.
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Hobbes speaks abstractly: what is right is what people would rationally consent
to, and this is left open-ended. Locke fills the content in: what people would
rationally consent to is not to have their liberties curtailed (beyond some
minimum, left unspecified for now).
The implications of these two views should not differ. If they do, there is
some reason to mistrust contractarianism. Hampton, however, believes there are
differences. Accordingly, Hobbes's fallback position has a "pragmatic"
advantage over the Lockean one, while Locke's view rectifies the dangerous
"dark" side of the Hobbesian stance.  Supposedly, the "dark" Hobbes view285
allows and even supports the abuse of minorities if that abuse is tolerated by the
convention-producing majority who are unharmed by it or who may benefit from
it.  But if claim-rights come about through the nature of the agreement, then the286
claim-rights against this sort of thing exist because the people themselves
(particularly the convention-producing majority) have decided against it. But if
they decide this, then it is not the case that such abuse would be tolerated by the
majority. Another dark side for Hobbes's fallback position, Hampton presumes, is
that the ruler can take as much advantage as possible over the ruled people.
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This would in fact be "right" if they could get away with it, but morally wrong
under Locke's ethics even if they could get away with it.  But if the rulers could287
get away with it, this implies the people are either not aware of it or do not care
about it that much. Even if Locke is correct in pointing out a "moral" grievance,
so long as Hobbesian psychology is correct, there would be little motivating
force behind Locke's moral condemnation. If there were such force behind his
moral outcry, that would only be so on the basis that the people have noticed the
infraction and care about it -- but this is what is denied in Hampton's scenario.
Thus, although Hobbesian or contractarian claim-rights come about through
artifice and Lockean claim-rights through natural, religious, or other a priori
means, the implications of the differing ontogeny should not differ in practice.
Many have recognized that Locke provides the moral content we want,
but if we accept a contractarian basis of morality, we can not quite get these
results. As David Gauthier, remarks, "modern moral philosophers want to begin
with the [Hobbesian] conception of man as an individual appropriator and derive
a Lockean, strongly overriding morality within the framework of Hobbist
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secularism and autonomy,"  but that "such a morality is not to be found."  If288          289
Hobbes is correct, then it is true that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with a
sovereign's curtailing the people's liberty in order to procure some desired good
of the people whose liberty is curtailed. If it is not conceived to be a benefit, the
ruler runs the risk of being ousted. The desired good achieved needs to be of
more value to the individuals than the loss to their liberty. It may be the case
that, in fact, any move that curtails one's liberty will not procure one's desired
good. But this seems unlikely. Weaker, it may be the case that there will often
enough be an alternative method of achieving that good without similar loss of
liberty. Libertarians argue so. But even if it is so, this is a contingent matter; and
it does nothing to criticize the in principle claim that violations of liberty may be
morally permissible under a contractarian defence of ethics. And if this is true,
then even though in practice contractarianism and libertarianism will appear
similar, Lockean libertarianism can not be a necessary outcome of
contractarianism. Libertarianism, after Locke, specifies what the content of a
rational agreement will look like between the state and the people, and this will
tend to be, according to libertarians, privatization. Contractarians, on the other
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hand, whether agreeing with the libertarian applied ethics or not, are committed
to leaving the content of any agreement unspecified. Whatever the agreement is,
that is necessarily morally permissible. Should this be agreement for an absolute
sovereign, or an agreement between the people and state to run an egalitarian
regime, then this state is morally permissible; whether or not a different system
would be better for them in fact. Contractarianism is open-ended. It is
necessarily so due to the open-endedness of individual self-interest. 
11.5 THE SCHISM
In this chapter we recognized a rift between Hobbesian and Lockean ethics
concerning a restriction on the state's or sovereign's power. Locke believed
there is an a priori moral reason for the state to be limited in power. Hobbes did
not. It is useful to think of this distinction as that between standard-bound and
preference-bound restrictions. The genesis of contractarian theory is to ground
ethics on individual preferences. Contractarianism is committed to being a
preference-based moral theory. As I have argued above, Locke veers from this
strict contractarian grounding when he introduces standard-bound restrictions to
the scope of the state's power. His motive for doing so is clear enough. Life
under an absolute sovereign would be hell. It would still be hell even if it were
slightly better on some scale than life in the State of Nature. Libertarians, in
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particular, follow Locke on seeing the need for restricting the state's power in
order to preserve individual (negative) liberty. Eradicating this situation by
introducing a standard bound restriction on the power of the sovereign, though,
is not permissible for a true contractarian. In order to serve the fundamental
purpose of concerned parties, contractarianism must give rise to a choice-rule
which is preference-dependent and standard-independent. Standard-bound
contractarianism in the manner of Locke is inconsistent with the raison d'etre of
contractarianism: to have social choices made under a rule which selects states
of affairs for how well they are liked (preference-based rule) instead of for what
they are (standard-bound rule).  290
The reader who wishes to remain in the liberal tradition of narrow ethics
and yet avoid subjugation to an absolute sovereign has two options: give up
contractarianism in favour of Lockean libertarianism; or discover a way to remain
true to preference-bound contractarianism and nevertheless avoid the fate of
being devoured by lions as well as foxes. In the following section, I will argue for
the latter option. In short, the distinction between Hobbes and Locke does not
amount to showing that contractarianism is committed to an absolute sovereign
the way Hobbes envisaged it. Contractarianism as a moral theory need not be,
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nor in fact should be, confined to the Hobbesian claim of absolute sovereignty of
the state. And it can do so while remaining wholly preference-based.
11.6 PROPERTY RIGHTS
I have argued above that true contractarian principles forbid a priori restrictions
on the content of agreements. If a content of an agreement is the erection of
state controlled public goods, nothing in the contractarian principles can forbid a
priori restrictions on individual liberty should this help implement public goods.
So long as life under a system of property rights is preferable to a system
without it, we have reason to want the domain of the state's power restricted. It
seems inconceivable that we should allow social choice to rule what I can or
cannot do with my property. Property rights ought to remain inviolable rather
than being subject to public choice.  Property rights, thus, are a good candidate291
for domain restriction. Much of the appeal of libertarianism rests on this
assumption. In fact, all of the liberal ethical theories hold this to a considerable
degree.  Although the benefits of upholding property rights has been292
questioned by non-liberal theories, it is not one that I shall attempt to challenge
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here. Upholding the inviolability of property rights is consistent with non-domain-
restricted, or preference-based, contractarianism.
So long as parties agree to leave property rights in the hands of public
choice, preference-based contractarians are committed to allowing such
property redistribution to occur. And where there is property redistribution, we
may suspect that property rights of individuals are therefore not inviolable. The
state's visible hands taking from one to give to another is apparently abrogating
the property rights of the first. Disallowing state intervention in property rights is
a case of domain restriction. This follows because upholding property rights
would trump the sovereign's will. If contractarianism forbids domain restriction, it
seemingly must acquiesce to the dissolution of property rights. And doing so
severs contractarianism from other liberal ethical theories.
Fortunately for contractarians, this conclusion is inaccurate. It is true that
if the sovereign has utter authority over all jurisdictions, then that must include
the jurisdiction of property rights. Should people complain, Hobbes has merely to
remind them that they themselves voted in the sovereign knowing full well that
part of the sovereign's duties may well be the confiscation of otherwise private
property. We must remember that the Hobbesian sovereign and all that the
sovereign should do has been antecedently agreed upon. Thus, however much
we grumble, it cannot be said that the sovereign seizes our property without our
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consent. Since a key factor of contractarianism is voluntary consent of all parties
concerned, to cite property rights as an example of domain-restriction misses the
mark. In this sense, then, there is indirect consent to the sovereign's
redistribution of property. If it is consensual, even if only in this indirect way, then
it is not technically a violation of property rights, since the having of private
property does not forbid consensual transfer of it. 
Pointing out that the sovereign's running roughshod over your property is
not "technically" a violation of your rights may not be satisfactory, I admit. Once
we have established the Hobbesian or absolute sovereign, there is nothing he
cannot do that we have not in this roundabout way "consented" to, and this
seems to misuse an otherwise viable notion of consent.
Fortunately, contractarianism as it is modernly defended is not committed
to Hobbes's depiction of an absolute sovereign. Inviolable private property may
be defended on preference-based contractarian grounds without appeal to any a
priori standard. So long as people typically care about property rights, this would
be a thing they would prefer to sanctify; property would be what they would
prefer to keep free of the state's hands. The fall-back Hobbes, noted earlier in
this chapter, is a limited sovereign; he has not the authority over all aspects of
individuals' lives, and that includes issues such as property rights. That the
domain must be unrestricted to be true to the contractarian tradition does not
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mean there must be an absolute sovereign that is unrestricted; simply, there is
no a priori standard preventing the people to submit to a system where property
rights are not inviolable. There is no natural right against it. The absolution (or
prevention) of property rights is unlikely to be in the agent's interests. Hence, it
is unlikely to be that to which agents will agree. This is partly an empirical claim.
It also gains support from our understanding of why we have the need to erect
moral institutions in the first place: to preserve individuals' interests in the face of
others trying to preserve their own interests. According to Gauthier, "Systems of
property and government are legitimized in terms of the consent they would
receive from rational persons in a suitably characterized position of free
choice."  This does not preclude someone's being rational who wants to give293
his property away. Part of the definition of property is the owner's right to give it
away if he so desires.
The point is: private property can be defended either by standard-bound
or preference-based ethics, and thus the desire for the preservation of property
rights is not in any obvious way a vote for standard-bound ethics over
preference-bound ones. Preference-based contractarianism holds that it
happens to be in individuals' interests to preserve property rights and to forbid
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on those grounds, at least prima facie, a state's ability to supersede those rights.
Standard-bound ethics defend property rights on grounds independently of those
preferences.
11.7 SUMMARY
The point of this chapter is to accept Locke's modification of the contractarian
position in regards to what Hampton has termed the "fallback position." I have
attempted to argue that, nevertheless, we cannot get quite the results that Locke
asserts from this fallback position. Further implications of this divergence will be
taken up in the following chapter. I will investigate whether contractarians are
committed to a centralized state, even if less than absolute sovereignty, or
whether there is room for a decentralized minimal state within the contractarian
tradition. Specifically, I will examine whether we can get a libertarian manifesto
from occurrent contractarian grounds.
286
Chapter 12
WHY I AM NOT A LIBERTARIAN
Now that we have seen the moral theory of occurrent preference-bound contractar-
ianism, it is well to wonder what its political implications are. Recall the discussion
in chapter eleven. Contractarianism of the Hobbesian brand was committed to state
intervention in all aspects of one's life. This was impalatable for Locke. To rectify
it, Locke left preference-bound contractarian principles in order to justify a more
limited state involvement. Can we arrive at Locke's more liberty-preserving
conclusion through occurrent contractarianism? The answer is Yes. What matters
for occurrent contractarians as much as for libertarians is that our individual
liberties to pursue our individual goods is preserved as much as possible amenable
to others' like liberties being preserved. Recognizing the contingency of one's
liberty preservation on others' like liberties, however, creates a block to the
recognition of full libertarian policies rather than inevitably leads to libertarianism.
Or so I shall attempt to argue here.
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12.1 LIBERTARIANISM AND CONTRACTARIANISM
Libertarianism is against centralized redistribution in general.  Contractarians,294
however, claim that what is moral is, roughly, what people agree to. Hence, for
contractarians, there can be nothing wrong in principle with centralized distribution
of goods, since it is in principle possible that the concerned parties will agree to it.
It is for this reason that libertarianism cannot be founded on contractarianism,
barring notable claims to the contrary.295
It is true, of course, that not all rational concerned parties agree to any
particular redistribution program in today's North American society. Thus, one might
assume occurrent contractarianism is not abrogated by applied libertarian policies.
For occurrent preference-based contractarians, morality serves a purpose,
and that is to better enable individuals with disparate aspirations to attain their
goals peacefully. Morality appeals to individual self-interest and the extent that it
fails this is the extent to which it is no longer motivating. As individuals prosper
within a moral realm as opposed to an amoral realm, it is in each person's
self-interest to live in a moral domain. As the moral domain can not flourish without
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general obedience to the moral dictates of that system, it is indirectly in each
individual's self-interest to obey the moral laws. And this follows even if the dictates
curtail more directly self-serving goals. As the theory is decidedly self-interest
based, there can be nothing intrinsically wrong with the possibility of curtailing one's
liberty in order to procure some desired goal -- so long as it is desired more than
one's liberty.
A libertarian may agree to this in principle, yet point out that, in fact, it will be
in one's self-interest to abide by libertarian, free-market policies. If morality is
founded on self-interest, then what provides more self-interested utility points, or
"utiles," will be morally recommended. As libertarianism claims to offer the most
individual utiles of any extant ethical theory, it contends to be the best ethical
system. If so, libertarianism does follow contractarian grounds. Contractarianism
presents the abstract formula; libertarianism fills in the content with empirical data.
This, I think, is the standard interpretation of how libertarian principles are founded
on contractarian ones. I hope here to demonstrate that it can not be so.
Part of the onus for libertarians is to show that the empirical support for
libertarian policies is well founded. Whether this is so or not I confess ignorance.
It requires specialization that I do not have. One requires the support of other
sciences including economics, psychology, ergonomics, sociology, and perhaps
history. Should these disciplines converge in pointing toward libertarian practices,
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I think we should acquiesce. Whether they do or not, moreover, cannot be resolved
by a few studies. We need also to be versed in statistics and general scientific
method. Although philosophers like to pride themselves for being part of a discipline
that founded most of the sciences, this does not qualify current philosophers as
experts in these offshoot fields. This is beside my main thesis, however. My avowed
ignorance in these applied matters does not affect the theoretical distinction I wish
to make between contractarians and libertarians, for there is a theoretical problem
with the above sketched libertarian response. Contractarians need not adopt
libertarian practices even if the experts unequivocally proved the teleological
benefits of libertarianism.
This may seem surprising. Have I contradicted myself? How can a theory
claim to be interest-based, and yet refuse to adopt a system the consequence of
which is beneficial on self-interested terms? The answer lies in what we have
gleaned from our discussion of self-interest. 
12.2 SELF-INTEREST REVISITED
Occurrent contractarianism is a preference-based ethic. The focus is on occurrent
preferences rather than considered preferences for the reasons outlined in chapters
four and five. Relying on considered preferences to ground ethics is relying on
standards that are independent of the preferences individuals actually hold. To
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claim these standards are the preferences individuals ought to hold is not to ground
ethics in preferences. Our goal of making morality a rational pursuit, where
rationality is individually motivating, determines, I have argued, a stringently
preference-based theory of ethics. This stringent preference-based theory is
occurrent contractarianism. Self-interest, on this model, is rightly to be defined by
an individual's occurrent beliefs and not by anything else. Occurrent beliefs are the
beliefs an individual happens to endorse. Furthering those beliefs or desires or
preferences, whatever they are, will further the individual's self-interest, occurrently
defined. 
Hypothetical contractarianism, recall, or at least realist versions of
hypothetical contractarianism, is concerned with what preferences individuals
occurrently hold as well as with what preferences individuals would likely hold given
specified circumstances and their occurrent beliefs and preferences. Libertarians
claim that given people's occurrent preferences, they would most likely see the
benefit of libertarian policies if given enough time to listen and understand the
libertarian arguments. At first glance, this appears like an empirical claim. If so, we
do not need philosophy to settle the issue. The claim need not be purely empirical,
however. I believe libertarians conceive this claim to be more along the lines of a
simple deduction: you want x (a variable to be filled in by the subject, and hence
motivating to the requisite degree) and you can get more of x under this system,
Murray 291
since it permits you the utmost liberty to pursue your own goals and preferences.
As put, what self-serving individual would not want to adopt libertarian policies? If
it is true that whatever our goals are, these are more likely to be fulfilled under
libertarian systems than any other, we would have to be irrational not to buy into
libertarianism. It is more probable, surely, that there is a flaw in libertarian theory
than that we are all irrational. One possible reason is because the variable x is
often a different sort of commodity than material possessions. Security, for example,
may be better purchased under a more egalitarian scheme than a libertarian one.
At any rate, so long as people think that, and act on it, occurrent contractarians are
not in a position to countermand that preference, however illguided it may be.
Security is a commodity that can be purchased along with anything else,
libertarians are careful to remind us. Privatized insurance agencies will have a
market if people are willing to spend money on security, and thus security, too, can
be bought -- and quite likely at a cheaper rate than through systems of centralized
redistribution. As I have already mentioned above, my goal here is not to decide
whether this is empirically true. Our question is simply this: What if it is not
convincing? What if people prefer that some decisions are made for them through
a central organization. Even if it is more expensive in the long run, it is not
inconsistent that people may nevertheless prefer to pay the price, not merely for the
extra security, but also because of its ease. The hassle and the extra time in
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searching out a better bargain may often not be worth the investment. In virtual
reality, computers may have the expertise and time to survey and pick what always
maximizes their programmed preferences. In the real world, however, we have often
not the brains, nor the resources, nor the time, nor the energy, to maximize our
every preference. So long as we can satisfy our preferences, however, we can be
content. In fact, given our constraints, preference satisfaction, rather than
preference maximization may well be the more rational method. My point here is
that even if it is true that libertarians can tell us how to maximize our preferences,
we may rationally decline given that our situation often lends itself to satisfying our
preferences instead. Where people are willing to satisfy their preferences, by
granting certain overarching functions to state legislation, say, we know that
occurrent contractarians will of course not intercede. What are libertarians willing
to do? If they agree with occurrent contractarians that voluntary contributions to
permit centralized state control over certain social goods, there is then no
fundamental difference between the two theories, and since libertarianism is
supposed to be built on the foundation of contractarianism, it is a redundant theory,
all its talk of negative rights notwithstanding. On the other hand, they may insist that
the agreement is irrational in this case, and thus not to be considered binding. If so,
libertarianism is opposed to contractarianism, and thus can hardly be claimed to be
rooted in contractarianism. Occurrent contractarians are committed to not shoving
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down anyone's throat what is not in their occurrently defined self-interest.
Libertarianism, on the other hand, evidently must go beyond occurrent preferences
in order to have people accommodate a libertarian schema -- even though what the
libertarian schema professes is the liberty to pursue one's own occurrent
preferences.
12.3 PARETIANISM
Libertarianism may be said to be founded on contractarian grounds with the
assistance of adopting the Pareto principle. The Pareto principle claims that should
any state improve at least one individual and not harm another it is to be preferred.
Paretianism and egalitarianism are incompatible theses since paretianism permits
inequality and egalitarianism does not. Imagine two states, S  and S , comprised of1  2
ten individuals each. In S , everyone has $10. In S , everyone has different1      2
amounts, although the poorest member (still) has $10. Moreover, in S there is an2 
increment of $10 between each citizen. The richest has $100. Due to the inequality
in S , egalitarians would prefer S  (with a mean of $10) to S  (with a mean of $55).2     1       2
Followers of Pareto, on the other hand, would prefer S  over S  since a mean of $552  1
is clearly superior to a mean of $10 and no one is worse off strictly speaking in S2
compared to S  (i.e., S  is pareto superior over S ). As it is the case that S  is clearly1  2     1        2
more beneficial to 90% of the population over S , and S  is also endorsed by1   2
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paretianism, it would appear that the logic of paretianism is preference-based.
Partly for this reason, paretianism is endorsed wholeheartedly by libertarians.
 Where changes are being considered between different social and political
structures, paretianism runs counter to occurrent contractarianism. I do not mean
that contractarians would necessarily prefer S  to S  in the above scenario. One can1  2
dispense with paretianism without being an egalitarian, and this is what I intend to
do. 
The emphasis on human psychology in ethics is an important facet of much
of recent ethical thought. Owen Flanagan has termed this reliance on psychology,
"psychological realism."  Contractarianism is much indebted to this notion of296
psychological realism. Hobbes was very specific about the sorts of people we are,
and was determined to build an ethical system given the groundwork of human
psychology. The very goal of making ethics appeal to self-interested people is
committed to being as accurate as possible about what sorts of people we are. If
we abide by psychological realism in other cases, we must abide by it in all cases
if we wish to be consistent. Among the general characteristics humans have been
discovered to possess, one in particular is going to make paretianism difficult to
sustain; and that is "relative deprivation." Relative deprivation is a psychological
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      I prefer the convention of using S  over a third state S , because298 2 3*
S  may give the unwanted implication that there is yet another choice to3
be made, i.e., S .2
state that people sometimes suffer for being made to appear less well off by the
greater advantage of another.  Paretianism claims that so long as at least one297
person is better off in S  than S  and no one is worse off, S  should be adopted over2  1       2
S . In S , recall, everyone has exactly $10. Imagine a new state S .  In S , we shall1   1           2   2
* 298  *
imagine that only one person has more than $10. Let's say, he has $50, and
everyone else still has $10. If relative deprivation is a psychological fact for a
significant number of people, it cannot be the case that S  will be preferred to S  by2      1
*
anyone other than the benefiting party. And should we adopt a theory that makes
it our duty to prefer S  to S , we have left a preference-based ethic in favour of a2   1
*
standard-based ethic. Libertarians, in endorsing paretianism at the level of social
and political structural changes, override preferences, at least those preferences
affected by relative deprivation.
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Let me be clear, for in one sense what I have said above is false. If S  is the1
present society, and S  is exactly the identical present society with the one2
*
exception that Jones is $40 richer through voluntary transaction with Smith, the
other members of society must indeed accept the pareto improvement. They have
no right to complain. That they feel they should have the money rather than Jones
cannot count as sufficient justification, as put, to prevent Jones's prosperity. Their
complaints, if any, are empty. That they must acquiesce to Jones's riches does not
mean they need to do anything. It is a negative demand. They must not interfere
with the voluntary transaction between Smith and Jones. At the level of free market
transaction, paretianism is wholly endorsed by occurrent contractarianism. In fact,
paretianism at this level is a condition of contractarianism. Recall in chapter one
that although the existence of negative externalities suffices to halt or alter
agreements, meddling by busy bodies outside the circle of relevance cannot affect
the legitimacy of voluntary, uncoerced agreements between concerned parties.
Where paretianism is peculiar to an occurrent preference model is at the
level of societal and political structural changes. If S  is the present political1
structure, and S  is a pareto superior but completely different political structure,2
then I resist the claim that people must accept S . Even if S  is pareto superior, I2    2
may not wish to undergo the necessary changes to help bring it about. And this is
still the case even when the costs to me to change from S  to S  are outweighed by1  2
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the benefits assumed under the conditions of pareto superiority. In other words, if
the shift from S  to S  demands positive action on my part (for example abiding by1  2
the different terms of the new political structure) and especially where I receive no
net benefit (albeit I suffer no loss either given the assumption of pareto superiority),
then occurrent contractarians cannot accept the mandate of paretianism. On the
other hand, if no action is required by me save my non-interference, pareto
improvements indeed must be endorsed. Changes within the free market do not
demand positive actions from those outside the agreements. Changes of political
structures do.
Some may contest that it is not so much one's duty to adopt any pareto
superior state; simply it is rational to do so. If a change from S  to S  is indeed1  2
pareto superior, then surely rationality cannot object to the change. If this is so,
then relative deprivation is an irrational psychological state and should not be
counted as one's proper preference. But then preferences and rationality part ways
and we need to decide whether ethics should be sensitive to rationality, strictly
defined, or preferences. I have already argued for why I believe we should adopt
a preference-based ethic, rather than a standard-bound one, as would be the case
for a rational ethical model that ignores certain occurrent preferences. We do not
run this danger here. In point of fact, what is irrational is preferring S  over S , not2   1
*
the reverse. If I am neither better nor worse off in S  or S , I, of course, should be1  2
*
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indifferent. That is to say, I should be indifferent if we assume non-tuism in our
quest to ground ethics on non-moral assumptions. Accepting the premise that
people are non-tuistic is not meant as a psychological claim. Its purpose is to rule
out the assumption that people will cooperate when it is less than rational for them
to do so simply because they have some affection for others' well-being. Natural
affections for others is what cannot be counted on. By ruling out the influence of
others' bargaining by affective feelings, one is forced to interact with others on a
strictly rational level. People are motivated to prosper for themselves. When
changes do not involve improvement over an individual's status quo (as is the case
for nine tenths of the subjects in our scenario), there is no motivation to choose that
situation. We are dealing with individuals motivated by their own individualistic
occurrent preferences. If rationality cannot decide between protecting my finger
from a paper cut to the extermination of the planet, there is also going to be nothing
inherently rational in my preferring S to S .2   1
* 
One might argue that choosing the pareto superior state may still be a
rational act even if I, personally, am indifferent between the two states. Since I am
indifferent, I can rationally delegate my choice selection to the person who cares,
i.e., the lone individual who actually prospers under S . For ease, let us imagine it2
*
is you. As you prefer S  to S , S  gets chosen, and this should be fine for me. In this1  2  1
*
case, I prefer what you prefer. That I may rationally do this, however, does not
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       See, for example, Robert Frank's discussion of the social299
implications of relative deprivation in Choosing the Right Pond: Human
Behaviour and the Quest for Status, New York: Oxford University Press,
1985, eg. 5-7.
mean that the uniquely rational thing for me to do is to delegate my preference to
you. And so long as I am affected by relative deprivation, it may not even be a
rational choice. If I am indifferent between S  and S , this should mean I lose1  2
*
nothing in the change from S  and S . But it is not necessarily true that I lose1  2
*
nothing. Perhaps you're preferring S  over S  will actually affect my indifference. If2   1
*
I am concerned with relative standing, for example, then you're preferring S  over2
*
S  may itself tip the scales toward my preferring S .1         1
Egalitarian doctrines jump on the relative deprivation bandwagon to claim
that therefore, we should not allow others to have more than anyone else, at least
within an undefined range.  I believe this goes too far. Imagined suffering from299
relative deprivation is a petty emotion and should not be sufficient to halt beneficial
social change any more than pent up violence should be allowed free reign simply
because it is a psychological fact. I think this response is absolutely correct, but we
should be wary of its limitations. What the response does not do is support
paretianism. What it shows is a reason to allow people a liberal degree of free
reign. If Barney beside me gets $10,000 more than me, I may feel disappointed in
comparison. But my disappointment is irrelevant. Barney's fortune has nothing to
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      Of course it may be the case that Joe's prosperity has a lot to do300
with me. Perhaps he robbed me. Then, my concern does matter. In the
discussion above, this is not the situation we are considering.
do with me (we assume for argument's sake ). Barney does not need my vote on300
whether he gets an extra $10,000 (unless he gets it from me, which is unlikely).
Asking for my vote is precisely what paretianism asks. Barney may contest: "What
the hell does he have to do with this? He, being a psychological being, will probably
resent it. But his resentment is out of line. He is not one of the concerned parties
in the contracts that I have made to earn this extra $10,000, and since
contractarianism requires only the votes of those party to the agreement, whether
he feels relatively deprived as a result of my good fortune is inconsequential."
Barney's response is absolutely right. It shows that contractarianism permits
inequalities. It also shows that paretianism is an unnecessary appendage to, if not
downright antithetical to, contractarianism. Let me explain.
People will prefer that others are not better off than themselves, or at least
there are enough psychological studies pointing to this rather dour fact, and so the
paretian claim that people should prefer S  to S  is psychologically false. It is2   1
*
irrelevant, however, whether they prefer S  to S  or S  to S . All that matters is2   1  1  2
*      *
whether they are one of the concerned contracting parties. If not, their feelings of
deprivation are inconsequential to social theory.
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If they are part of the contract, their feelings of relative deprivation may get
in the way of real benefits, and the individuals themselves have to accommodate
that in their appraisal of any contracts. Robert Frank argues that the importance of
relative standing is itself a commodity -- bought and sold as with everything else.301
Thus, we may assume, a pareto superior position will be chosen by those who do
not benefit by the change only so long as they are compensated by the one(s) who
do benefit. Frank is partly right about this, but it is obscured by the fact that he
makes it sound as though what is required is a social compensation program run
through a centralized distribution office. Simply, if Jones wants to make a deal with
Smith in order to reap an extra $10,000, Smith is not likely to be merely indifferent
about it if Jones's proposal leaves Smith at the status quo. Smith will likely want
something in return. Jones cannot be blind to that in his proposal. If Jones requires
some action from Smith in order to reap his fortune, he will need to make it worth
Smith's while to help him. Jones's telling Smith about paretianism, alone, is unlikely
to do the trick.
Just as Smith will unlikely be convinced by paretianism, so too contractarians




Standard-based contractarianism appears to be inconsistent with what we know as
libertarian policies. For example, libertarianism wishes to claim that suicide is
permissible so long as no harm to others is committed, and the act is uncoerced.
This is in line with occurrent contractarianism, but not standard-based or
considered contractarianism. Basing libertarianism on occurrent preferences,
however, meets with the following difficulties. In our present society, people
generally agree with taxation. People in general do not wish to abandon social
security and health care and building regulations and public education and public
road systems. That libertarianism nevertheless advocates the benefits of
abandoning centralized programming can not be a moral matter, then, so long as
the libertarian foundation is occurrent contractarianism. It is, instead, a matter for
economists and political scientists. It would not be even a philosophical issue as far
as I can tell. On occurrent contractarian grounds, whatever is agreed to is morally
permissible. Thus, so long as libertarianism is based on occurrent preferences,
libertarians cannot recommend our abandoning certain agreed upon policies on the
grounds of its being immoral. That is to say, they can recommend libertarian
policies, but not on moral grounds. Claiming that taxation is theft on these lines
would be merely a rhetorical device. Theft is immoral but taxation is not so long as
the individual members of a society do happen to agree in principle with it.
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However many do agree in principle with taxation, there may well be a
number who do not. Taxing these people countermands their occurrent
preferences. The libertarian claim that tax is theft is true for these people and it
would appear that occurrent contractarians are committed to agree. A plan to
exclude these conscientious tax evaders from the costs as well as from the benefits
(if any) of taxation introduces free-rider problems. If the roads are paid through tax
money, how can we detect and prevent non-tax-payers from using the roads? The
libertarian answer is to simply do away with taxation on the whole and privatize
roads and education and health-care and what-not. Under privatization, only those
who benefit pay, and only those who pay benefit.
Quite often it is only poor imagination that prevents people from seeing how
cost-efficient privatized goods can be offered. Nevertheless, the libertarian scheme
has been built around the minority. What if, we ask, the majority prefer a centralized
distribution system of goods such as education, health care, roads, and the like.
Arguing which system is most cost-effective is beside the point for an occurrent-
based ethic. Rather, we must see which system, if any, violates the occurrent
contractarian model of morality. Libertarians argue that the centralized distribution
system violates the preferences of the minority who wish not to be taxed. Does the
libertarian schema violate the occurrent interests of those who agree in principle
with centralized distribution of goods? Moving from a taxation system to a
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conservatism. If the present structure was a libertarian system,
occurrent contractarians would be reluctant to move to a centralized
state system. Occurrent contractarianism places the onus on the
reformers to show that either there is no real agreement or that
negative externalities exist under the present system before occurrent
contractarians can advocate changing from one political structure to
another.
libertarian system, even if the move is pareto superior, cannot be demanded of
individuals unless harms are committed in the present system that can be avoided
under the new system. So long as there are some who prefer life under a
centralized distribution structure than one under a libertarian privatized structure,
then occurrent contractarianism cannot advocate the move.302
What we may well disagree with is the use our tax money is put to. I may
agree to a number of things, but not necessarily to all uses. Since taxation is forced
and yet some of that money is distributed in ways counter to my interests, at least
part of taxation violates the contractarian principles of morality and justice. Granted,
but what of the rest of the taxation money? That we can disagree with how some of
our tax money is being spent is not to disagree with taxation in general. And the
point where local dissatisfaction degenerates to wholesale dissatisfaction with
taxation and centralized distribution is where libertarianism leaves occurrent
grounds.
One could allude to the fact that we generally have no choice in paying our
taxes, or how that tax money is to be spent, to disabuse ourselves form the view
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that forceful taxation meets the requirements of mutual consent under occurrent
contractarianism. This ignores our having established the legitimacy of commitment
under an occurrent preference model.  It is not a violation of Ulysses's occurrent303
preferences to refuse to untie him from the mast as he pleads for release sailing
past the sirens because he made public his overriding occurrent preference not to
be unbound. Most goals have costs. We are not likely to prefer to pay these costs
all by themselves, but some of them we tolerate in order to satisfy our goal. Morality
as an institution is like this. We give up some of our predatory actions in order not
to be the prey of others. Political structures are no exception to this rule. We
willingly make some sacrifices for what we assume to be a larger benefit. That we
gripe during the time of the sacrifice, while we pay our taxes, is not to say we
therefore have not consented to this, any more than ignoring Ulysses's gripes
indicates his crew is violating his occurrent preferences.
There is a serious worry, of course. To what extent have we agreed to suffer
for the benefits of a political structure? Certainly we have rights to complain we are
paying too much, or that we are receiving the wrong sort of compensation, or are
receiving too little benefit for the cost. Libertarians are wise to alert us to these
dangers. One need not be a libertarian to make these remarks, however. We can
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criticize the internal workings of the government without abandoning the whole
structure.
12.5 STANDARD-BASED LIBERTARIANISM
What the above reveals is that libertarianism at its full theory can not be based on
occurrent contractarianism and be consistent, where its "full theory" advocates a
fully privatized state. It is in our occurrent interest to disallow a Hobbesian absolute
sovereign, but there is much room on the continuum between that Leviathan and
a Nozickean minimal state. There is a possibility that libertarianism is based on
considered contractarianism, however. Under a considered contractarian rubric,
there need not be such a reliance on what people actually have or would consent
to given their occurrent preference structures. Rather, what is in the people's
interests is determined on the basis of external principles. Moreover, there is
something quite plausible in this supposition. If moral permissibility is not based on
what preferences and agreements people happen to have or make, but on those
preferences and agreements people should have made, if they were right thinking
and suitably placed, this will allow the claim that libertarianism is the necessary
outcome of a moral theory. That people in fact individually prosper under a
libertarian system, whether they know this or not, will be grounds to institute a
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libertarian order, since what is morally permissible is what furthers individual
interests at least hypothetically defined. 
As argued in chapter four, standard based contractarianism is the wrong sort
of contractarianism. In brief, it ignores preferences in favour of antecedently held
(and in this case highly contentious) standards of excellence. There is another
problem, however, with basing libertarianism on standard-bound contractarianism
that is independent of its being merely the wrong sort of contractarianism.
Libertarians are inconsistent on their grounding of contractarian principles.
Although they require considered or standard-based contractarianism in order to
wish to adopt libertarianism when the occurrent preferences of the people see the
benefits of non-libertarian doctrines, libertarians must also appeal to occurrent
contractarianism. Standard-bound and occurrent contractarianism are incompatible,
however.
It is important to understand that contractarianism restricted by considered
preferences (we'll call this "considered contractarianism" for short) and occurrent
contractarianism cannot be held at the same time. The implications of the two views
differ. Take, for example, mass suicide. So long as all members voluntarily consent
to kill themselves (i.e., there was no hypnosis, brain-washing, coercion, blackmail,
and the like), occurrent contractarians can find nothing immoral about it. Given that
this is their uncoerced preference, and their actions are more important to them
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than the adverse effects these actions have on others, it would be morally
permissible. And this is so even when it does not seem to be in their best interest
from a god's eye-view. We may believe that almost any other decision would be
better for them than suicide. I am not thinking of mercy killing. Perhaps the group
believes the only way to save the world is through mass suicide on March 11, at
4:00 p.m. Or perhaps they believe mass suicide will give them immortality. We are
free to scoff at their belief system. We think it would be more in their self-interest
to be disabused of such crack-pot ideas. The point is, whatever their occurrent
preferences, mass suicide is not their true self-interest, and for this reason
considered contractarians have grounds to interfere. For we imagine that if they
stood back and saw the state of affairs the way we see it, i.e., had they "considered"
their preferences with a more objective perspective, they would see the
ludicrousness of their plan. There are no such grounds for occurrent contractarians.
Occurrent contractarianism, recall, makes no distinction between "considered" and
"unconsidered" preferences, so long as these are identifiably the preferences the
actors actually hold. To speculate on what would be their "considered" preferences
is akin to the unrealistic or preference-insensitive versions of hypothetical
contractarianism. We would be asking them to place themselves in a situation that
is counter to their present state.
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Hypothetical contractarianism legitimately adheres to occurrent preferences
when we are considering the likely reactions of others to our behaviour. We must
speculate on their likely preferences, for their occurrent preferences presumably
have not taken into account our actions as of yet, and so do not count for that
reason. Speculating on whether someone is acting under considered preferences
or not is a different matter. Here, we know what their occurrent preferences are. In
our example, it is to commit suicide en masse. This is their preference, and we are
wondering whether we should interfere or not. To intercede on the grounds that if
they were more like us, they would want to be stopped is to ignore their occurrent
preferences in favour of the preferences we imagine we would have if we were in
their same situation. Not only does this foist our beliefs on them, but it is also
logically misguided. For if we were in their same situation, then it would be more
likely that our occurrent preferences would be the same as theirs, and not as ours
are presently in a counter-situation.
The purpose of this example is to illustrate that moral answers will differ
depending on whether one is an occurrent contractarian or a considered
contractarian. We need not agree on which is better to recognize that to adopt both
is contradictory. Mass suicide would be at the same time both moral (on occurrent
grounds) and immoral (on considered grounds), and any theory that tries to say
both is therefore no theory at all.
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If it can be shown that libertarianism relies indiscriminately on both occurrent
and considered versions of contractarianism, we can deny the link between con-
tractarianism and libertarianism. My short claim here is that libertarianism does rely
on both versions. 
Although libertarianism must be grounded on a standard-based contract, at
least as far as encouraging others to alter their occurrent preferences to go along
with libertarian policies, they explicitly admit that only occurrent preferences matter.
The following sort of libertarian remark is clearly an occurrent contractarian credo:
"So what if Scrooge doesn't want to give to charity; that's his choice." There is
certainly nothing here that asks, "yes, but what is really in Scrooge's interests?"
Butler, who also advocates that people should do whatever is in their true
self-interest, is not typically thought to be a chancellor of libertarianism.
Let me summarize my main points up to now. Libertarianism can not be
based solely on occurrent contractarianism. For, if so, the fact that people do agree
in principle with taxation would show that there can be no claim that taxation is
immoral. There can be no moral grounds for moving from our present political
structure to a libertarian one. But neither can libertarianism be based solely on
standard-based contractarianism. Standard-based contractarians will agree that the
morally permissible political structure is what right-minded people, suitably placed,
would consent to. And it may well be a matter for academicians to decide what that
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is. Should it turn out to be libertarianism, then there is, seemingly, a grounding for
libertarianism on standard-based contractarianism. This line of argument fails,
however, for it cannot account for allowing Scrooge to do whatever he likes even
if it is not in his best interest, coolly considered. It can not account for the
permissibility of suicide. It can not account for the reliance on individual liberty to
let people decide their own interests and goals, however stupid they may appear
to others. It abandons, in fact, the very notion upon which contractarianism is based
and to which libertarianism explicitly appeals.
Given these considerations, it appears that libertarianism requires both
standard-based and occurrent forms of contractarianism, and that libertarians
indiscriminately vacillate between the two. This is not a good foundation if the two
interpretations of contractarianism are incompatible, as I have argued.
A libertarian objection at this point may be to insist that standard-based and
occurrent contractarianism are not, at least necessarily, incompatible in the way
that I claim. It is not inconceivable that what would be in the best interest of the
people is to let people decide for themselves. That they decide for themselves
shows the occurrent contractarian basis, and that this is the best political scenario
shows it is wholly compatible with a standard-based contractarian basis. Simply put,
what people would rationally agree to if suitably placed is a system that would allow
people to pursue their occurrent interests. As nothing is inconsistent in imagining
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this, libertarians do very well, thank you, in straddling the two contractarian
interpretations. Thus, my complaint that libertarians are inconsistent in their
theoretical support is mistaken. Or so this line of objection would assert.
I do not believe so. This neat mix of standard-based and occurrent
contractarianism, as put, amounts to simply showing the merits of occurrent
contractarianism. The claim here is that by allowing Scrooge to do whatever he
pleases will likely yield consent from Scrooge. His assent is not based on any
standard concerning what he would consent to if suitably placed. It is, rather, a
tautology. People will consent to do what they want to do since, by definition, they
want to do it. There is no reliance on the standard-based model. There is no
provision that we will disallow Scrooge's miserliness on the grounds that if he were
right thinking he would be more generous. Likewise, there is no provision that
forbids Mother Theresa's excessive altruism. Nor is there any provision for
criticizing the rest of us who acquiesce to taxation, however begrudgingly. That we
would agree to live in a system that would honour our agreements is simply to point
out the viability of occurrent contractarianism. Standard-based contractarianism is
inconsistent with this. To ask whether people would agree with a system that would
decide for them what counts as being in their interest is not likely to get actual
consent. We cannot move to the legitimacy of standard-based contractarianism
without the occurrent consent to do so. Interestingly enough, this is precisely the
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form of argument that libertarians have raised against Rawls.  However plausible304
it is to choose egalitarian systems once we are behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls
forgets that the bulk of us have little occurrent incentive to willingly step behind this
veil. 
12.6 SUMMARY
Good consequences are defined by the individuals themselves on contractarian
grounds. The consequentialist aspect of contractarianism, then, does not mean that
contractarians will necessarily adopt whatever political system leads to the best,
objectively defined, results. Given this, it is beside the point for libertarians to tell
us what those best results are -- at least, if their intent is to show that libertarianism
is grounded on contractarianism. It is another matter altogether whether they want
to educate us to seeing the light. This is certainly permissible, if not commendable.
My point here, and throughout, is that there is simply no clear link between the two
theories, save some overlap in policy endorsement.
What counts as good consequences is not determined by some philosopher
or economist in his hermetically sealed tower. It is decided by the individuals
themselves. Besides the large claim that libertarianism is a better system (as if that
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were not enough), for contractarians to adopt libertarian policies, it must also be
shown that the people involved believe it to be to their advantage. The people
involved, and that means society at large, must agree. Otherwise, it is not
conceived to be in their benefit -- whether or not it is in fact. And this is the problem
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